ANMERKUNGEN ZU KARL JASPERS »PSYCHOLOGIE DER WELTANSCHAUUNGEN« Das eingangs kundzugebende Zugeständnis, daß eine »angemessene« Richtung für eine positiv auf ...

Should philosophers of science be paying attention to developments in "nanoscience"? Undoubtedly, it is too early to tell for sure. The goal of this paper is to take a preliminary look. In particular, I look at the use of computational models in the study of nano-sized solid-state materials. What I find is that there are features of these models that appear on their face to be at odds with some basic philosophical intuitions about the relationships between different theories and between (...) theories and their models. My conclusion is that developments in nanoscience are not an unlikely place for novel insights in the philosophy of science to emerge. (shrink)

Contrary to the claim that measurement standards are absolutely accurate by definition, I argue that unit definitions do not completely fix the referents of unit terms. Instead, idealized models play a crucial semantic role in coordinating the theoretical definition of a unit with its multiple concrete realizations. The accuracy of realizations is evaluated by comparing them to each other in light of their respective models. The epistemic credentials of this method are examined and illustrated through an analysis of the contemporary (...) standardization of time. I distinguish among five senses of ‘measurement accuracy’ and clarify how idealizations enable the assessment of accuracy in each sense. (shrink)

Die Schrift bringt den Text einer Vorlesung, die im Wintersemester 1935/36 unter dem Titel »Grundfragen der Metaphysik« an der Universität Freiburg/Br. gehalten wurde. Sie ist zu einem wesentlichen Teil Auslegung der Lehre Kants vom 'System aller Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes' in der »Kritik der reinen Vernunft« und führt fort, was in der Abhandlung »Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik« (1929) begonnen wurde.