The displacement of the idea that facts and evidence matter by the idea that everything boils down to subjective interests and perspectives is -- second only to American political campaigns -- the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time.

A source of much difficulty and confusion in the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a naive realism about operators. By this we refer to various ways of taking too seriously the notion of operator-as-observable, and in particular to the all too casual talk about measuring operators that occurs when the subject is quantum mechanics. Without a specification of what should be meant by measuring a quantum observable, such an expression can have no clear meaning. A definite specification is provided by (...) Bohmian mechanics, a theory that emerges from Schrödinger's equation for a system of particles when we merely insist that particles means particles. Bohmian mechanics clarifies the status and the role of operators as observables in quantum mechanics by providing the operational details absent from standard quantum mechanics. It thereby allows us to readily dismiss all the radical claims traditionally enveloping the transition from the classical to the quantum realm — for example, that we must abandon classical logic or classical probability. The moral is rather simple: Beware naive realism, especially about operators! (shrink)

Describes the various senses as sensory systems that are attuned to the environment. Develops the notion of rich sensory information that specifies the distal environment. Includes a discussion of affordances.

We reconsider the consequences of the observed violations of Bell's inequalities. Two common responses to these violations are (i) the rejection of realism and the retention of locality and (ii) the rejection of locality and the retention of realism. Here we critique response (i). We argue that locality contains an implicit form of realism, since in a worldview that embraces locality, spacetime, with its usual, fixed topology, has properties independent of measurement. Hence we argue that response (i) is incomplete, in (...) that its rejection of realism is only partial. (shrink)

(i) Scientific realism is primarily a metaphysical doctrine about the existence and nature of the unobservables of science. (ii) There are good explanationist arguments for realism, most famously that from the success of science, provided abduction is allowed. Abduction seems to be on an equal footing, at least, with other ampliative methods of inference. (iii) We have no reason to believe a doctrine of empirical equivalence that would sustain the underdetermination argument against realism. (iv) The key to defending realism from (...) the pessimistic meta-induction is that we have greatly improved our capacity to understand the unobservable world over recent centuries. (shrink)

A combination of methodological considerations and propositions about the causal structure of spacetime provides a reply to Fine's criticisms of the "factorizability requirement" used in several versions of Bell's theorem. His proposal of "action in harmony" is criticized. Experimental tests are proposed for both the "synchronization models" and the "prism models", which Fine has invented as loopholes to Bell's theorem. A theorem of Suppes and Zanotti which purports to show the impossibility of hidden variables is criticized. One of their crucial (...) premisses seems to be justifiable only if one accepts a Parmenidean metaphysics. (shrink)

We study the EPR-type correlations from the perspective of the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. We argue that these correlations do not entail any form of “non-locality”, when viewed in the context of this interpretation. The abandonment of strict Einstein realism implied by the relational stance permits to reconcile quantum mechanics, completeness, (operationally defined) separability, and locality.