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Multisensory evidence

Philosophical Issues 30 (1):238-256 (2020)

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  1. Is perceptual indiscriminability nontransitive?Diana Raffman - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):153-75.
    It is widely supposed that one family of sorites paradoxes, perhaps the most perplexing versions of the puzzle, owe at least in part to the nontransitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. To a first approximation, perceptual indiscriminability is the relationship obtaining among objects (stimuli) that appear identical in some perceptual respect—for example hue, or pitch, or texture. Indiscriminable objects look the same, or sound the same, or feel the same. Received wisdom has it that there are or could be series of objects (...)
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  • The Multisensory Character of Perception.Casey O’Callaghan - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (10):551-569.
    My thesis is that perceptual awareness is richly multisensory. I argue for this conclusion on the grounds that certain forms of multisensory perceptual experience are incompatible with the claim that each aspect of a perceptual experience is associated with some specific sensory modality or another. First, I explicate what it is for some feature of a conscious perceptual episode to be modality specific. Then, I argue based on philosophical and experimental evidence that some novel intermodal features are perceptible only through (...)
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  • Against hearing meanings.Casey O'Callaghan - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):783-807.
    Listening to speech in a language you know differs phenomenologically from listening to speech in an unfamiliar language, a fact often exploited in debates about the phenomenology of thought and cognition. It is plausible that the difference is partly perceptual. Some contend that hearing familiar language involves auditory perceptual awareness of meanings or semantic properties of spoken utterances; but if this were so, there must be something distinctive it is like auditorily to perceptually experience specific meanings of spoken utterances. However, (...)
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  • Experiencing the production of sounds.Matthew Nudds - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):210-229.
    Whether or not we would be happy to do without sounds, the idea that our expe- rience of sounds is of things which are distinct from the world of material objects can seem compelling. All you have to do to confirm it is close your eyes and reflect on the character of your auditory experience.
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  • Experiencing the Production of Sounds.Matthew Nudds - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):210-229.
    It is often supposed that our experience of sounds is as of things distinct from the material world of sight and touch: reflecting on the character of our auditory experience might seem to confirm that. This paper describes the features of our auditory experience that can lead one to think of sounds in this way. It then describes a way we can experience sounds as being part of the material world. Since this is a kind of experience that essentially involves (...)
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  • Auditory-induced bouncing is a perceptual (rather than a cognitive) phenomenon: Evidence from illusory crescents.Hauke S. Meyerhoff & Brian J. Scholl - 2018 - Cognition 170 (C):88-94.
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  • Experiential evidence?Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1053-1079.
    Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from conflating two importantly different conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experience is able to provide evidence in one sense of the term, although not in the sense that the evidentialist requires. I argue this, in part, by relying on a reading of the Sellarsian dilemma that differs from the version standardly encountered in contemporary epistemology, one that is aimed initially at the epistemology of (...)
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  • Indiscriminability and the sameness of appearance.Katalin Farkas - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.
    Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for considerations (...)
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  • Perception and evidence.Alex Byrne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170:101-113.
    Critical discussion of Susanna Schellenberg's account of hallucination and perceptual evidence.
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  • Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
    The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ’No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ’Yes’. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can (...)
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  • The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
    This chapter analyzes aspects of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality. It focuses on the phenomenal character and the intentional content of perceptual states, canvassing various possible relations among them. It argues that there is a good case for a sort of representationalism, although this may not take the form that its advocates often suggest. By mapping out some of the landscape, the chapter tries to open up territory for different and promising forms of representationalism to be explored in the (...)
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  • The Structure of Appearance.Nelson Goodman - 1956 - Studia Logica 4:255-261.
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