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  1. Trope theory and the Bradley regress.Anna-Sofia Maurin - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):311-326.
    Trope theory is the view that the world is a world of abstract particular qualities. But if all there is are tropes, how do we account for the truth of propositions ostensibly made true by some concrete particular? A common answer is that concrete particulars are nothing but tropes in compresence. This answer seems vulnerable to an argument (first presented by F. H. Bradley) according to which any attempt to account for the nature of relations will end up either in (...)
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  • Review of Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi, Holes and Other Superficialities. [REVIEW]David Lewis & Stephanie Lewis - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):77-79.
    Argle. I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: all things are material. Either holes are somehow material, or else there are no such things. Maybe a hole is the material hole-lining that, as we so misleadingly say, “surrounds” the hole; or else whatever ostensible reference we make to holes is secretly some other sort of language-game altogether, or it’s fictitious reference, or it’s just plain mistaken.
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  • Viciousness and the structure of reality.Ricki Leigh Bliss - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):399-418.
    Given the centrality of arguments from vicious infinite regress to our philosophical reasoning, it is little wonder that they should also appear on the catalogue of arguments offered in defense of theses that pertain to the fundamental structure of reality. In particular, the metaphysical foundationalist will argue that, on pain of vicious infinite regress, there must be something fundamental. But why think that infinite regresses of grounds are vicious? I explore existing proposed accounts of viciousness cast in terms of contradictions, (...)
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  • Being Positive About Negative Facts.Mark Jago & Stephen Barker - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
    Negative facts get a bad press. One reason for this is that it is not clear what negative facts are. We provide a theory of negative facts on which they are no stranger than positive atomic facts. We show that none of the usual arguments hold water against this account. Negative facts exist in the usual sense of existence and conform to an acceptable Eleatic principle. Furthermore, there are good reasons to want them around, including their roles in causation, chance-making (...)
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  • The least discerning and most promiscuous truthmaker.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):307 - 324.
    I argue that the one and only truthmaker is the world. This view can be seen as arisingfrom (i) the view that truthmaking is a relation of grounding holding between true propositions and fundamental entities, together with (ii) the view that the world is the one and only fundamental entity. I argue that this view provides an elegant and economical account of the truthmakers, while solving the problem of negative existentials, in a way that proves ontologically revealing.
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  • Mellor on negative properties.Andrew Botterell - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):523-526.
    DH Mellor has argued that there can be no negative, disjunctive, or conjunctive properties. This argument has been criticized by Alex Oliver on the grounds that it rests on a contentious identity criterion for facts, but it seems to me that a simpler criticism is available. According to this criticism, the problem with Mellor's argument is that it trades on an ambiguity in the semantics of the phrase "the fact that", according to which "the fact that" can be understood as (...)
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  • (1 other version)A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
    In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...)
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  • (1 other version)New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
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  • Negative findings in electronic health records and biomedical ontologies: a realist approach.Werner Ceusters, Peter Elkin & Barry Smith - 2007 - International Journal of Medical Informatics 76 (3):S326-S333.
    PURPOSE—A substantial fraction of the observations made by clinicians and entered into patient records are expressed by means of negation or by using terms which contain negative qualifiers (as in “absence of pulse” or “surgical procedure not performed”). This seems at first sight to present problems for ontologies, terminologies and data repositories that adhere to a realist view and thus reject any reference to putative non-existing entities. Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) and Referent Tracking (RT) are examples of such paradigms. The (...)
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  • Negative Properties, Real and Irreducible.David Hommen - 2013 - Philosophia Naturalis 50 (2):383-406.
    Few philosophers believe in the existence of so-called negative properties. Indeed, many find it mind-boggling just to imagine such properties. In contrast, I think not only that negative properties are quite imaginable, but also that there are good reasons for believing that some such properties actually exist. In this paper, I want to defend the reality and irreducibility, or genuineness, as I call it, of negative properties. After briefly presenting the idea of a negative property, I collect commonly invoked tests (...)
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  • Holes and Other Superficialities by Roberto Casati and Achille C. Varzi. [REVIEW]D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):585-586.
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  • Real Metaphysics: Replies.D. H. Mellor - 2002 - In Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.
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  • On truthmakers for negative truths.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):264 – 268.
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  • Non-Symmetrical Relations, O-Roles, and Modes.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (4):373-395.
    I examine and discuss in this paper Orilia’s theory of external, non-symmetrical relations, that is based on ontological roles (O-Roles). I explore several attempts to interpret O-Roles from an ontological viewpoint and I reject them because of two problems concerning the status of asymmetrical relations (to be distinguished from non-symmetrical relations simpliciter) and of exemplification as an external, non-symmetrical relation. Finally, following Heil’s and Lowe’s characterization of modes as particular properties that ontologically depend on their “bearers”, I introduce relational modes (...)
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  • How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
    When there is truth, there must be some thing (or things) to account for that truth: some thing(s) that couldn’t exist and the true proposition fail to be true. That is the truthmaker principle. True propositions are made true by entities in the mind-independently existing external world. The truthmaker principle seems attractive to many metaphysicians, but many have wanted to weaken it and accept not that every true proposition has a truthmaker but only that some important class of propositions require (...)
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  • Negative Properties.Nick Zangwill - 2011 - Noûs 45 (3):528-556.
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  • (4 other versions)Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy.C. D. Broad - 1939 - Mind 48 (192):502-517.
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  • Falsemakers: Something Negative about Facts.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):169-182.
    The author argues for the existence of negative facts. The first section is devoted to an argument, grounded on truthmaker maximalism, that aims at demonstrating that negative facts must exist at least as false propositions’ falsemakers. In the second section, the author analyzes and criticizes several attempts to get rid of negative facts: the ones based on incompatibilities, absences, totality facts and polarities, as well as the ones based on various restrictions on truthmaker maximalism or on the non-acceptance of facts (...)
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  • Negotiation and generality.Herbert Hochberg - 1969 - Noûs 3 (3):325-343.
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  • What is a Negative Property?Sam Baron, Richard Copley-Coltheart, Raamy Majeed & Kristie Miller - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (1):33-54.
    This paper seeks to differentiate negative properties from positive properties, with the aim of providing the groundwork for further discussion about whether there is anything that corresponds to either of these notions. We differentiate negative and positive properties in terms of their functional role, before drawing out the metaphysical implications of proceeding in this fashion. We show that if the difference between negative and positive properties tabled here is correct, then negative properties are metaphysically contentious entities, entities that many philosophers (...)
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  • I—Peter Simons: Relations and Truthmaking.Peter Simons - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):199-213.
    The metaphysics of relations is still in its infancy. We use the idea of truthmaking to gain purchase on this metaphysics. Assuming a modest supervenience conception of truthmaking, where true relational predications require multiply dependent truthmakers, these are indispensable relations. Though some such relations are required, none are needed for internal relatedness, nor for several other kinds of relational predication. Discerning the metaphysically basic kinds of relations is fraught with uncertainties, but must be tackled if progress is to be made.
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  • (4 other versions)Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy.C. D. Broad - 1934 - Mind 43 (170):204-224.
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  • (4 other versions)Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy. [REVIEW]A. E. M. & C. D. Broad - 1938 - Journal of Philosophy 35 (18):491.
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  • (2 other versions)Matters of Metaphysics.D. H. MELLOR - 1991 - Philosophy 67 (260):268-270.
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  • (1 other version)A World of States of Affairs.John Heil & D. M. Armstrong - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):115.
    Despite heroic efforts, philosophers have found it increasingly difficult to evade discussion of metaphysical topics. Take the philosophy of mind. Take, in particular, the mind-body problem in its latest guise: the problem of causal relevance. If mental properties are not reducible to physical properties, how can we reconcile the role such properties seem to have in producing bodily motions that constitute actions with the apparent fact that the very same motions are entirely explicable on the basis of purely physical properties (...)
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  • Negative Exemplification.Donald Brownstein - 1973 - American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1):43 - 50.
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  • (2 other versions)Matters of Metaphysics.Alex Byrne & D. H. Mellor - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (2):285.
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