- A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
|
|
Kripke's proof is ad hominem not two-dimensional.David Papineau - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494.details
|
|
Textbook kripkeanism and the open texture of concepts.Stephen Yablo - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):98–122.details
|
|
Phenomenal and perceptual concepts.David Papineau - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 111--144.details
|
|
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.details
|
|
(2 other versions)What Mary Didn't Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.details
|
|
(1 other version)On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument against physicalism.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.details
|
|
(1 other version)Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap.Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.details
|
|
Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.details
|
|
Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.details
|
|
Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):133-143.details
|
|
Papineau on the intuition of distinctness.Andrew Melnyk - 2002 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind 4 (1).details
|
|
(1 other version)The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap.Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.details
|
|
(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.details
|
|
Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
(1 other version)Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
(4 other versions)Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.details
|
|
Philosophical Naturalism. Philosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
|
|
(1 other version)On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.details
|
|
(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Thinking about Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):333-335.details
|
|
Thinking about Consciousness.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):171-186.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 170 (4):463-464.details
|
|