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Truth Serum, Liar Serum, and Some Problems About Saying What You Think is False

In Eliot Michaelson & Andreas Stokke (eds.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2018)

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  1. The Definition of Lying and Deception.James Edwin Mahon - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Survey of different definitions of lying and deceiving, with an emphasis on the contemporary debate between Thomas Carson, Roy Sorensen, Don Fallis, Jennifer Saul, Paul Faulkner, Jennifer Lackey, David Simpson, Andreas Stokke, Jorg Meibauer, Seana Shiffrin, and James Mahon, among others, over whether lies always aim to deceive. Related questions include whether lies must be assertions, whether lies always breach trust, whether it is possible to lie without using spoken or written language, whether lies must always be false, whether lies (...)
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  • Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2012 - Noûs 48 (3):496-520.
    This paper argues for an account of insincerity in speech according to which an utterance is insincere if and only if it communicates something that does not correspond to the speaker's conscious attitudes. Two main topics are addressed: the relation between insincerity and the saying-meaning distinction, and the mental attitude underlying insincere speech. The account is applied to both assertoric and non-assertoric utterances of declarative sentences, and to utterances of non-declarative sentences. It is shown how the account gives the right (...)
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  • Constructing the World.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by Rudolf Carnap's Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt, David J. Chalmers argues that the world can be constructed from a few basic elements. He develops a scrutability thesis saying that all truths about the world can be derived from basic truths and ideal reasoning. This thesis leads to many philosophical consequences: a broadly Fregean approach to meaning, an internalist approach to the contents of thought, and a reply to W. V. Quine's arguments against the analytic and the a priori. (...)
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  • Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.
    The paper argues that the correct definition of lying is that to lie is to assert something one believes to be false, where assertion is understood in terms of the notion of the common ground of a conversation. It is shown that this definition makes the right predictions for a number of cases involving irony, joking, and false implicature. In addition, the proposed account does not assume that intending to deceive is a necessary condition on lying, and hence counts so-called (...)
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  • Paderewski Variations.R. Mark Sainsbury - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (4):483-502.
    How successful are Fregean theories compared with guise-theoretic Millian theories in dealing with a range of problematic propositional attitude ascriptions? The range considered is roughly that of Paderewski puzzles and their relatives. I argue that these fall into two categories: in one category, the Fregean theory looks to be under pressure from guise-theoretic rivals, though I argue that Fregeans can, to advantage, borrow some guise-theoretic machinery. Concerning the other category, which includes Kripke's two Paderewski puzzles, I argue that these puzzles (...)
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  • Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
    This is the 1991 (2nd) edition of the 1986 book (MIT Press), considered to be the classic defense of Millianism. The nature of the information content of declarative sentences is a central topic in the philosophy of language. The natural view that a sentence like "John loves Mary" contains information in which two individuals occur as constituents is termed the naive theory, and is one that has been abandoned by most contemporary scholars. This theory was refuted originally by philosopher Gottlob (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  • On Sinn and Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1997 - In Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.), The Frege reader. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 151-172.
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  • The definition of lying.Thomas L. Carson - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):284–306.
    Few moral questions have greater bearing on the conduct of our everyday lives than questions about the morality of lying. These questions are also important for ethical theory. An important test of any theory of right and wrong is whether it gives an adequate account of the morality of lying. Conceptual questions about the nature of lying are prior to questions about the moral status of lying. Any theory about the moral status of lying presupposes an account of what lying (...)
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  • Deontology and the ethics of lying.Arnold Isenberg - 1964 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (4):463-480.
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  • (1 other version)A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.
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  • (1 other version)On sense and intension.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:135-82.
    What is involved in the meaning of our expressions? Frege suggested that there is an aspect of an expression.
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  • Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):595-639.
    When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?
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  • (1 other version)The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 55-140.
    Why is two-dimensional semantics important? One can think of it as the most recent act in a drama involving three of the central concepts of philosophy: meaning, reason, and modality. First, Kant linked reason and modality, by suggesting that what is necessary is knowable a priori, and vice versa. Second, Frege linked reason and meaning, by proposing an aspect of meaning (sense) that is constitutively tied to cognitive signi?cance. Third, Carnap linked meaning and modality, by proposing an aspect of meaning (...)
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  • Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledge.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - In C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 83.
    What is involved in the consciousness of a conscious, "occurrent" propositional attitude, such as a thought, a sudden conjecture or a conscious decision? And what is the relation of such consciousness to attention? I hope the intrinsic interest of these questions provides sufficient motivation to allow me to start by addressing them. We will not have a full understanding either of consciousness in general, nor of attention in general, until we have answers to these questions. I think there are constitutive (...)
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  • What Is Lying.Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.
    In order to lie, you have to say something that you believe to be false. But lying is not simply saying what you believe to be false. Philosophers have made several suggestions for what the additional condition might be. For example, it has been suggested that the liar has to intend to deceive (Augustine 395, Bok 1978, Mahon 2006), that she has to believe that she will deceive (Chisholm and Feehan 1977), or that she has to warrant the truth of (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible , and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend (...)
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  • What lies behind misspeaking.Roy Sorensen - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):399.
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  • Lies and deception: an unhappy divorce.Jennifer Lackey - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):236-248.
    The traditional view of lying holds that this phenomenon involves two central components: stating what one does not believe oneself and doing so with the intention to deceive. This view remained the generally accepted view of the nature of lying until very recently, with the intention-to-deceive requirement now coming under repeated attack. In this article, I argue that the tides have turned too quickly in the literature on lying. For while it is indeed true that there can be lies where (...)
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  • Two Definitions of Lying.James Edwin Mahon - 2008 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2):211-230.
    This article first examines a number of different definitions of lying, from Aldert Vrij, Warren Shibles, Sissela Bok, the Oxford English Dictionary, Linda Coleman and Paul Kay, and Joseph Kupfer. It considers objections to all of them, and then defends Kupfer’s definition, as well as a modified version of his definition, as the best of those so far considered. Next, it examines five other definitions of lying, from Harry G. Frankfurt, Roderick M. Chisholm and Thomas D. Feehan, David Simpson, Thomas (...)
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  • (1 other version)Reference and description revisited.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:201-218.
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  • Practical knowledge.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):388-409.
    Argues that we know without observation or inference at least some of what we are doing intentionally and that this possibility must be explained in terms of knowledge-how. It is a consequence of the argument that knowing how to do something cannot be identified with knowledge of a proposition.
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  • (1 other version)Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law.Seana Valentine Shiffrin - 2014 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    To understand one another as individuals and to fulfill the moral duties that require such understanding, we must communicate with each other. We must also maintain protected channels that render reliable communication possible, a demand that, Seana Shiffrin argues, yields a prohibition against lying and requires protection for free speech. This book makes a distinctive philosophical argument for the wrong of the lie and provides an original account of its difference from the wrong of deception. Drawing on legal as well (...)
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  • X-Knowledge of Action Without Observation.Hanna Pickard - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):203-228.
    This paper argues that perception of one's body ‘from the inside’ provides one with an awareness of acting, and that this awareness explains a previously overlooked feature of one's knowledge of one's own actions. Actions are events: they occur during periods of time. Knowledge of such events must be sensitive to their course through time. Perception of one's body ‘from the inside’ allows one to monitor one's actions as they unfold, thereby sustaining one's knowledge of what one is doing over (...)
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  • Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive.Roy Sorensen - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264.
    Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved. Strangely, we condemn these bald-faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non-deceptive false assertion : lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the apparent intensity of (...)
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  • The trouble with being sincere.Timothy Chan & Guy Kahane - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):215-234.
    Questions about sincerity play a central role in our lives. But what makes an assertion insincere? In this paper we argue that the answer to this question is not as straightforward as it has sometimes been taken to be. Until recently the dominant answer has been that a speaker makes an insincere assertion if and only if he does not believe the proposition asserted. There are, however, persuasive counterexamples to this simple account. It has been proposed instead that an insincere (...)
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  • Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.
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  • Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.
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  • Lying and Deceit.Paul Faulkner - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.
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  • Frege’s puzzle. [REVIEW]A. D. Smith - 1988 - Mind 97 (385):136-137.
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