- Actually-Rigidified Descriptivism Revisited.Jesper Kallestrup - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):5-21.details
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A Puzzle about Disagreement.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (37):283-297.details
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Diagonal decision theory.Melissa Fusco - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-12.details
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Direct reference and the Goldbach puzzle.Stefan Rinner - 2024 - Theoria 90 (1):8-16.details
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The Normative Property Dualism Argument.Jesse Hambly - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Quantifying In from a Fregean Perspective.Seth Yalcin - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):207-253.details
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The nesting problem of two‐dimensional semantics.Zhaoqing Xu - 2021 - Philosophical Forum 52 (2):177-183.details
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Eternalism and Propositional Multitasking: in defence of the Operator Argument.Clas Weber - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):199-219.details
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Predicativity, the Russell-Myhill Paradox, and Church’s Intensional Logic.Sean Walsh - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (3):277-326.details
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Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):183-200.details
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Thought Sharing, Communication, and Perspectives about the Self.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (4):487-507.details
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Pierre’s rational and public beliefs.Victor Verdejo - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):451-469.details
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In Defence of the Shareability of Fregean Self-Thought.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):281-299.details
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The content of model-based information.Raphael van Riel - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3839-3858.details
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Communicating and Disagreeing with Distinct Concepts: A Defense of Semantic Internalism.Matheus Valente - 2019 - Theoria 85 (4):312-336.details
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A Puzzle about Communication.Matheus Valente & Andrea Onofri - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):1035-1054.details
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Linguistic Criteria of Intentionality.Ciecierski Tadeusz - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):35-58.details
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Epistemic Intensions.Scott Soames - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):220-228.details
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Can Truth‐Conditional Theorists of Content Do Without ‘That’‐Clause Ascriptions?Lionel Shapiro - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (1):1-27.details
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Names Are Variables.Anders J. Schoubye - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (1):53-94.details
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Secondary belief content, what is it good for?Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1467-1476.details
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Private Investigators and Public Speakers.Alexander Sandgren - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):95-113.details
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Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions.David Ripley - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):97 - 118.details
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Against the identification of assertoric content with compositional value.Brian Rabern - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):75-96.details
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Chalmers and Semantics.Panu Raatikainen - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1193-1221.details
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Variability, Rigidity and the Nesting Problem.Olga Poller - 2021 - Theoria 87 (1):230-246.details
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Variables and Attitudes.Bryan Pickel - 2013 - Noûs 49 (2):333-356.details
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Structured propositions and trivial composition.Bryan Pickel - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2991-3006.details
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Two-Dimensional Semantics and Fictional Names: The Myth of Intension.Seong Soo Park - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):639-658.details
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Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports.James Openshaw - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):415-437.details
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Two pictures of communication: from content identity to coordination.Andrea Onofri - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-20.details
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Loar’s Puzzle, Similarity, and Knowledge of Reference.Andrea Onofri - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (2):1-45.details
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Soames’s argument 1 against strong two-dimensionalism.Robert Michels - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):403-420.details
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Fregeanism, sententialism, and scope.Harvey Lederman - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1235-1275.details
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A Hyperintensional Account of Metaphysical Equivalence.Kristie Miller - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):772-793.details
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When Lingens meets Frege: communication without common ground.Jens Kipper - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1441-1461.details
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Propositional apriority and the nesting problem.Jens Kipper - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1091-1104.details
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Communicating Egocentric Beliefs: Two-Content Accounts.Jens Kipper - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):947-967.details
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The A Priori‐Operator and the Nesting Problem.Eric Johannesson & Sara Packalén - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):169-176.details
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Impossible Worlds.Mark Jago - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):713-728.details
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Against Metasemantics-First Moral Epistemology.Jesse Hambly & Shang Long Yeo - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-21.details
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Singular Reference in Fictional Discourse?Manuel García-Carpintero - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (54):143-177.details
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What is the correct logic of necessity, actuality and apriority?Peter Fritz - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):385-414.details
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A logic for epistemic two-dimensional semantics.Peter Fritz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1753-1770.details
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The problem of factives for sense theories.Graeme Forbes - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):654-662.details
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Can Bayesianism Solve Frege’s Puzzle?Jesse Fitts - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (3):989-998.details
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Chalmers on the objects of credence.Jesse Fitts - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):343-358.details
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Co‐Hyperintensionality.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):270-287.details
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Actuality and the a priori.Fabio Lampert - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):809-830.details
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Why Propositions Might be Sets of Truth-supporting Circumstances.Paul Elbourne - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):101-111.details
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