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Is inferentialism circular?

Analysis 78 (3):450-454 (2018)

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  1. (2 other versions)Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
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  • (1 other version)The Runabout Inference-Ticket.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Analysis 21 (2):38-39.
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  • Talking with Tonkers.Jared Warren - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Unrestricted inferentialism holds both that any collection of inference rules can determine a meaning for an expression and meaning constituting rules are automatically valid. Prior's infamous tonk connective refuted unrestricted inferentialism, or so it is universally thought. This paper argues against this consensus. I start by formulating the metasemantic theses of inferentialism with more care than they have hitherto received; I then consider a tonk language — Tonklish — and argue that the unrestricted inferentialist's treatment of this language is only (...)
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  • What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
    In some previous work, I tried to give a concept-based account of the nature of our entitlement to certain very basic inferences (see the papers in Part III of Boghossian 2008b). In this previous work, I took it for granted, along with many other philosophers, that we understood well enough what it is for a person to infer. In this paper, I turn to thinking about the nature of inference itself. This topic is of great interest in its own right (...)
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  • Tonk, Plonk and Plink.Nuel Belnap - 1962 - Analysis 22 (6):130-134.
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  • (1 other version)The runabout inference ticket.Arthur Prior - 1967 - In P. F. Strawson (ed.), Philosophical logic. London,: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-9.
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  • Categories of Art.Kendall L. Walton - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (3):334-367.
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  • (1 other version)Having concepts: A brief refutation of the twentieth century.Jerry Fodor - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.
    A certain ‘pragmatist’ view of concept possession has defined the mainstream of Anglophone philosophy of language/mind for decades: namely, that to have the concept C is to be able to distinguish Cs from non‐Cs, and/or to recognize the validity of certain C‐involving inferences. The present paper offers three arguments why no such account could be viable. An alternative ‘Cartesian’ view is outlined, according to which having C is being able to think about Cs ‘as such’. Some consequences of the proposed (...)
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  • Is meaning normative?Anandi Hattiangadi - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240.
    Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that the content of a term prescribes a pattern of use, or that it merely determines which pattern (...)
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  • A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - Studia Logica 54 (1):132-133.
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  • A Study of Concepts.Robert Hanna - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (3):541.
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  • (1 other version)Having Concepts: a Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century.Jerry Fodor - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.
    A certain ‘pragmatist’ view of concept possession has defined the mainstream of Anglophone philosophy of language/mind for decades: namely, that to have the concept C is to be able to distinguish Cs from non‐Cs, and/or to recognize the validity of certain C‐involving inferences. The present paper offers three arguments why no such account could be viable. An alternative ‘Cartesian’ view is outlined, according to which having C is being able to think about Cs ‘as such’. Some consequences of the proposed (...)
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  • (1 other version)Conjunction and Contonktion Revisited.A. Prior - 1964 - Analysis 24 (6):191 - 195.
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  • A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - MIT Press.
    Philosophers from Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein to the recent realists and antirealists have sought to answer the question, What are concepts? This book provides a detailed, systematic, and accessible introduction to an original philosophical theory of concepts that Christopher Peacocke has developed in recent years to explain facts about the nature of thought, including its systematic character, its relations to truth and reference, and its normative dimension. Particular concepts are also treated within the general framework: perceptual concepts, logical concepts, and (...)
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  • Inferentialism: Why Rules Matter.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2014 - London and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In this study two strands of inferentialism are brought together: the philosophical doctrine of Brandom, according to which meanings are generally inferential roles, and the logical doctrine prioritizing proof-theory over model theory and approaching meaning in logical, especially proof-theoretical terms.
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  • Logic as Metaphysics.Nick Zangwill - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (10):517-550.
    I defend logical realism. I begin by motivating the realist approach by underlining the difficulties for its main rival: inferentialism. I then focus on AND and OR, and delineate a realist view of these two logical constants. The realist view is developed in terms of Alexander’s Principleshowing that AND and OR have distinctive determining roles. After that, I say what logic is not. We should not take logic to be essentially about the mind, or language, or exclusively about an abstract (...)
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  • (1 other version)Putting Concepts to Work: Some Thoughts for the Twentyfirst Century.Jesse Prinz, Andy Clark & Jerry Fodor - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):57-69.
    Fodor's theory makes thinking prior to doing. It allows for an inactive agent or pure reflector, and for agents whose actions in various ways seem to float free of their own conceptual repertoires. We show that naturally evolved creatures are not like that. In the real world, thinking is always and everywhere about doing. The point of having a brain is to guide the actions of embodied beings in a complex material world. Some of those actions are, to be sure, (...)
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  • Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Kirk - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):238-241.
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  • (1 other version)Conjunction and contonktion revisited.A. N. Prior - 1964 - Analysis 24 (6):191.
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