- On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.details
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Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.details
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(4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.details
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(2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.details
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(2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.details
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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Vagueness.Delia Graff & Timothy Williamson (eds.) - 1994 - London and New York: Ashgate.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.details
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Consciousness.Christopher S. Hill - 2009 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.details
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The obscure object of hallucination.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.details
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(4 other versions)The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
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Everything.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):415–465.details
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(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
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Logic for philosophy.Theodore Sider - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Vagueness.Bertrand Russell - 1923 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):84 – 92.details
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Wang's paradox.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):201--32.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
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Distinctions Without a Difference.Vann McGee & Brian McLaughlin - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):203-251.details
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Do visual experiences have contents?Susanna Siegel - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Vague, So Untrue.David Braun & Theodore Sider - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):133 - 156.details
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(1 other version)Vagueness.Bertrand Russell - 1923 - Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 1 (2):84-92.details
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(1 other version)Vague identity: Evans misunderstood.David K. Lewis - 1988 - Analysis 48 (3):128-130.details
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(4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
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(1 other version)What are the contents of experiences.Adam Pautz - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):483-507.details
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Intentionalism and perceptual presence.Adam Pautz - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.details
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Multiple actualities and ontically vague identity.Robert Williams - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):134-154.details
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On the structure of higher-order vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1999 - Mind 108 (429):127-143.details
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Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.details
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Vagueness in reality.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Vagueness in reality.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Vagueness And The Sorites Paradox.Kirk Ludwig & Greg Ray - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s16):419-461.details
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