- Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 1980 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1981 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism.David Chalmers - 2009 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Causation and mental causation.Jaegwon Kim - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 227--242.details
|
|
Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem.F. J. Varela - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-49.details
|
|
Human Freedom and the Self.Roderick Chisholm - 1964 - In Robert Kane (ed.), Free Will. Blackwell.details
|
|
Realistic monism - why physicalism entails panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):3-31.details
|
|
Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - In A. Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism? pp. 3-31.details
|
|
Minding Matter: How not to Argue for the Causal Efficacy of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2011 - Rev Neuroscience 22 (5):483-507.details
|
|
Reflections of the interaction of the mind and the brain.Benjamin Libet - 2006 - Progress in Neurobiology 78:322--326.details
|
|
Freedom, Teleology, and Evil.Stewart Goetz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):460 - 465.details
|
|
Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: a neurophysical model of mind–brain interaction.Jeffrey M. Schwartz, Henry P. Stapp & Mario Beauregard - 2005 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 360:1309-1327.details
|
|
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
|
|
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism.David Chalmers - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Ceteris Absentibus Physicalism.Stephan Leuenberger - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 4:145-170.details
|
|
Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain.Chun Siong Soon, Marcel Brass, Hans-Jochen Heinze & John-Dylan Haynes - 2008 - Nature Neuroscience 11 (5):543--545.details
|
|
Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniß zur inneren Wahrnehmung.Alexius Meinong - 1899 - Zeitschrift für Psychologie Und Physiologie Der Sinnesorgane 21:182--272.details
|
|
Philosophical Naturalism. [REVIEW]David Papineau - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189):523-526.details
|
|
Introducing substance concepts.Ruth G. Millikan - 2000 - In On Clear and Confused Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Consciousness, information, and panpsychism.William Seager - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):272-88.details
|
|
The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. pp. 520--533.details
|
|
Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.details
|
|
Color and the inverted spectrum.David R. Hilbert & Mark Eli Kalderon - 2000 - In Steven Davis (ed.), Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-214.details
|
|
Introduction: Prospects and problems for teleosemantics.Graham Macdonald & David Papineau - 2006 - In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--22.details
|
|
Self-agency and mental causality.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press.details
|
|
Introduction to Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - In Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 474-93.details
|
|
Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis.Robert A. Wilson - 2005 - Cognitive Processing 6 (4).details
|
|
Physicalism, or Something near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):306-310.details
|
|
Facing up to the problem of consciousness.D. J. Chalmers - 1996 - Toward a Science of Consciousness:5-28.details
|
|
Conscious events as orchestrated space-time selections.Stuart R. Hameroff & Roger Penrose - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):36-53.details
|
|
The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):378-378.details
|
|
What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Free Will, Praise and Blame.J. J. C. Smart - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism.Robert Kane - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Reality and Representation.David Papineau - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):629-632.details
|
|
Intersubjective/intrasubjective.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - In The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Do we have free will?Benjamin W. Libet - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.details
|
|
A rebuttal on health.Christopher Boorse - 1997 - In James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder (eds.), What is Disease? Humana Press. pp. 1--134.details
|
|
Vindicating Intentional Realism: A Review of Jerry Fodor's "Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind". [REVIEW]Frances Egan - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59-61.details
|
|
Psychosemantics, the Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW]Jan Wolenski - 1991 - Studia Logica 50 (2):356-357.details
|
|
Imagistic representation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II. Harvard University Press. pp. 135-149.details
|
|
The Mark of the Mental.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - Phenomenology and Mind 4:124-136.details
|
|
A framework for consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 2003 - Nature Neuroscience 6:119-26.details
|
|
On the distinction between disease and illness.Christopher Boorse - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1):49-68.details
|
|
Mental paint.Ned Block - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 165--200.details
|
|
The 'intrinsic nature' argument for panpsychism.William E. Seager - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):129-145.details
|
|