- Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in all Worlds?Robert Schroer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.details
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Herman Cappelen - Philosophy Without Intuitions. [REVIEW]Sebastian J. Mueller - 2013 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Literatur 1 (1):35-43.details
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Real acquaintance and physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Dualism.Richard Brown - manuscriptdetails
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Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic Progress.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3053-3074.details
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The Brain and its States.Richard Brown - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. pp. 211-238.details
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Passage and Perception.Simon Prosser - 2011 - Noûs 47 (1):69-84.details
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Knowledge-how: A unified account.Berit Brogaard - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 136-160.details
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(2 other versions)In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
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The Rise and Fall of the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - forthcoming - In Corine Besson, Anandi Hattiangadi & Romina Padro (eds.), Meaning, Modality and Mind: Essays Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Naming and Necessity. Oxford University Press.details
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Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear from Ghosts than Zombies.Philip Goff - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):119-139.details
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Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
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(2 other versions)Panpsychism.William E. Seager, Philip Goff & Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Powers and the mind–body problem.István Aranyosi - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):57 – 72.details
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Resisting the epistemic argument for compatibilism.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1743-1767.details
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Knowing What It's Like.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):187-209.details
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Facing up to the Hard Problem as an Integrated Information Theorist.Robert Chis-Ciure & Francesco Ellia - forthcoming - Foundations of Science.details
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Powers and the hard problem of consciousness: conceivability, possibility and powers.Sophie R. Allen - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2):1-33.details
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The Inconceivability Argument.Brian Cutter - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Filozofija uma: pregled suvremenih rasprava o umu i tijelu (Eng. Philosophy of mind: a survey of contemporary debates on the mind-body problem).Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti - 2022 - Rijeka: University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.details
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Lightweight and Heavyweight Anti-physicalism.Damian Aleksiev - 2022 - Synthese 200 (112):1-23.details
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(1 other version)The Epistemology of Modality.Antonella Mallozzi, Michael Wallner & Anand Vaidya - 2021 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Zombie intuitions.Eugen Fischer & Justin Sytsma - 2021 - Cognition 215 (C):104807.details
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Chalmers and Semantics.Panu Raatikainen - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1193-1221.details
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No ground to bridge the gap.Elisabetta Sassarini - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7981–7999.details
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Towards a Unitary Case for Russellian Panpsychism.Luca Dondoni - 2021 - Philosophia 2021 (1):1-22.details
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(1 other version)Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness as an Integrated Information Theorist.Robert Chis-Ciure & Francesco Ellia - 2021 - Foundations of Science 1 (1):255-271.details
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If consciousness causes collapse, the zombie argument fails.Mousa Mohammadian - 2021 - Synthese 199:1599–1615.details
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Phenomenal transparency and the transparency of subjecthood.Kevin Morris - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):39-45.details
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Physicalism without supervenience.Lei Zhong - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1529-1544.details
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The World Just Is the Way It Is.David Builes - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):1-27.details
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Replies.Barbara Vetter - 2020 - Philosophical Inquiries 1 (8):199-222.details
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Correct Conceivability and its Role in the Epistemology of Modality.Robert Michels - 2020 - Les Principes Métaphysiques.details
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The Super Justification Argument for Phenomenal Transparency.Kevin Morris - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):437-455.details
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Truthmaking.Kelly Trogdon - 2020 - In Michael J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding. New York: Routledge. pp. 396-407.details
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Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1065-1085.details
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Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?François Kammerer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667.details
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Did the universe design itself?Philip Goff - 2019 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (1):99-122.details
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Hylomorphism and the Construct of Consciousness.William Jaworski - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1125-1139.details
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Essentialist modal rationalism.Philip Goff - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):2019-2027.details
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A consciousness-based quantum objective collapse model.Elias Okon & Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):3947-3967.details
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A Naturalistic Account of Content and an Application to Modal Epistemology.Manolo Martínez - 2010 - Dissertation, Universitat de Barcelonadetails
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Zombies Slap Back: Why the Anti-Zombie Parody Does Not Work.Duško Prelević - 2015 - Disputatio 7 (40):25–43.details
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(1 other version)Panpsychism and Structural Realism.Godehard Brüntrup - 2011 - In Michael Blamauer (ed.), The Mental as Fundamental: New Perspectives on Panpsychism. Ontos Verlag. pp. 15-35.details
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Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 265-289.details
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What panpsychists should reject: on the incompatibility of panpsychism and organizational invariantism.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1833-1846.details
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Ideal Negative Conceivability and the Halting Problem.Manolo Martínez - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):979-990.details
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How to be a type-C physicalist.Adrian Boutel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):301-320.details
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Phenomenal Powers.Hedda Hassel Mørch - manuscriptdetails
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Interactionist Zombies.Jake Khawaja - 2022 - Synthese 200.details
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