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  1. The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
    Helen Longino seeks to break the current deadlock in the ongoing wars between philosophers of science and sociologists of science--academic battles founded on disagreement about the role of social forces in constructing scientific knowledge. While many philosophers of science downplay social forces, claiming that scientific knowledge is best considered as a product of cognitive processes, sociologists tend to argue that numerous noncognitive factors influence what scientists learn, how they package it, and how readily it is accepted. Underlying this disagreement, however, (...)
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  • The weirdest people in the world?Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine & Ara Norenzayan - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):61-83.
    Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is (...)
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  • Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition Advancing the Debate.Jonathan Evans & Keith E. Stanovich - 2013 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3):223-241.
    Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing (...)
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  • The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear Prejudice, and Generalization.Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (8):393-421.
    Generic generalizations such as ‘mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus’ or ‘sharks attack bathers’ are often accepted by speakers despite the fact that very few members of the kinds in question have the predicated property. Previous work suggests that such low-prevalence generalizations may be accepted when the properties in question are dangerous, harmful, or appalling. This paper argues that the study of such generic generalizations sheds light on a particular class of prejudiced social beliefs, and points to new ways in (...)
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  • 1,500 scientists lift the lid on reproducibility.M. Baker - 2016 - Nature 533 (7604):452-454.
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  • Computers and Intractability. A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness.Michael R. Garey & David S. Johnson - 1983 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (2):498-500.
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  • Resource-rational analysis: understanding human cognition as the optimal use of limited computational resources.Falk Lieder & Thomas L. Griffiths - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences:1-85.
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  • The generalizability crisis.Tal Yarkoni - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e1.
    Most theories and hypotheses in psychology are verbal in nature, yet their evaluation overwhelmingly relies on inferential statistical procedures. The validity of the move from qualitative to quantitative analysis depends on the verbal and statistical expressions of a hypothesis being closely aligned – that is, that the two must refer to roughly the same set of hypothetical observations. Here, I argue that many applications of statistical inference in psychology fail to meet this basic condition. Focusing on the most widely used (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Scientific Explanation.P. Kitcher & W. C. Salmon - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (1):85-98.
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  • "How does it work" versus "what are the laws?": Two conceptions of psychological explanation.Robert C. Cummins - 2000 - In Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil (eds.), The Shadows and Shallows of Explanation. MIT Press.
    In the beginning, there was the DN (Deductive Nomological) model of explanation, articulated by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). According to DN, scientific explanation is subsumption under natural law. Individual events are explained by deducing them from laws together with initial conditions (or boundary conditions), and laws are explained by deriving them from other more fundamental laws, as, for example, the simple pendulum law is derived from Newton's laws of motion.
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  • Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms.Uwe Peters - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (3):713-738.
    When scientists or science reporters communicate research results to the public, this often involves ethical and epistemic risks. One such risk arises when scientific claims cause cognitive or behavioural changes in the audience that contribute to the self-fulfilment of these claims. I argue that the ethical and epistemic problems that such self-fulfilment effects may pose are much broader and more common than hitherto appreciated. Moreover, these problems are often due to a specific psychological phenomenon that has been neglected in the (...)
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  • Minding the Gap: Bias, Soft Structures, and the Double Life of Social Norms.Lacey J. Davidson & Daniel Kelly - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy (2):190-210.
    We argue that work on norms provides a way to move beyond debates between proponents of individualist and structuralist approaches to bias, oppression, and injustice. We briefly map out the geography of that debate before presenting Charlotte Witt’s view, showing how her position, and the normative ascriptivism at its heart, seamlessly connects individuals to the social reality they inhabit. We then describe recent empirical work on the psychology of norms and locate the notions of informal institutions and soft structures with (...)
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  • Individualism, Structuralism, and Climate Change.Michael Brownstein, Alex Madva & Daniel Kelly - 2021 - Environmental Communication 1.
    Scholars, journalists, and activists working on climate change often distinguish between “individual” and “structural” approaches to decarbonization. The former concern choices individuals can make to reduce their “personal carbon footprint” (e.g., eating less meat). The latter concern changes to institutions, laws, and other social structures. These two approaches are often framed as oppositional, representing a mutually exclusive forced choice between alternative routes to decarbonization. After presenting representative samples of this oppositional framing of individual and structural approaches in environmental communication, we (...)
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  • Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science.Uwe Peters - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):1061-1081.
    In the philosophy of science, it is a common proposal that values are illegitimate in science and should be counteracted whenever they drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions. Drawing on recent cognitive scientific research on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Advocates of it have overlooked that values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level even when they (...)
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  • Generic Generalizations.Sarah-Jane Leslie & Adam Lerner - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • The Tractable Cognition Thesis.Iris Van Rooij - 2008 - Cognitive Science 32 (6):939-984.
    The recognition that human minds/brains are finite systems with limited resources for computation has led some researchers to advance the Tractable Cognition thesis: Human cognitive capacities are constrained by computational tractability. This thesis, if true, serves cognitive psychology by constraining the space of computational‐level theories of cognition. To utilize this constraint, a precise and workable definition of “computational tractability” is needed. Following computer science tradition, many cognitive scientists and psychologists define computational tractability as polynomial‐time computability, leading to the P‐Cognition thesis. (...)
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  • Generic Statements Require Little Evidence for Acceptance but Have Powerful Implications.Andrei Cimpian, Amanda C. Brandone & Susan A. Gelman - 2010 - Cognitive Science 34 (8):1452-1482.
    Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence (...)
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  • Quantified Statements are Recalled as Generics: Evidence from Preschool Children and Adults.Sarah-Jane Leslie & Susan Gelman - 2012 - Cognitive Psychology 64 (186):214.
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  • (4 other versions)The implications of induction.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1970 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 160:486-487.
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  • Explanatory Unification: Double and Doubtful.Uskali Mäki - 2001 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (4):488-506.
    Explanatory unification—the urge to “explain much by little”—serves as an ideal of theorizing not only in natural sciences but also in the social sciences, most notably in economics. The ideal is occasionally challenged by appealing to the complexity and diversity of social systems and processes in space and time. This article proposes to accommodate such doubts by making a distinction between two kinds of unification and suggesting that while such doubts may be justified in regard to mere derivational unification (which (...)
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  • The Role of Explanation in Discovery and Generalization: Evidence From Category Learning.Joseph J. Williams & Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Cognitive Science 34 (5):776-806.
    Research in education and cognitive development suggests that explaining plays a key role in learning and generalization: When learners provide explanations—even to themselves—they learn more effectively and generalize more readily to novel situations. This paper proposes and tests a subsumptive constraints account of this effect. Motivated by philosophical theories of explanation, this account predicts that explaining guides learners to interpret what they are learning in terms of unifying patterns or regularities, which promotes the discovery of broad generalizations. Three experiments provide (...)
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  • Cognitive Models of Science.C. Carey & R. N. Giere - 1992 - In R. Giere & H. Feigl (eds.), Cognitive Models of Science. University of Minnesota Press.
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  • Belief in the law of small numbers.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1971 - Psychological Bulletin 76 (2):105.
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  • (1 other version)An introduction to the philosophy of induction and probability.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1992 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 182 (1):95-96.
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  • (1 other version)An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):313-315.
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  • Review of V erbal Behavior. [REVIEW]Noam Chomsky - 1959 - Language 35 (1):26--58.
    I had intended this review not specifically as a criticism of Skinner's speculations regarding language, but rather as a more general critique of behaviorist (I would now prefer to say "empiricist") speculation as to the nature of higher mental processes. My reason for discussing Skinner's book in such detail was that it was the most careful and thoroughgoing presentation of such speculations, an evaluation that I feel is still accurate. Therefore, if the conclusions I attempted to substantiate in the review (...)
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  • Are there two processes in reasoning? The dimensionality of inductive and deductive inferences.Rachel G. Stephens, John C. Dunn & Brett K. Hayes - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (2):218-244.
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  • Generic Generalizations in Science: A Bridge to Everyday Language.François Claveau & Jordan Girard - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):839-859.
    This article maintains that an important class of scientific generalizations should be reinterpreted: they have typically been understood as ceteris paribus laws, but are, in fact, generics. Four arguments are presented to support this thesis. One argument is that the interpretation in terms of ceteris paribus laws is a historical accident. The other three arguments draw on similarities between these generalizations and archetypal generics: they come with similar inferential commitments, they share a syntactic form, and the existing theories to make (...)
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  • Abductive, presumptive and plausible arguments.Douglas Walton - 2001 - Informal Logic 21 (2).
    Current practice in logic increasingly accords recognition to abductive, presumptive or plausible arguments, in addition to deductive and inductive arguments. But there is uncertainty about what these terms exactly mean, what the differences between them are (if any), and how they relate. By examining some analyses ofthese terms and some of the history of the subject (including the views of Peirce and Cameades), this paper sets out considerations leading to a set of definitions, discusses the relationship of these three forms (...)
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  • On the scope and limits of generalizations in the social sciences.Daniel Little - 1993 - Synthese 97 (2):183 - 207.
    This article disputes the common view that social science explanations depend on discovery of lawlike generalizations from which descriptions of social outcomes can be derived. It distinguishes between governing and phenomenal regularities, and argues that social regularities are phenomenal rather than governing. In place of nomological deductive arguments, the article maintains that social explanations depend on the discovery of causal mechanisms underlying various social processes. The metaphysical correlate of this argument is that there are no social kinds: types of social (...)
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  • The problem of induction.Steven A. Sloman & D. Lagnado - 2005 - In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. pp. 95--116.
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  • Memory Errors Reveal a Bias to Spontaneously Generalize to Categories.Shelbie L. Sutherland, Andrei Cimpian, Sarah-Jane Leslie & Susan A. Gelman - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1021-1046.
    Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal (...)
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  • Are All Generics Created Equal?Francis Jeffry Pelletier - 2009 - In Kinds, Things, and Stuff: Mass Terms and Generics. New York, US: Oup Usa.
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  • BIZARRE chimpanzees do not represent “the chimpanzee”.David A. Leavens, Kim A. Bard & William D. Hopkins - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):100-101.
    Henrich et al. convincingly caution against the overgeneralization of findings from particular human populations, but fail to apply their own compelling reasoning to our nearest living relatives, the great apes. Here we argue that rearing history is every bit as important for understanding cognition in other species as it is in humans.
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  • The place of induction in science.Mario Bunge - 1960 - Philosophy of Science 27 (3):262-270.
    The place of induction in the framing and test of scientific hypotheses is investigated. The meaning of 'induction' is first equated with generalization on the basis of case examination. Two kinds of induction are then distinguished: the inference of generals from particulars (first degree induction), and the generalization of generalizations (second degree induction). Induction is claimed to play a role in the framing of modest empirical generalizations and in the extension of every sort of generalizations--not however in the invention of (...)
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