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  1. The statistics of cognitive variability: Explaining common patterns in individuals, groups and financial markets.Jian-Qiao Zhu, Jake Spicer, Adam Sanborn & Nick Chater - 2024 - Cognition 250 (C):105858.
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  • On the computational complexity of ethics: moral tractability for minds and machines.Jakob Stenseke - 2024 - Artificial Intelligence Review 57 (105):90.
    Why should moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and machine ethicists care about computational complexity? Debates on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can or should be used to solve problems in ethical domains have mainly been driven by what AI can or cannot do in terms of human capacities. In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other end by exploring what kind of moral machines are possible based on what computational systems can or cannot do. To do so, we analyze normative (...)
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  • People's thinking plans adapt to the problem they're trying to solve.Joan Danielle K. Ongchoco, Joshua Knobe & Julian Jara-Ettinger - 2024 - Cognition 243 (C):105669.
    Much of our thinking focuses on deciding what to do in situations where the space of possible options is too large to evaluate exhaustively. Previous work has found that people do this by learning the general value of different behaviors, and prioritizing thinking about high-value options in new situations. Is this good-action bias always the best strategy, or can thinking about low-value options sometimes become more beneficial? Can people adapt their thinking accordingly based on the situation? And how do we (...)
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  • Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.
    Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value of evidence—ambiguity (...)
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  • Resource Rationality.Thomas F. Icard - manuscript
    Theories of rational decision making often abstract away from computational and other resource limitations faced by real agents. An alternative approach known as resource rationality puts such matters front and center, grounding choice and decision in the rational use of finite resources. Anticipated by earlier work in economics and in computer science, this approach has recently seen rapid development and application in the cognitive sciences. Here, the theory of rationality plays a dual role, both as a framework for normative assessment (...)
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  • The Origins of Distinctively Human Mindreading: A Bio-social-technological Co-evolutionary Account.Armin W. Schulz - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
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  • Narratives, probabilities, and the currency of thought.Samuel G. B. Johnson, Avri Bilovich & David Tuckett - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e110.
    Whereas most commentators agree about the centrality of narratives in decision-making, the commentaries revealed little consensus about the nature of radical uncertainty. Here we consider thirteen objections to our views, including our characterization of the uncertain decision environment and associated cognitive, affective, and social processes. We conclude that under radical uncertainty, narratives rather than probabilities are the currency of thought.
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  • Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?David Thorstad - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):396-413.
    Bounded rationality gets a bad rap in epistemology. It is argued that theories of bounded rationality are overly context‐sensitive; conventionalist; or dependent on ordinary language (Carr, 2022; Pasnau, 2013). In this paper, I have three aims. The first is to set out and motivate an approach to bounded rationality in epistemology inspired by traditional theories of bounded rationality in cognitive science. My second aim is to show how this approach can answer recent challenges raised for theories of bounded rationality. My (...)
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  • (1 other version)How Is Perception Tractable?Tyler Brooke-Wilson - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    Perception solves computationally demanding problems at lightning fast speed. It recovers sophisticated representations of the world from degraded inputs, often in a matter of milliseconds. Any theory of perception must be able to explain how this is possible; in other words, it must be able to explain perception's computational tractability. One of the few attempts to move toward such an explanation has been the information encapsulation hypothesis, which posits that perception can be fast because it keeps computational costs low by (...)
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  • The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences.Jake Quilty-Dunn, Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e261.
    Mental representations remain the central posits of psychology after many decades of scrutiny. However, there is no consensus about the representational format(s) of biological cognition. This paper provides a survey of evidence from computational cognitive psychology, perceptual psychology, developmental psychology, comparative psychology, and social psychology, and concludes that one type of format that routinely crops up is the language-of-thought (LoT). We outline six core properties of LoTs: (i) discrete constituents; (ii) role-filler independence; (iii) predicate–argument structure; (iv) logical operators; (v) inferential (...)
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  • Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis.Jie Gao - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (5):1238-1257.
    According to evidentialist views, credence in a proposition p should be proportional to the degree of evidential support that one has in favor of p. However, empirical evidence suggests that our credences are systematically sensitive to practical factors. In this article, I provide a cost–benefit analysis of credences' practical sensitivity. The upshot of this analysis is that credences sensitive to practical factors fare better than practically insensitive ones along several dimensions. All things considered, our credences should be sensitive to practical (...)
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  • Arbitrating norms for reasoning tasks.Aliya R. Dewey - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-26.
    The psychology of reasoning uses norms to categorize responses to reasoning tasks as correct or incorrect in order to interpret the responses and compare them across reasoning tasks. This raises the arbitration problem: any number of norms can be used to evaluate the responses to any reasoning task and there doesn’t seem to be a principled way to arbitrate among them. Elqayam and Evans have argued that this problem is insoluble, so they call for the psychology of reasoning to dispense (...)
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  • Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference.Jake Quilty-Dunn & E. J. Green - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):273-298.
    Perceptual representations pick out individuals and attribute properties to them. This paper considers the role of perceptual attribution in determining or guiding perceptual reference to objects. We consider three extant models of the relation between perceptual attribution and perceptual reference–all attribution guides reference, no attribution guides reference, or a privileged subset of attributions guides reference–and argue that empirical evidence undermines all three. We then defend a flexible-attributives model, on which the range of perceptual attributives used to guide reference shifts adaptively (...)
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  • IX—In Defence of Individual Rationality.Emma Borg - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):195-217.
    Common-sense (or folk) psychology holds that (generally) we do what we do for the reasons we have. This common-sense approach is embodied in claims like ‘I went to the kitchen because I wanted a drink’ and ‘She took a coat because she thought it might rain and hoped to stay dry’. However, the veracity of these common-sense psychological explanations has been challenged by experimental evidence (primarily from behavioural economics and social psychology) which appears to show that individuals are systematically irrational—that (...)
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  • Generalization Bias in Science.Uwe Peters, Alexander Krauss & Oliver Braganza - 2022 - Cognitive Science 46 (9):e13188.
    Many scientists routinely generalize from study samples to larger populations. It is commonly assumed that this cognitive process of scientific induction is a voluntary inference in which researchers assess the generalizability of their data and then draw conclusions accordingly. We challenge this view and argue for a novel account. The account describes scientific induction as involving by default a generalization bias that operates automatically and frequently leads researchers to unintentionally generalize their findings without sufficient evidence. The result is unwarranted, overgeneralized (...)
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  • Two paradoxes of bounded rationality.David Thorstad - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.
    My aim in this paper is to develop a unified solution to two paradoxes of bounded rationality. The first is the regress problem that incorporating cognitive bounds into models of rational decisionmaking generates a regress of higher-order decision problems. The second is the problem of rational irrationality: it sometimes seems rational for bounded agents to act irrationally on the basis of rational deliberation. I review two strategies which have been brought to bear on these problems: the way of weakening which (...)
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  • Cognitive Variation: The Philosophical Landscape.Zina B. Ward - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (10):e12882.
    We do not all make choices, reason, interpret our experience, or respond to our environment in the same way. A recent surge of scientific interest has thrust these individual differences into the spotlight: researchers in cognitive psychology and neuroscience are now devoting increasing attention to cognitive variation. The philosophical dimensions of this research, however, have yet to be systematically explored. Here I make an initial foray by considering how cognitive variation is characterized. I present a central dilemma facing descriptions of (...)
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  • Engineered Wisdom for Learning Machines.Brett Karlan & Colin Allen - 2024 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 36 (2):257-272.
    We argue that the concept of practical wisdom is particularly useful for organizing, understanding, and improving human-machine interactions. We consider the relationship between philosophical analysis of wisdom and psychological research into the development of wisdom. We adopt a practical orientation that suggests a conceptual engineering approach is needed, where philosophical work involves refinement of the concept in response to contributions by engineers and behavioral scientists. The former are tasked with encoding as much wise design as possible into machines themselves, as (...)
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  • A Generative View of Rationality and Growing Awareness†.Teppo Felin & Jan Koenderink - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    In this paper we contrast bounded and ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Ecological approaches to rationality build on the idea of humans as “intuitive statisticians” while we argue for a more generative conception of humans as “probing organisms.” We first highlight how ecological rationality’s focus on cues and statistics is problematic for two reasons: the problem of cue salience, and the problem of cue uncertainty. We highlight these problems by revisiting the statistical and cue-based logic that underlies (...)
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  • Collectives and Epistemic Rationality.Ulrike Hahn - 2022 - Topics in Cognitive Science 14 (3):602-620.
    Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 602-620, July 2022.
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  • Rethinking Rationality.Emmanuel M. Pothos & Timothy J. Pleskac - 2022 - Topics in Cognitive Science 14 (3):451-466.
    Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 451-466, July 2022.
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  • Metaphysics of the Bayesian mind.Justin Tiehen - 2022 - Mind and Language 38 (2):336-354.
    Recent years have seen a Bayesian revolution in cognitive science. This should be of interest to metaphysicians of science, whose naturalist project involves working out the metaphysical implications of our leading scientific accounts, and in advancing our understanding of those accounts by drawing on the metaphysical frameworks developed by philosophers. Toward these ends, in this paper I develop a metaphysics of the Bayesian mind. My central claim is that the Bayesian approach supports a novel empirical argument for normativism, the thesis (...)
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  • (1 other version)Explaining Human Diversity: the Need to Balance Fit and Complexity.Armin W. Schulz - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (2):1-19.
    While the existence of human cognitive and behavioral diversity is now widely recognized, it is not yet well established how to explain this diversity. In particular, it is still unclear how to determine whether any given instance of human cognitive and behavioral diversity is due to a common psychology that is merely “triggered” differently in different bio-cultural environments, or whether it is due to deeply and fundamentally different psychologies. This paper suggests that, to answer this question, we need to employ (...)
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  • Flow and the dynamics of conscious thought.Joshua Shepherd - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):969-988.
    The flow construct has been influential within positive psychology, sport psychology, the science of consciousness, the philosophy of agency, and popular culture. In spite of its longstanding influence, it remains unclear [a] how the constituents of the flow state ‘hang together’—how they relate to each other causally and functionally—[b] in what sense flow is an ‘optimal experience,’ and [c] how best to describe the unique phenomenology of the flow state. As a result, difficulties persist for a clear understanding of the (...)
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  • Underlying delusion: Predictive processing, looping effects, and the personal/sub-personal distinction.Matteo Colombo & Regina E. Fabry - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology (6):829-855.
    What is the relationship between the concepts of the predictive processing theory of brain functioning and the everyday concepts with which people conduct and explain their mental lives? To answer this question, we focus on predictive processing explanations of mental disorder that appeal to false inference. After distinguishing two concepts of false inference, we survey four ways of understanding the relationship between explanations of mental phenomena at the personal and sub-personal level. We then argue that if predictive processing accurately accounts (...)
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  • Bayesian collective learning emerges from heuristic social learning.P. M. Krafft, Erez Shmueli, Thomas L. Griffiths, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & Alex “Sandy” Pentland - 2021 - Cognition 212 (C):104469.
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  • Book: Cognitive Design for Artificial Minds.Antonio Lieto - 2021 - London, UK: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Ltd.
    Book Description (Blurb): Cognitive Design for Artificial Minds explains the crucial role that human cognition research plays in the design and realization of artificial intelligence systems, illustrating the steps necessary for the design of artificial models of cognition. It bridges the gap between the theoretical, experimental and technological issues addressed in the context of AI of cognitive inspiration and computational cognitive science. -/- Beginning with an overview of the historical, methodological and technical issues in the field of Cognitively-Inspired Artificial Intelligence, (...)
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  • Fragmentation and logical omniscience.Adam Elga & Agustín Rayo - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):716-741.
    It would be good to have a Bayesian decision theory that assesses our decisions and thinking according to everyday standards of rationality — standards that do not require logical omniscience (Garber 1983, Hacking 1967). To that end we develop a “fragmented” decision theory in which a single state of mind is represented by a family of credence functions, each associated with a distinct choice condition (Lewis 1982, Stalnaker 1984). The theory imposes a local coherence assumption guaranteeing that as an agent's (...)
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  • Probabilistic stability, agm revision operators and maximum entropy.Krzysztof Mierzewski - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-38.
    Several authors have investigated the question of whether canonical logic-based accounts of belief revision, and especially the theory of AGM revision operators, are compatible with the dynamics of Bayesian conditioning. Here we show that Leitgeb's stability rule for acceptance, which has been offered as a possible solution to the Lottery paradox, allows to bridge AGM revision and Bayesian update: using the stability rule, we prove that AGM revision operators emerge from Bayesian conditioning by an application of the principle of maximum (...)
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  • Reasoning with heuristics.Brett Karlan - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):100-108.
    Which rules should guide our reasoning? Human reasoners often use reasoning shortcuts, called heuristics, which function well in some contexts but lack the universality of reasoning rules like deductive implication or inference to the best explanation. Does it follow that human reasoning is hopelessly irrational? I argue: no. Heuristic reasoning often represents human reasoners reaching a local rational maximum, reasoning more accurately than if they try to implement more “ideal” rules of reasoning. I argue this is a genuine rational achievement. (...)
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  • (1 other version)The science of belief: A progress report.Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science 1.
    The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic (...)
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  • Loving and knowing: reflections for an engaged epistemology.Hanne De Jaegher - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):847-870.
    In search of our highest capacities, cognitive scientists aim to explain things like mathematics, language, and planning. But are these really our most sophisticated forms of knowing? In this paper, I point to a different pinnacle of cognition. Our most sophisticated human knowing, I think, lies in how we engage with each other, in our relating. Cognitive science and philosophy of mind have largely ignored the ways of knowing at play here. At the same time, the emphasis on discrete, rational (...)
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  • Beyond the matrix: Experimental approaches to studying cognitive agents in social-ecological systems.Uri Hertz, Raphael Köster, Marco A. Janssen & Joel Z. Leibo - 2025 - Cognition 254 (C):105993.
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  • An algorithmic account for how humans efficiently learn, transfer, and compose hierarchically structured decision policies.Jing-Jing Li & Anne G. E. Collins - 2025 - Cognition 254 (C):105967.
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  • Still no lie detector for language models: probing empirical and conceptual roadblocks.Benjamin A. Levinstein & Daniel A. Herrmann - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.
    We consider the questions of whether or not large language models (LLMs) have beliefs, and, if they do, how we might measure them. First, we consider whether or not we should expect LLMs to have something like beliefs in the first place. We consider some recent arguments aiming to show that LLMs cannot have beliefs. We show that these arguments are misguided. We provide a more productive framing of questions surrounding the status of beliefs in LLMs, and highlight the empirical (...)
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  • Logical norms as defeasible obligations: disentangling sound and feasible inferences.Matteo De Benedetto & Alessandra Marra - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper develops a novel approach to the question of the normativity of logic, which we reinterpret as a clash between two intuitions: the direct normativity intuition and the unfeasibility intuition. The standard response has been to dismiss the direct normativity intuition, bridging logic and reasoning via principles that relativize the normative import of logic to pragmatic and feasibility considerations. We argue that the standard response is misguided. Building upon theories of bounded rationality, our approach conceptualizes reasoning as constrained by (...)
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  • Active inductive inference in children and adults: A constructivist perspective.Neil R. Bramley & Fei Xu - 2023 - Cognition 238 (C):105471.
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  • Logics and collaboration.Liz Sonenberg - 2023 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 31 (6):1024-1046.
    Since the early days of artificial intelligence (AI), many logics have been explored as tools for knowledge representation and reasoning. In the spirit of the Crossley Festscrift and recognizing John Crossley’s diverse interests and his legacy in both mathematical logic and computer science, I discuss examples from my own research that sit in the overlap of logic and AI, with a focus on supporting human–AI interactions.
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  • Conviction Narrative Theory: A theory of choice under radical uncertainty.Samuel G. B. Johnson, Avri Bilovich & David Tuckett - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e82.
    Conviction Narrative Theory (CNT) is a theory of choice underradical uncertainty– situations where outcomes cannot be enumerated and probabilities cannot be assigned. Whereas most theories of choice assume that people rely on (potentially biased) probabilistic judgments, such theories cannot account for adaptive decision-making when probabilities cannot be assigned. CNT proposes that people usenarratives– structured representations of causal, temporal, analogical, and valence relationships – rather than probabilities, as the currency of thought that unifies our sense-making and decision-making faculties. According to CNT, (...)
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  • Quantum of Wisdom.Colin Allen & Brett Karlan - 2022 - In Greg Viggiano (ed.), Quantum Computing and AI: Social, Ethical, and Geo-Political Implications. pp. 157-166.
    Practical quantum computing devices and their applications to AI in particular are presently mostly speculative. Nevertheless, questions about whether this future technology, if achieved, presents any special ethical issues are beginning to take shape. As with any novel technology, one can be reasonably confident that the challenges presented by "quantum AI" will be a mixture of something new and something old. Other commentators (Sevilla & Moreno 2019), have emphasized continuity, arguing that quantum computing does not substantially affect approaches to value (...)
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  • Constructive Biases in Clinical Judgment.Bartosz W. Wojciechowski, Bernadetta Izydorczyk, Pawel Blasiak, James M. Yearsley, Lee C. White & Emmanuel M. Pothos - 2022 - Topics in Cognitive Science 14 (3):508-527.
    Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 508-527, July 2022.
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  • The Division of Labor in Communication: Speakers Help Listeners Account for Asymmetries in Visual Perspective.Robert D. Hawkins, Hyowon Gweon & Noah D. Goodman - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (3):e12926.
    Recent debates over adults' theory of mind use have been fueled by surprising failures of perspective-taking in communication, suggesting that perspective-taking may be relatively effortful. Yet adults routinely engage in effortful processes when needed. How, then, should speakers and listeners allocate their resources to achieve successful communication? We begin with the observation that the shared goal of communication induces a natural division of labor: The resources one agent chooses to allocate toward perspective-taking should depend on their expectations about the other's (...)
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  • Origin of perseveration in the trade-off between reward and complexity.Samuel J. Gershman - 2020 - Cognition 204 (C):104394.
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  • Epistemic Irrationality in the Bayesian Brain.Daniel Williams - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):913-938.
    A large body of research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience draws on Bayesian statistics to model information processing within the brain. Many theorists have noted that this research seems to be in tension with a large body of experimental results purportedly documenting systematic deviations from Bayesian updating in human belief formation. In response, proponents of the Bayesian brain hypothesis contend that Bayesian models can accommodate such results by making suitable assumptions about model parameters. To make progress in this debate, I (...)
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  • Ecological rationality and economics: where the Twain shall meet.Andreas Ortmann & Leonidas Spiliopoulos - 2023 - Synthese 201 (4):1-30.
    Over the past decades psychological theories have made significant headway into economics, culminating in the 2002 (partially) and 2017 Nobel prizes awarded for work in the field of Behavioral Economics. Many of the insights imported from psychology into economics share a common trait: the presumption that decision makers use shortcuts that lead to deviations from rational behaviour (the Heuristics-and-Biases program). Many economists seem unaware that this viewpoint has long been contested in cognitive psychology. Proponents of an alternative program (the Ecological-Rationality (...)
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  • The information inelasticity of habits: Kahneman’s bounded rationality or Simon’s procedural rationality?Elias L. Khalil - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-40.
    Why would decision makers adopt heuristics, priors, or in short “habits” that prevent them from optimally using pertinent information—even when such information is freely-available? One answer, Herbert Simon’s “procedural rationality” regards the question invalid: DMs do not, and in fact cannot, process information in an optimal fashion. For Simon, habits are the primitives, where humans are ready to replace them only when they no longer sustain a pregiven “satisficing” goal. An alternative answer, Daniel Kahneman’s “mental economy” regards the question valid: (...)
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  • Humans adaptively resolve the explore-exploit dilemma under cognitive constraints: Evidence from a multi-armed bandit task.Vanessa M. Brown, Michael N. Hallquist, Michael J. Frank & Alexandre Y. Dombrovski - 2022 - Cognition 229 (C):105233.
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  • A rational reinterpretation of dual-process theories.Smitha Milli, Falk Lieder & Thomas L. Griffiths - 2021 - Cognition 217 (C):104881.
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  • Arguing to Defeat: Eristic Argumentation and Irrationality in Resolving Moral Concerns.Rasim Serdar Kurdoglu & Nüfer Yasin Ateş - 2020 - Journal of Business Ethics 175 (3):519-535.
    By synthesizing the argumentation theory of new rhetoric with research on heuristics and motivated reasoning, we develop a conceptual view of argumentation based on reasoning motivations that sheds new light on the morality of decision-making. Accordingly, we propose that reasoning in eristic argumentation is motivated by psychological (e.g., anxiety reduction) or material (e.g., vested interests) gains that do not depend on resolving the problem in question truthfully. Contrary to heuristic argumentation, in which disputants genuinely argue to reach a practically rational (...)
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  • A Resource‐Rational, Process‐Level Account of the St. Petersburg Paradox.Ardavan S. Nobandegani & Thomas R. Shultz - 2020 - Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (1):417-432.
    How much would you pay to play a lottery with an “infinite expected payoff?” In the case of the century old, St. Petersburg Paradox, the answer is that the vast majority of people would only pay a small amount. The authors seek to understand this paradox by providing an explanation consistent with a broad, process‐level model of human decision‐making under risk.
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