- (4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Art, Mind, and Religion. [REVIEW]David Lewis - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (1):22-27.details
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Physicalism, or Something near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):306-310.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.details
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(2 other versions)Comments on Jaegwon Kim’s M ind and the Physical World.Barry Loewer - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):655-662.details
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(4 other versions)Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.details
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(1 other version)An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.details
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A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism.Andrew Melnyk - 2003 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.details
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Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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(3 other versions)Special Sciences, or Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.Jerry Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97--115.details
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Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Mind/Brain Identity Theory.Jjc Smart - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.details
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(1 other version)Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.details
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(1 other version)Psychological predicates.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In William H. Capitan & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Art, mind, and religion. [Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 37--48.details
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Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation.James F. Woodward - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Can physicalism be non-reductive?Andrew Melnyk - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296.details
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Evaluating the evidence for multiple realization.Thomas W. Polger - 2009 - Synthese 167 (3):457 - 472.details
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Defining physicalism.Alyssa Ney - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1033-1048.details
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The identity theory.C. Hill - 2009 - In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 359--363.details
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Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.John Perry - 2001 - MIT Press.details
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(3 other versions)Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis).J. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.details
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Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism.Åsa Wikforss - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):158-181.details
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Counterparts of persons and their bodies.David Lewis - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (7):203-211.details
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(1 other version)How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.details
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1953 and all that. A tale of two sciences.Philip Kitcher - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):335-373.details
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Contingent identity.Allan Gibbard - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):187-222.details
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(4 other versions)Mental events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In Lawrence Foster & Joe William Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. London, England: Humanities Press. pp. 79-101.details
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Two Confusions Concerning Multiple Realization.Thomas W. Polger - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):537-547.details
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Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.details
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Mind in a physical world: An essay on the mind–body problem and mental causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.details
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Program explanation: A general perspective.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):107-17.details
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Realization and the metaphysics of mind.Thomas W. Polger - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259.details
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(3 other versions)Special sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.details
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Multiple realizations.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):635-654.details
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The Mind Incarnate.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2004 - MIT Press.details
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Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.details
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Is consciousness a brain process.Ullin T. Place - 1956 - British Journal of Psychology 47 (1):44-50.details
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Phenomenal properties, psychophysical laws and the identity theory.Jaegwon Kim - 1972 - The Monist 56 (April):178-92.details
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Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.details
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Absent qualia are impossible -- a reply to Block.Sydney Shoemaker - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (October):581-99.details
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Are absent qualia impossible?Ned Block - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (2):257-74.details
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The inverted spectrum.Sydney Shoemaker - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (July):357-381.details
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Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.details
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(1 other version)Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap.Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.details
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Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.details
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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Analytic functionalism and the reduction of phenomenal states.Janet Levin - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (March):211-38.details
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