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Is Self-Deception Pretense?

Manuscrito 37 (2):291-332 (2014)

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  1. (1 other version)Alief and Belief.Tamar Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
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  • Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
    Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...)
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  • Self-Deception as Pretense.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
    I propose that paradigmatic cases of self-deception satisfy the following conditions: (a) the person who is self-deceived about not-P pretends (in the sense of makes-believe or imagines or fantasizes) that not-P is the case, often while believing that P is the case and not believing that not-P is the case; (b) the pretense that not-P largely plays the role normally played by belief in terms of (i) introspective vivacity and (ii) motivation of action in a wide range of circumstances. Understanding (...)
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  • Perspectives on Self-Deception.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1988 - University of California Press. Edited by Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty.
    Students of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and literature will welcome this collection of original essays on self-deception and related phenomena such as wishful thinking, bad faith, and false consciousness. The book has six sections, each exploring self-deception and related phenomena from a different perspective.
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  • Lying to oneself.Raphael Demos - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (18):588-595.
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  • The Motivational Role of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.
    This paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue (...)
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  • (1 other version)3. Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind.Mark Johnston - 1988 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 63-91.
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  • Self-deception, action, and will.Robert Audi - 1982 - Erkenntnis 18 (2):133-158.
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  • Deceiving oneself or self-deceived? On the formation of beliefs under the influence.Ariela Lazar - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):265-290.
    How does a subject who is competent to detect the irrationality of a belief that p, form her belief against weighty or even conclusive evidence to the contrary? The phenomenon of self-deception threatens a widely shared view of beliefs according to which they do not regularly correspond to emotions and evaluative attitudes. Accordingly, the most popular answer to this question is that the belief formed in self-deception is caused by an intention to form that belief. On this view, the state (...)
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  • 12. Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception.Georges Rey - 1988 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 264-296.
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  • Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology.Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20):203-221.
    To what extent do self-deception and delusion overlap? In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms. “Motivated” delusions, just like self-deception, can be described as beliefs driven by personal interests. If self-deception can be understood folk-psychologically because of its motivational component, so can motivated delusions. Non-motivated delusions also fit the folk-psychological notion of belief, since they can be described as hypotheses one endorses when attempting to make sense of unusual and powerful experiences. (...)
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  • The duality of mind: an historical perspective.Keith Frankish & Jsbt Evans - 2009 - In Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
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  • The product of self-deception.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437.
    I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception? Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action in a (...)
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  • The Motivational Role of Belief.D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219-246.
    This paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue (...)
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  • Imagination and the motivational view of belief.L. O'Brien - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):55-62.
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  • Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science).Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernández (eds.) - 2008 - Psychology Press.
    This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception.
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  • Self-deception as pseudo-rational regulation of belief.Christoph Michel & Albert Newen - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):731-744.
    Self-deception is a special kind of motivational dominance in belief-formation. We develop criteria which set paradigmatic self-deception apart from related phenomena of automanipulation such as pretense and motivational bias. In self-deception rational subjects defend or develop beliefs of high subjective importance in response to strong counterevidence. Self-deceivers make or keep these beliefs tenable by putting prima-facie rational defense-strategies to work against their established standards of rational evaluation. In paradigmatic self-deception, target-beliefs are made tenable via reorganizations of those belief-sets that relate (...)
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  • The myth of self-deception.Steffen Borge - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-28.
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  • The philosophy of deception.Clancy W. Martin (ed.) - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    This title gathers together essays on deception, self-deception, and the intersections of the two phenomena, from the leading thinkers on the subject.
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  • On self-deception.David Kipp - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (October):305-317.
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  • Against the Deflationary Account of Self-Deception.José Eduardo Porcher - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20):67-84.
    Self-deception poses serious difficulties for belief attribution because the behavior of the self-deceived is deeply conflicted: some of it supports the attribution of a certain belief, while some of it supports the contrary attribution. Theorists have resorted either to attributing both beliefs to the self-deceived, or to postulating an unconscious belief coupled with another kind of cognitive attitude. On the other hand, deflationary accounts of self- deception have attempted a more parsimonious solution: attributing only one, false belief to the subject. (...)
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  • Delusion and motivationally biased belief: Self-deception in the two-factor framework.Martin Davies - 2008 - In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernández (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press. pp. 71–86.
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  • Introduction: "The intersections of deception and self-deception".Clancy Martin - 2009 - In Clancy W. Martin (ed.), The philosophy of deception. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Self-deception, self-pretence, and emotional detachment.Michael W. Martin - 1979 - Mind 88 (July):441-446.
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  • Self-Deception and Self-Understanding: New Essays In Philosophy and Psychology.ed Mike W. Martin - 1985
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