- Belief in character studies.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):27-42.details
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How beliefs are like colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7889-7918.details
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Interpretivism without judgement-dependence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (2):611-615.details
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Can Deflationism Save Interpretivism?Krzysztof Poslajko - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):709-725.details
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How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2018 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.details
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Interpretivism and norms.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):905-930.details
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Interventionism for the Intentional Stance: True Believers and Their Brains.Markus I. Eronen - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):45-55.details
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(1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.details
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Fictionalism and the folk.Adam Toon - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):280-295.details
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(4 other versions)Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 2001 - In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.details
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(1 other version)Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.details
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Groups as Agents.Deborah Tollefsen - 2015 - Malden, MA: Polity.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):76-100.details
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Intentional systems theory, mental causation and empathic resonance.Marc V. P. Slors - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):321-336.details
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Interpretivism.Alex Byrne - 1998 - European Review of Philosophy 3 (Response-Dependence):199-223.details
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Real patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.details
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The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Folk psychology as a model.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-16.details
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A Dispositional Approach to the Attitudes.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - In Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure. New York: Palgrave. pp. 75-99.details
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(1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.details
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Precis of the intentional stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):495-505.details
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In defence of (model) theory theory.Heidi Maibom - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.details
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(1 other version)What is Relativism?Paul Boghossian - 2006 - In Patrick Greenough & Michael Patrick Lynch (eds.), Truth and realism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 13--37.details
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Psychology as philosophy.Donald Davidson - 1974 - In Stuart C. Brown (ed.), Philosophy Of Psychology. London: : Macmillan. pp. 41-52.details
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Mind Ascribed. An elaboration and defence of interpretivism.Bruno Mölder - 2010 - John Benjamins.details
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Interpretation: Its Scope and Limits.U. Kriegel - 2010 - In Allan Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics. Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Dennett's little grains of salt.Gregory McCulloch - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):1-12.details
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