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  1. Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Hilary Putnam deals in this book with some of the most fundamental persistent problems in philosophy: the nature of truth, knowledge and rationality. His aim is to break down the fixed categories of thought which have always appeared to define and constrain the permissible solutions to these problems.
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  • (2 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
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  • (2 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
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  • (1 other version)Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
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  • (1 other version)Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
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  • (1 other version)A coherence theory of truth and knowledge.Donald Davidson - 1986 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 307-319.
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  • (1 other version)Reason, Truth and History.Kathleen Okruhlik - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):692-694.
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  • (1 other version)Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy.S. Cavell - 1979 - Critical Philosophy 1 (1):97.
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  • Understanding Wittgenstein's On certainty.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2004 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This radical reading of Wittgenstein's third and last masterpiece, On Certainty, has major implications for philosophy. It elucidates Wittgenstein's ultimate thoughts on the nature of our basic beliefs and his demystification of scepticism. Our basic certainties are shown to be nonepistemic, nonpropositional attitudes that, as such, have no verbal occurrence but manifest themselves exclusively in our actions. This fundamental certainty is a belief-in, a primitive confidence or ur-trust whose practical nature bridges the hitherto unresolved categorial gap between belief and action.
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  • Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
    In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti- luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck. Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti- luck epistemology can be developed in new directions.
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  • A defence of common sense.George Edward Moore - 1925 - In J. H. Muirhead (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy, Second Series. George Allen and Unwin.
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  • (2 other versions)Proof of an external world.George Edward Moore - 1939 - Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (5):273--300.
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  • (1 other version)A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.Donald Davidson - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)Internalism exposed.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):271-293.
    In recent decades, epistemology has witnessed the development and growth of externalist theories of knowledge and justification. Critics of externalism have focused a bright spotlight on this approach and judged it unsuitable for realizing the true and original goals of epistemology. Their own favored approach, internalism, is defended as a preferable approach to the traditional concept of epistemic justification. I shall turn the spotlight toward internalism and its most prominent rationale, revealing fundamental problems at the core of internalism and challenging (...)
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  • Knowledge and the internal.John McDowell - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):877-93.
    1. I am going to work with an idea from Sellars, that knowledge—at least as enjoyed by rational animals—is a certain sort of standing in the space of reasons. My concern is a familiar philosophical dialectic, which I shall approach in terms of what happens to the Sellarsian idea when the image of standings in the space of reasons undergoes a certain deformation. That it is a deformation is something we can learn from how unsatisfactory the familiar dialectic is.
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  • The Case for Closure.John Hawthorne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 26-43.
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  • Epistemic Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (11):550-571.
    The goal of this paper is to mark the transition from an anti-luck epistemology to an anti-risk epistemology, and to explain in the process how the latter has advantages over the former. We begin with an account of anti-luck epistemology and the modal account of luck that underpins it. Then we consider the close inter-relationships between luck and risk, and in the process set out the modal account of risk that is a natural extension of the modal account of luck. (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.
    This essay offers a rearticulation and defence of the modal account of luck that the author developed in earlier work . In particular, the proposal is situated within a certain methodology, a component of which is paying due attention to the cognitive science literature on luck ascriptions. It is shown that with the modal account of luck properly articulated it can adequately deal with some of the problems that have recently been offered against it, and that the view has a (...)
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  • Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.
    A certain construal of the Gettier problem is offered, according to which this problem concerns the task of identifying the anti-luck condition on knowledge. A methodology for approaching this construal of the Gettier problem—anti-luck epistemology—is set out, and the utility of such a methodology is demonstrated. It is argued that a range of superficially distinct cases which are meant to pose problems for anti-luck epistemology are in fact related in significant ways. It is claimed that with these cases properly understood, (...)
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  • The conditional fallacy in contemporary philosophy.Robert K. Shope - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (8):397-413.
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  • The Structure of Sceptical Arguments.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):37 - 52.
    It is nowadays taken for granted that the core radical sceptical arguments all pivot upon the principle that the epistemic operator in question is 'closed' under known entailments. Accordingly, the standard anti-sceptical project now involves either denying closure or retaining closure by amending how one understands other elements of the sceptical argument. However, there are epistemic principles available to the sceptic which are logically weaker than closure but achieve the same result. Accordingly the contemporary debate fails to engage with the (...)
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  • Anti-risk epistemology and negative epistemic dependence.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2879-2894.
    Support is canvassed for a new approach to epistemology called anti-risk epistemology. It is argued that this proposal is rooted in the motivations for an existing account, known as anti-luck epistemology, but is superior on a number of fronts. In particular, anti-risk epistemology is better placed than anti-luck epistemology to supply the motivation for certain theoretical moves with regard to safety-based approaches to knowledge. Moreover, anti-risk epistemology is more easily extendable to epistemological questions beyond that in play in the theory (...)
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  • Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
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  • Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3):51-66.
    It is argued that standard accounts of the epistemology of religious commitmentfail to be properly sensitive to certain important features of the nature of religious conviction. Once one takes these features of religious conviction seriously, then it becomes clear that we are not to conceive of the epistemology of religious conviction along completely rational lines.But the moral to extract from this is not fideism, or even a more moderate proposal that casts the epistemic standing of basic religious beliefs along nonrational (...)
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  • Defusing epistemic relativism.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):397-412.
    This paper explores the question of whether there is an interesting form of specifically epistemic relativism available, a position which can lend support to claims of a broadly relativistic nature but which is not committed to relativism about truth. It is argued that the most plausible rendering of such a view turns out not to be the radical thesis that it is often represented as being.
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  • On synchronic dogmatism.Rodrigo Borges - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3677-3693.
    Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.
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  • Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism.D. H. Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 4:145-159.
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  • The conditional fallacy.Daniel Bonevac, Josh Dever & and David Sosa - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (3):273-316.
    To say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if submerged anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water. To say that this sleeper knows French, is to say that if, for example, he is ever addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds pertinently in French, acts appropriately or translates correctly into his own tongue.
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  • Is `god exists' a `hinge proposition' of religious belief?Duncan Pritchard - 2000 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (3):129-140.
    There are parallels between certain responses to local epistemological scepticism about religious belief and an influential reply to radical epistemological scepticism. What ties both accounts together is that they utilise, either implicitly or explicitly, a “hinge” proposition thesis which maintains that the pivotal beliefs in question are immune to sceptical attack even though they lack sufficient epistemic grounds. It is argued that just as this strategy lacks any anti-sceptical efficacy in the context of the radical sceptical debate, so it offers (...)
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  • Wittgenstein: Epistemology.Nicola Claudio Salvatore - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Wittgenstein: Epistemology Although Ludwig Wittgenstein is generally more known for his works on logic and on the nature of language, but throughout his philosophical journey he reflected extensively also on epistemic notions such as knowledge, belief, doubt, and certainty. This interest is more evident in his final notebook, published posthumously as On Certainty (1969, henceforth … Continue reading Wittgenstein: Epistemology →.
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  • The Argument from Abomination.Michael Veber - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1185-1196.
    The conclusive reasons view of knowledge entails the “abominable conjunction” that I know that I have hands but I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat. The argument from abomination takes this as a reason to reject the view. This paper aims to buttress the argument from abomination by adding a new sort to this list: the logical abominations. These include: “I know that argument is sound and that sound arguments have true conclusions but I (...)
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  • Zagzebski on Rationality.Duncan Pritchard & Shane Ryan - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):39--46.
    This paper examines Linda Zagzebski’s account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebski’s claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering Zagzebski a (...)
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