- Epistemic Cans.Tim Kearl & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Truth is One (No Need for Pluralism).Giorgio Volpe - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.details
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A Rational Agent With Our Evidence.Dominik Kauss - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Categorical phenomenalism about sexual orientation.T. R. Whitlow & N. G. Laskowski - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):581-596.details
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Well‐being, part 2: Theories of well‐being.Eden Lin - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12813.details
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Solving the Ideal Worlds Problem.Caleb Perl - 2021 - Ethics 132 (1):89-126.details
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Explaining Normative Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):51-80.details
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Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:253-277.details
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The advice models of happiness: a response to Feldman.Jussi Suikkanen - 2019 - International Journal of Wellbeing 9 (2):8-13.details
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Contractualism for Us As We Are.Nicholas Southwood - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):529-547.details
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Actual vs. counterfactual dispositional metasemantics : a reply to Andow.Michael Johnson & Jennifer Nado - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):717-734.details
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Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?Daniel Wodak - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):259-279.details
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Subjective Disagreement.Beddor Bob - 2018 - Noûs 53 (4):819-851.details
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Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Understanding phenomena.Christoph Kelp - unknowndetails
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.details
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Dispositions.James M. Bucknell - 2015 - Dissertation, Univeristy of New South Walesdetails
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Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics 1 : Realism and Constructivism in a Kantian Context.Karl Schafer - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):690-701.details
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Verbal Debates in Epistemology.Daniel Greco - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):41-55.details
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Process reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.details
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The American Pragmatists. [REVIEW]Tom Donaldson - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (3):355-359.details
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An Improved Whole Life Satisfaction Theory of Happiness.Jussi Suikkanen - 2011 - International Journal of Wellbeing 1 (1):149-166.details
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Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-22.details
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A Defense of the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm.Justin Klocksiem - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):285 – 300.details
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What is the 'Cause' in Causal Decision Theory?Christopher Hitchcock - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):129-146.details
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Can There Be a Knowledge-First Ethics of Belief?Dennis Whitcomb - 2014 - In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Dispositions.Sungho Choi - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Default Reasoning: Jumping to Conclusions and Knowing When to Think Twice.Kent Bach - 1984 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1):37.details
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Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action.David Sobel - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):218.details
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Fittingness: The sole normative primitive.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.details
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Internal Reasons.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - In Internal Reasons.details
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The chameleon’s revenge: Response-dependence, finks and provisoed biconditionals.Eline Busck Gundersen - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):435-441.details
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The Meaning of "Look".Wylie Breckenridge - 2007 - Dissertation, New College, University of Oxforddetails
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Reasons for action: Internal vs. external.Stephen Finlay & Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Mirage of Motivation Reason Internalism.Saleh Afroogh - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56:1-19.details
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Dispositions.Michael Fara - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Antirealism, theism and the conditional fallacy.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):123–139.details
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Finkish dispositions.David Kellogg Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.details
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Colour constancy as counterfactual.Jonathan Cohen - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.details
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Neo-Kantian constructivism and metaethics.Kirk Surgener - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy.Robert N. Johnson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):53-72.details
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Descartes and the Possibility of Enlightened Freedom.Daniel Fogal - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (4):499-534.details
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Ifs, Ands, and Buts: An Incremental Truthmaker Semantics for Indicative Conditionals.Stephen Yablo - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):175-213.details
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An epistemic value theory.Dennis Whitcomb - 2007 - Dissertation, Rutgersdetails
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The Conditions of Moral Realism.Christian Miller - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:123-155.details
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Advisors and Deliberation.Steven Arkonovich - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):405-424.details
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Internalism, (Super)fragile Reasons, and the Conditional Fallacy.Teresa Robertson - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (2):171-184.details
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Conditionalizing on knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):89-121.details
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An objective counterfactual theory of information.Jonathan Cohen & Aaron Meskin - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):333 – 352.details
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