- Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk.Lilith Newton - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-23.details
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Secret Law Revisited.Benjamin L. S. Nelson - 2019 - Ratio Juris 32 (4):473-486.details
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Access, Promulgation, and Propaganda.Benjamin L. S. Nelson - manuscriptdetails
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Luck and Risk.Jesús Navarro - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):63-75.details
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk.Jesús Navarro - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1-22.details
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk.Jesús Navarro - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):929-950.details
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Etiological Proper Function and the Safety Condition.Dario Mortini - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-22.details
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Entitlement, epistemic risk and scepticism.Luca Moretti - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):576-586.details
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Epistemic Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Leaching.Luca Moretti & Crispin Wright - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):566-580.details
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Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice.Veli Mitova - 2023 - Metaphilosophy 54 (4):539-552.details
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Sosa on scepticism and the background.Duncan Pritchard - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.details
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Metaphysics of risk and luck.Jaakko Hirvelä - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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The sensitivity of legal proof.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-23.details
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Fake Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesus Navarro - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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An objection to the modal account of risk.Martin Smith - 2023 - Synthese 201 (5):1-9.details
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Defining Wokeness.J. Spencer Atkins - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (3):321-338.details
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Deepfakes, Fake Barns, and Knowledge from Videos.Taylor Matthews - 2023 - Synthese 201 (2):1-18.details
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Profiling and Proof: Are Statistics Safe?Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (2):161-183.details
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Intellectual virtue and its role in epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-20.details
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Experience is Knowledge.Matt Duncan - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. OUP. pp. 106-129.details
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Knowledge, practical knowledge, and intentional action.Joshua Shepherd & J. Adam Carter - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9:556-583.details
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Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes: Pessimism about the Epistemic Project.Giada Fratantonio - 2021 - International Journal of Evidence and Proof:online first.details
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Close Error, Visual Perception, and Neural Phase: A Critique of the Modal Approach to Knowledge.Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1123-1152.details
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The Problem of Unwelcome Epistemic Company.Joshua Blanchard - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):529-541.details
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Knowing How to Know That.Benjamin Elzinga - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1987-2001.details
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Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.details
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Is epistemic safety threatened by Frankfurt cases? A reply to Kelp.Domingos Faria - 2020 - Diametros 17 (66):66-71.details
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De Minimis Normativism: a New Theory of Full Aptness.J. Adam Carter - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):16-36.details
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(1 other version)Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3635-3664.details
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On two formulations of the safety condition and epistemic risk.Francois-Igor Pris - 2019 - Al-Farabi 3 (67):15-24.details
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On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.details
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Modal Virtue Epistemology.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):61-79.details
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Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2018 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Epistemology of Disagreement, Bias, and Political Deliberation: The Problems for a Conciliatory Democracy.Jay Carlson - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1161-1171.details
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Knowledge of things.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3559-3592.details
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Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).details
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Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.details
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Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge.details
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Holistic Competence and its Partial Manifestations.Tony Tsz Fung Lau - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (5):2589-2602.details
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Knowing How to Know That.Benjamin Elzinga - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1987-2001.details
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In defence of the modal account of legal risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-16.details
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An Inductive Risk Account of the Ethics of Belief.Guy Axtell - 2019 - Philosophy. The Journal of the Higher School of Economic 3 (3):146-171.details
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On behalf of a bi-level account of trust.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2299-2322.details
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The redundancy problem: From knowledge-infallibilism to knowledge-minimalism.Stephen Hetherington - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4683-4702.details
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A taxonomy of types of epistemic dependence: introduction to the Synthese special issue on epistemic dependence.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Jesús Vega-Encabo - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2745-2763.details
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Do Safety Failures Preclude Knowledge?J. R. Fett - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (2):301-319.details
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Knowledge-how, Understanding-why and Epistemic Luck: an Experimental Study.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & Joshua Shepherd - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):701-734.details
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Fake Barns and Our Epistemological Theorizing.Ángel García Rodríguez - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):29-53.details
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Risk.Sven Ove Hansson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Ernest Sosa: Judgment and Agency.Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (5):274-276.details
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