First published in 1935, On Escape represents Emmanuel Levinas’s first attempt to break with the ontological obsession of the Western tradition. In it, Levinas not only affirms the necessity of an escape from being, but also gives a meaning and a direction to it. Beginning with an analysis of need not as lack or some external limit to a self-sufficient being, but as a positive relation to our being, Levinas moves through a series of brilliant phenomenological analyses of such phenomena (...) as pleasure, shame, and nausea in order to show a fundamental insufficiency in the human condition. In his critical introduction and annotation, Jacques Rolland places On Escape in its historical and intellectual context, and also within the context of Levinas’s entire oeuvre, explaining Levinas’s complicated relation to Heidegger, and underscoring the way Levinas’s analysis of “being riveted,” of the need for escape, is a meditation on the body. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Ever since the beginning of the modern phenomenological movement disciplined attention has been paid to various patterns of human experience as ...

A sequel to Levinas' Totality and Infinity.

Since their separation in Platonic metaphysics, the Western philosophical tradition has given primacy to the question of being and neglected the question of the good. This, according to French phenomenologist Emmanuel Levinas, was not merely oversight, but a result of the manner in which being was thought. The present book is a series of reflections on being and the good written between 1940 and 1945, originally published in 1947, and translated in conjunction with the projected translations of Levinas’s essays on (...) the philosophy of religion and other matters as well as his major work Autrement qu'être ou au delà de l'essence. It is to be read in the context of Levinas’s later efforts to think this relation through anew by grounding metaphysics in ethics rather than by constructing an ethic upon pre-established metaphysical foundations. The original difficulty derives from the nature of consciousness itself which attempts to encompass the one and the other in a single point of view. By thus reducing the alterity of the other, otherness is incorporated into the same thus compromising it as other. This is especially pernicious in the matter of other persons since they are then taken to be the sum total of their observable roles and behaviors. This procedure holds mutatis mutandis for the intricate economic and political structures of society which are incorporated in like fashion into a totality. But what gives meaning and worth to existence lies beyond constituting consciousness and beyond totality: other persons, irreducible to the sums of their behaviors, are the ultimate source of values. (shrink)