A generally ignored feature of Plato’s celebrated image of the cave in Republic VII is that the ascent from the cave is, in its initial stages, said to be brought about by force. What kind of ‘force’ is this, and why is it necessary? This paper considers three possible interpretations, and argues that each may have a role to play.

Plato's Symposium, written in the early part of the 4th century BC, is set at a drinking party attended by some of the leading intellectuals of the day, including Aristophanes, the comic dramatist, Socrates, Plato's mentor, and Alcibiades, the brilliant but treacherous politician. Each guest gives a speech in praise of the benefits of desire and its role in the good and happy human life. At the core of the work stands Socrates' praise of philosophical desire, and an argument for (...) the superiority of the philosophical life as the best route to happiness. This edition provides an accessible and engaging new translation by M. C. Howatson, and a substantial introduction, by Frisbee C. C. Sheffield, which guides the reader through the various parts of the dialogue and reflects on its central arguments. A chronology and detailed notes on the participants help to set this enduring work in context. (shrink)

The essays in this anthology explore the full spectrum of Plato's philosophy and are representative of the variety of perspectives within feminist criticism.

Book synopsis: Reissued in 1997 with corrections and a new Afterword, this book fully explores for the first time an idea common to Plato and Aristotle, which unites their treatments - otherwise very different - of love and friendship. The idea is that although persons are separate, their lives need not be. One person's life may overflow into another's, and as such, helping another person is a way of serving oneself. The author shows how their view of love and friendship, (...) within not only personal relationships, but also the household and even the city-state, promises to resolve the old dichotomy between egoism and altruism. (shrink)

C. D. C. Reeve develops a powerful new account of the age-old argument over whether the just are happier than the unjust, drawing from a new understanding of Plato's conception of philosophy.

This chapter contains sections titled: Socrates and the Art of Love Socrates and Athenian Paiderastia Loving Socrates Love and the Ascent to the Beautiful The Art and Psychology of Love Explained Writing about Love.

The Statesman is Plato's neglected political work, but it is crucial for an understanding of the development of his political thinking. In some respects it continues themes from the Republic, particularly the importance of knowledge as entitlement to rule. But there are also changes: Plato has dropped the ambitious metaphysical synthesis of the Republic, changed his view of the moral psychology of the citizen, and revised his position on the role of law and institutions. In its presentation of the statesman's (...) expertise, the Statesman modifies, as well as defending in original ways, this central theme of the Republic. (shrink)

Explores the relationship between philosophers' and psychoanalysts' attempts to discover how man thinks and perceives himself.

Malcolm argues that all middle-dialogue Platonic Forms are at the same time universals and self-predicating in that they are paradigm cases. This renders them vulnerable to the Third Man argument. Early-dialogue Forms, by contrast, exemplify themselves only when it is legitimate for them to do so, and are therefore exempted from the Third Man. Beauty, for example, may reasonably be supposed to be a beautiful thing "as a general nature", and this exemplification, Malcolm argues, gives no hold to the nonidentity (...) that generates the Third Man. In the middle dialogues, however, Plato is wrong to take Forms as both universals and paradigm cases. The source of this trouble is not the logico-linguistic error of confusing the name of a Form with its description, but Plato's failure to distinguish two types of things that may be called Forms: the universal F and perfectly F things. (shrink)