Most definitions of the concept of stakeholder include only human entities. This paper advances the argument that the non-human natural environment can be integrated into the stakeholder management concept. This argument includes the observations that the natural environment is finally becoming recognized as a vital component of the business environment, that the stakeholder concept is more than a human political/economic one, and that non-human nature currently is not adequately represented by other stakeholder groups. In addition, this paper asserts that any (...) of several stakeholder management processes can readily include the natural environment as one or more stakeholders of organizations. Finally, the point is made that this integration would provide a more holistic, value-oriented, focused and strategic approach to stakeholder management, potentially benefitting both nature and organizations. (shrink)

This article presents an integrative conceptual framework for linking corporate social performance, stakeholders, and quality of management, then tests this framework empirically. Results provide strong support for the hypothesis that perceived quality of management can be explained by the quality of performance with respect to specific primary stakeholders: owners, employees, customers, and (marginally) communities, but treatment of ecological environmental considera- tions is not a significant factor.

Researchers in the business and society area have yet to address corporations that receive special government subsidies (a.k.a. corporate welfare). This article makes the argument that given their subsidized status, the citizenship of those companieswarrants scrutiny, tests the common notion that large companies in particular industries derive the greatest benefit from corporate welfare, and determines what, if any, relationship corporate welfare has with corporate citizenship. Results show that large companies in particular industries are the most likely recipients of corporate welfare. (...) In addition, corporations that receive corporate welfare demonstrate levels of corporate citizenship, which, after controlling for size, are not significantly different from companies that receive no such subsidies. (shrink)

In this research, the authors present a model that demonstrates that motivating managers to change unpopular or irresponsible corporate behavior may be required when the stakeholders desire such a change. Using agency theory, they then test part of the model and demonstrate why it may be necessary for an organized protest to impact on share prices before managers choose to change the behavior. Investors' reactions to announcements of product boycotts and stock divestitures made over the 23-year period 1969-1991 were examined. (...) Announcements about boycotts were associated with significant negative market reactions, whereas divestiture announcements resulted in no significant market responses. From a pure stock market perspective, boycotts appear to be a more effective tool in influencing managers to change a company's behavior. (shrink)

This article discusses the development and application of various types of corporate social monitoring systems. Boycotts are a relatively simple form of social monitoring system which aim to produce changes in corporate social behavior. Boycotts may be organized by a single group, or by a number of groups simultaneously. Rating systems may be organized around a single issue, such as the Sullivan Principles rating scheme, or may include multiple companies and multiple issues, such as shopping guides or ethical investment systems.Monitoring (...) systems may be unidimensional or multidimensional, qualitative or quantitative, and absolute or relative. Consumers and investors appear to be the groups most likely to be targeted in these schemes. The importance of these monitoring systems appears to be increasing as both consumers and investors become more interested in using social criteria in decision-making. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that common stock investors are exclusively interested in earning the highest level of future cash-flow for a given amount of risk. This view suggests that investors select a well-diversified portfolio of securities to achieve this goal. Accordingly, it is often assumed that investors are unwilling to pay a premium for corporate behavior which can be described as socially-responsible.Recently, this view has been under increasing attack. According to the Social Investment Forum, at least 538 institutional investors now (...) allocate funds using social screens or criteria. In addition, Alice Tepper Marlin, president of the New York-based Council on Economic Priorities has recently estimated that about $600 billion of invested funds are socially-screened (1992). (shrink)

In this article, we document the growing influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the realm of socially responsible investing (SRI). Drawing from ethical and economic perspectives on stakeholder management and agency theory, we develop a framework to understand how and when NGOs will be most influential in shaping the ethical and social responsibility orientations of business using the emergence of SRI as the primary influencing vehicle. We find that NGOs have opportunities to influence corporate conduct via direct, indirect, and interactive (...) influences on the investment community, and that the overall influence of NGOs as major actors in socially responsible investment is growing, with attendant consequences for corporate strategy, governance, and social performance. (shrink)

Shannon Shipp argues for the Modified Vendetta Sanction as a method of corporate-collective punishment. He claims that this sanction evades the difficulties of Peter French's Hester Prynne Sanction. In this paper I argue that, though the Modified Vendetta Sanction evades the problems that Shipp poses for it, it fails to evade some of the difficulties that I pose for French's method. Moreover, there are some difficulties that plague the Modified Vendetta Sanction which do not count against the Hester Prynne Sanction. (...) Therefore, if my analysis holds, then Shipp's method neither improves significantly on the Hester Prynne Sanction nor is unproblematic in its own right. The significance of this paper is that it foils yet another attempt by some corporate punishment theorists to establish the plausibility of a method of corporate-collective punishment. (shrink)

In this research, the authors present a model that demonstrates that motivating managers to change unpopular or irresponsible corporate behavior may be required when the stakeholders desire such a change. Using agency theory, they then test part of the model and demonstrate why it may be necessary for an organized protest to impact on share prices before managers choose to change the behavior. Investors' reactions to announcements of product boycotts and stock divestitures made over the 23-year period 1969-1991 were examined. (...) Announcements about boycotts were associated with significant negative market reactions, whereas divestiture announcements resulted in no significant market responses. From a pure stock market perspective, boycotts appear to be a more effective tool in influencing managers to change a company's behavior. (shrink)