Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (1 other version)The Reasons of Love.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2004 - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
    The author argues that the key to a fulfilled life is to pursue what one cares about, that love is the most authoritative form of caring, and that the purest form of love is, in a complicated way, self-love.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   214 citations  
  • (1 other version)Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   306 citations  
  • Value Relations Revisited.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2012 - Economics and Philosophy 28 (2):133-164.
    In Rabinowicz (2008), I considered how value relations can best be analysed in terms of fitting pro-attitudes. In the formal model of that paper, fitting pro-attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of ‘better’, ‘worse’, ‘equally as good as’ and ‘incomparable in value’. Unfortunately, the approach is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Moral Luck Defended.Nathan Hanna - 2012 - Noûs 48 (4):683-698.
    I argue that there is moral luck, i.e., that factors beyond our control can affect how laudable or culpable we are.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • (1 other version)Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics.Michael S. Moore - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    The concept of causation is fundamental to ascribing moral and legal responsibility for events. Yet the precise relationship between causation and responsibility remains unclear. This book clarifies that relationship through an analysis of the best accounts of causation in metaphysics, and a critique of the confusion in legal doctrine.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  • Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error.Gilbert Harman - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999):315-331.
    Ordinary moral thought often commits what social psychologists call 'the fundamental attribution error '. This is the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent's distinctive character traits. In fact, there is no evidence that people have character traits in the relevant sense. Since attribution of character traits leads to much evil, we should try to educate ourselves and others to stop doing it.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   336 citations  
  • (2 other versions)The Moralistic Fallacy.Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   331 citations  
  • Moral luck and the virtues of impure agency.Margaret Urban Walker - 1991 - Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2):14-27.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • (1 other version)Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   582 citations  
  • Which relationships justify partiality? The case of parents and children.Niko Kolodny - 2010 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (1):37-75.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • Moral luck and the law.David Enoch - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):42-54.
    Is there a difference in moral blameworthiness between a murderer and an attempted murderer? Should there be a legal difference between them? These questions are particular instances of the question of moral luck and legal luck (respectively). In this paper, I survey and explain the main argumentative moves within the general philosophical discussion of moral luck. I then discuss legal luck, and the different ways in which this discussion may be related to that of moral luck.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Incommensurability and agency.Joseph Raz - 1999 - In Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 110-28.
    Human agents act for reasons that contribute to their good. However, in our explanation of why agents act for reasons that depend on what they value, we encounter the problem of situations in which goods are neither better than others nor are of equal value. The incommensurability of value can then be seen to lead to an incommensurability of reasons for action. Examining rationalist and classical conceptions of human agency, Raz uses the presence of incommensurability to understand how this affects (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    The illusory appeal of double effect -- The significance of intent -- Means and ends -- Blame.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   611 citations  
  • Morals from motives.Michael A. Slote - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Morals from Motives develops a virtue ethics inspired more by Hume and Hutcheson's moral sentimentalism than by recently-influential Aristotelianism. It argues that a reconfigured and expanded "morality of caring" can offer a general account of right and wrong action as well as social justice. Expanding the frontiers of ethics, it goes on to show how a motive-based "pure" virtue theory can also help us to understand the nature of human well-being and practical reason.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   149 citations  
  • (4 other versions)The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. Edited by Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya.
    The foundation for a system of morals, this 1749 work is a landmark of moral and political thought. Its highly original theories of conscience, moral judgment, and virtue offer a reconstruction of the Enlightenment concept of social science, embracing both political economy and theories of law and government.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   734 citations  
  • Taking luck seriously.Michael Zimmerman - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (11):553-576.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   143 citations  
  • Luck and moral responsibility.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1987 - Ethics 97 (2):374-386.
    The following argument is addressed: (1) a person is morally responsible for an event's occurring only if that event's occurring was not a matter of luck; (2) no event is such that its occurring is not a matter of luck; therefore, (3) no event is such that someone is morally responsible for its occurring. Two notions of control are distinguished: restricted and complete. (2) is shown false on the first interpretation, (1) on the second. The discussion involves a distinction between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   84 citations  
  • A solution to the problem of moral luck.Brynmor Browne - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):345-356.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • (3 other versions)Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
    The doyen of living English philosophers, by these reflections, took hold of and changed the outlook of a good many other philosophers, if not quite enough. He did so, essentially, by assuming that talk of freedom and responsibility is talk not of facts or truths, in a certain sense, but of our attitudes. His more explicit concern was to look again at the question of whether determinism and freedom are consistent with one another -- by shifting attention to certain personal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1340 citations  
  • (3 other versions)Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   795 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Reasons of Love.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - Princeton University Press.
    This beautifully written book by one of the world's leading moral philosophers argues that the key to a fulfilled life is to pursue wholeheartedly what one cares about, that love is the most authoritative form of caring, and that the purest form of love is, in a complicated way, self-love. Harry Frankfurt writes that it is through caring that we infuse the world with meaning. Caring provides us with stable ambitions and concerns; it shapes the framework of aims and interests (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   161 citations  
  • On Keeping Things in Proportion.Adam Lovett & Stefan Riedener - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (3).
    Formula One isn’t very important. You can't care about it too much. The refugee crisis is more important. You can care about it much more. In this paper we investigate how important something is. By ‘importance’ we mean how much it is fitting to care about a thing. We explore a view about this which we call Proportionalism. This view says that a thing’s importance depends on that thing’s share of the world’s total value. The more of what matters there (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Empirical Vindication of Moral Luck.Victor Kumar - 2018 - Noûs 53 (4):987-1007.
    In resultant moral luck, blame and punishment seem intuitively to depend on downstream effects of a person’s action that are beyond his or her control. Some skeptics argue that we should override our intuitions about moral luck and reform our practices. Other skeptics attempt to explain away apparent cases of moral luck as epistemic artifacts. I argue, to the contrary, that moral luck is real—that people are genuinely responsible for some things beyond their control. A partially consequentialist theory of responsibility (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Moral Luck.Thomas Nagel - 1993 - In Daniel Statman (ed.), Moral Luck. SUNY Press. pp. 141--166.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   208 citations  
  • The Moral of Moral Luck.Susan Wolf - 2001 - Philosophic Exchange 31 (1).
    This essay is primarily concerned with one type of moral luck – luck in how things turn out. Do acts that actually lead to harm deserve the same treatment as similar acts that, by chance, do not lead to harm? This paper argues that we must recognize the truth in two, opposing tendencies in such cases.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations  
  • (1 other version)Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):494-497.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   418 citations  
  • Salience, Imagination, and Moral Luck.Nathan Stout - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):297-313.
    One key desideratum of a theory of blame is that it be able to explain why we typically have differing blaming responses in cases involving significant degrees of luck. T.M. Scanlon has proposed a relational account of blame, and he has argued that his account succeeds in this regard and that this success makes his view preferable to reactive attitude accounts of blame. In this paper, I aim to show that Scanlon's view is open to a different kind of luck-based (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - New York: Routledge.
    There is a contradiction in our ideas about moral responsibility. In one strand of our thinking, we believe that a person can become more blameworthy by luck. Consider some examples in order to make that idea concrete. Two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in the same way, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would each freely take a bribe if one were offered. By luck of the courthouse draw, only one judge is offered a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   81 citations  
  • Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrong’ kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between the ‘right’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   442 citations  
  • Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    Emotions shape the landscape of our mental and social lives. Like geological upheavals in a landscape, they mark our lives as uneven, uncertain and prone to reversal. Are they simply, as some have claimed, animal energies or impulses with no connection to our thoughts? Or are they rather suffused with intelligence and discernment, and thus a source of deep awareness and understanding? In this compelling book, Martha C. Nussbaum presents a powerful argument for treating emotions not as alien forces but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   466 citations  
  • Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value.Bennett W. Helm - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   166 citations  
  • Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Most people assume that, even though some degenerative or criminal behavior may be caused by influences beyond our control, ordinary human actions are not similarly generated, but rather are freely chosen, and we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for them. A less popular and more radical claim is that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform. It is this hard determinist stance that Derk Pereboom articulates in Living Without Free Will. Pereboom argues that our best scientific (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   444 citations  
  • A Modal Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck.Rik Peels - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):73-88.
    In this article I provide and defend a solution to the problem of moral luck. The problem of moral luck is that there is a set of three theses about luck and moral blameworthiness each of which is at least prima facie plausible, but that, it seems, cannot all be true. The theses are that (1) one cannot be blamed for what happens beyond one’s control, (2) that which is due to luck is beyond one’s control, and (3) we rightly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Is Incommensurability Vagueness?John Broome - 1997 - In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   115 citations  
  • Morality and bad luck.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1989 - Metaphilosophy 20 (3-4):203-221.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • The case against moral luck.David Enoch & Andrei Marmor - 2007 - Law and Philosophy 26 (4):405-436.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • (2 other versions)The morality of freedom.J. Raz - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (1):108-109.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   688 citations  
  • Morals from Motives.Michael Slote - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):415-418.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   140 citations  
  • (2 other versions)The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one's rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   320 citations  
  • Moral Luck.Bernard Williams - 1981 - Critica 17 (51):101-105.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   454 citations  
  • Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. Neil Levy develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. He argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no more vulnerable to luck (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   203 citations  
  • Luck.Nicholas Rescher - 1990 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 64 (3):5 - 19.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Précis of Upheavals of Thought.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):443-449.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   306 citations  
  • (2 other versions)The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1062 citations  
  • (1 other version)Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2003 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 65 (1):174-175.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   355 citations  
  • Luck, blame, and desert.Michael Cholbi - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):313-332.
    T.M. Scanlon has recently proposed what I term a ‘double attitude’ account of blame, wherein blame is the revision of one’s attitudes in light of another person’s conduct, conduct that we believe reveals that the individual lacks the normative attitudes we judge essential to our relationship with her. Scanlon proposes that this account justifies differences in blame that in turn reflect differences in outcome luck. Here I argue that although the double attitude account can justify blame’s being sensitive to outcome (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Standing To Blame, or Why Moral Disapproval Is What It Is.Stefan Https://Orcidorg Riedener - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):183-210.
    Intuitively, we lack the standing to blame others in light of moral norms that we ourselves don't take seriously: if Adam is unrepentantly aggressive, say, he lacks the standing to blame Celia for her aggressiveness. But why does blame have this feature? Existing proposals try to explain this by reference to specific principles of normative ethics – e.g. to rule‐consequentialist considerations, to the wrongness of hypocritical blame, or principles of rights‐forfeiture based on this wrongness. In this paper, I suggest a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • (1 other version)Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):308-310.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   471 citations  
  • Morality and Luck.Henning Jensen - 1984 - Philosophy 59 (229):323 - 330.
    Thomas Nagel recognizes that it is commonly believed that people can neither be held morally responsible nor morally assessed for what is beyond their control. Yet he is convinced that although such a belief may be intuitively plausible, upon reflection we find that we do make moral assessments of persons in a large number of cases in which such assessments depend on factors not under their control. Of such factors he says: (p. 26).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations