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  1. Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”?Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith - 1985 - Cognition 21 (1):37–46.
    We use a new model of metarepresentational development to predict a cognitive deficit which could explain a crucial component of the social impairment in childhood autism. One of the manifestations of a basic metarepresentational capacity is a ‘ theory of mind ’. We have reason to believe that autistic children lack such a ‘ theory ’. If this were so, then they would be unable to impute beliefs to others and to predict their behaviour. This hypothesis was tested using Wimmer (...)
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  • Pragmatic development explains the Theory-of-Mind Scale.Evan Westra & Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Cognition 158 (C):165-176.
    Henry Wellman and colleagues have provided evidence of a robust developmental progression in theory-of-mind (or as we will say, “mindreading”) abilities, using verbal tasks. Understanding diverse desires is said to be easier than understanding diverse beliefs, which is easier than understanding that lack of perceptual access issues in ignorance, which is easier than understanding false belief, which is easier than understanding that people can hide their true emotions. These findings present a challenge to nativists about mindreading, and are said to (...)
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  • Pragmatic Development and the False Belief Task.Evan Westra - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):235-257.
    Nativists about theory of mind have typically explained why children below the age of four fail the false belief task by appealing to the demands that these tasks place on children’s developing executive abilities. However, this appeal to executive functioning cannot explain a wide range of evidence showing that social and linguistic factors also affect when children pass this task. In this paper, I present a revised nativist proposal about theory of mind development that is able to accommodate these findings, (...)
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  • (1 other version)How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (5):606-637.
    What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the (...)
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  • Competence and performance in belief-desire reasoning across two cultures: The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about false belief?Amir Amin Yazdi, Tim P. German, Margaret Anne Defeyter & Michael Siegal - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):343-368.
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  • Solving the Puzzle about Early Belief‐Ascription.Katharina A. Helming, Brent Strickland & Pierre Jacob - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (4):438-469.
    Developmental psychology currently faces a deep puzzle: most children before 4 years of age fail elicited-response false-belief tasks, but preverbal infants demonstrate spontaneous false-belief understanding. Two main strategies are available: cultural constructivism and early-belief understanding. The latter view assumes that failure at elicited-response false-belief tasks need not reflect the inability to understand false beliefs. The burden of early-belief understanding is to explain why elicited-response false-belief tasks are so challenging for most children under 4 years of age. The goal of this (...)
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  • Belief-based action prediction in preverbal infants.Victoria Southgate & Angelina Vernetti - 2014 - Cognition 130 (1):1-10.
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  • Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception.H. Wimmer - 1983 - Cognition 13 (1):103-128.
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  • Where to look first for children's knowledge of false beliefs.Michael Siegal & Karen Beattie - 1991 - Cognition 38 (1):1-12.
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  • Mindreading in Infancy.Peter Carruthers - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (2):141-172.
    Various dichotomies have been proposed to characterize the nature and development of human mindreading capacities, especially in light of recent evidence of mindreading in infants aged 7 to 18 months. This article will examine these suggestions, arguing that none is currently supported by the evidence. Rather, the data support a modular account of the domain-specific component of basic mindreading capacities. This core component is present in infants from a very young age and does not alter fundamentally thereafter. What alters with (...)
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  • Here, there and everywhere: emotion and mental state talk in different social contexts predicts empathic helping in toddlers.Jesse Drummond, Elena F. Paul, Whitney E. Waugh, Stuart I. Hammond & Celia A. Brownell - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm.David Buttelmann, Malinda Carpenter & Michael Tomasello - 2009 - Cognition 112 (2):337-342.
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  • Children's early understanding of false belief.Peter Mitchell & Hazel Lacohée - 1991 - Cognition 39 (2):107-127.
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  • Do 10-month-old infants understand others’ false beliefs?Yuyan Luo - 2011 - Cognition 121 (3):289-298.
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  • Early conversational environment enables spontaneous belief attribution in deaf children.Marek Meristo, Karin Strid & Erland Hjelmquist - 2016 - Cognition 157 (C):139-145.
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