- Alphabetic and nonalphabetic L1 effects in English word identification: a comparison of Korean and Chinese English L2 learners. [REVIEW]Min Wang, Keiko Koda & Charles A. Perfetti - 2003 - Cognition 87 (2):129-149.details
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Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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(1 other version)The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.details
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The relationship between parental mental-state language and 2.5-year-olds’ performance on a nontraditional false-belief task. [REVIEW]Erin Roby & Rose M. Scott - 2018 - Cognition 180 (C):10-23.details
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Preschoolers' and adults' belief reasoning and task demand.Lu Wang - unknowndetails
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Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2012 - MIT Press.details
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Six-year-olds' difficulties handling intensional contexts.Sarah Hulme, Peter Mitchell & David Wood - 2003 - Cognition 87 (2):73-99.details
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Shape constancy and theory of mind: is there a link?Peter Mitchell & Laura M. Taylor - 1999 - Cognition 70 (2):167-190.details
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Qualities and relations in folk theories of mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.details
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Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.details
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Heuristics and counterfactual self-knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63-64.details
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Analytic functionalism without representational functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.details
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First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
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Self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds, and kinesthetic-visual matching.Robert W. Mitchell - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-133.details
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Intentional schema will not do the work of a theory of mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140.details
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Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.details
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The scientist as child.Alison Gopnik - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):485-514.details
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Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.Alison Gopnik & Henry M. Wellman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.details
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Self-ascription without qualia: A case study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.details
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Theory of Mind, Personal Epistemology, and Science Learning: Exploring Common Conceptual Components.Natassa Kyriakopoulou & Stella Vosniadou - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:531223.details
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A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.details
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Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.details
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“Good developmental sequence” and the paradoxes of children's skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53-54.details
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The anthropology of folk psychology.Steven Daniel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):38-39.details
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Understanding self and other.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):142-154.details
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Ontogeny, evolution, and folk psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.details
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Empathy and Imagination.Nancy Sherman - 1998 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):82-119.details
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Objects of desire, thought, and reality: Problems of anchoring discourse referents in development.Josef Perner, Bibiane Rendl & Alan Garnham - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (5):475–513.details
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The basis for understanding belief.Paul E. Newton & Vasudevi Reddy - 1995 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 25 (4):343–362.details
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Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default.Paula Rubio-Fernández - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (1):218-241.details
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Testing the domain-specificity of a theory of mind deficit in brain-injured patients: Evidence for consistent performance on non-verbal, “reality-unknown” false belief and false photograph tasks.Ian A. Apperly, Dana Samson, Claudia Chiavarino, Wai-Ling Bickerton & Glyn W. Humphreys - 2007 - Cognition 103 (2):300-321.details
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Competence and performance in belief-desire reasoning across two cultures: The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about false belief?Amir Amin Yazdi, Tim P. German, Margaret Anne Defeyter & Michael Siegal - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):343-368.details
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Domain specificity in conceptual development: Neuropsychological evidence from autism.Alan M. Leslie & Laila Thaiss - 1992 - Cognition 43 (3):225-251.details
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Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.details
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Recall or regeneration of past mental states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.details
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Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.details
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Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.details
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Understanding that looking causes knowing.David R. Olson & Bruce Homer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):135-135.details
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Omitting the second person in social understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141.details
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Intentional relations and social understanding.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107-122.details
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Moral competence is cognitive but (perhaps) nonmodular.Susan Dwyer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):128-129.details
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How do young children process beliefs about beliefs?: Evidence from response latency.Haruo Kikuno, Peter Mitchell & Fenja Ziegler - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (3):297–316.details
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Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind.Paul Bloom - 2000 - Cognition 77 (1):25-31.details
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Interpreting autism: A critique of Davidson on thought and language.Kristin Andrews - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):317-332.details
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Realism and children's early grasp of mental representation: belief-based judgements in the state change task.Rebecca Saltmarsh, Peter Mitchell & Elizabeth Robinson - 1995 - Cognition 57 (3):297-325.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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