- (3 other versions)Knowledge.K. Lehrer - 1974 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 38 (2):326-327.details
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(3 other versions)Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Routledge.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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The Virtues of Inconsistency.Peter Klein - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):105-135.details
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Knowledge, Truth, and Duty.Marian David - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - In Roth Michael & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13-29.details
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Truth as the Epistemic Goal.Marian David - 2001 - In Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 151-169.details
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Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1974 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.details
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(3 other versions)Theory of knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.details
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Working without a net: a study of egocentric epistemology.Richard Foley - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Objective Chance.John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 92--108.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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(3 other versions)Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Routledge.details
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Concepts of Epistemic Justification.William P. Alston - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):57-89.details
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Reply to Ross.Keith Lehrer - 2003 - In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 326--329.details
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Sellars on induction reconsidered.Keith Lehrer - 1983 - Noûs 17 (3):469-473.details
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(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.details
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(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1987 - Mind 96 (382):285-288.details
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The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.details
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Reasonable acceptance and the lottery paradox: the case for a more credulous consistency.Glenn Ross - 2003 - In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 91--107.details
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(3 other versions)Change in view: Principles of reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 2008 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 35-46.details
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