- The uses of plans.Martha E. Pollack - 1992 - Artificial Intelligence 57 (1):43-68.details
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Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.Michael Bratman - 1999 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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I Intend that We J.Michael Bratman - 1999 - In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 142–161.details
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The Construction of Social Reality.John Searle - 1995 - Free Press.details
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Shared intention, reliance, and interpersonal obligations.Facundo M. Alonso - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):444-475.details
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(1 other version)Normativity and the will: selected papers on moral psychology and practical reason.R. Jay Wallace (ed.) - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
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Intentions and plans in decision and game theory.Martin van Hees & Olivier Roy - 2007 - In Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions. Ashgate.details
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What good is a will?J. David Velleman - 2007 - In Anton Leist (ed.), Action in Context. De Gruyter.details
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(1 other version)On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.details
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(1 other version)Intentionality.J. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.details
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(1 other version)Towards a theory of intention revision.Wiebe van Der Hoek, Wojciech Jamroga & Michael Wooldridge - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):265-290.details
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(1 other version)Reasoning about Rational Agents.Michael Wooldridge & Bruce Edmonds - unknowndetails
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Epistemic logic and epistemology: The state of their affairs.Johan van Benthem - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):49 - 76.details
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Intention is choice with commitment.Philip R. Cohen & Hector J. Levesque - 1990 - Artificial Intelligence 42 (2-3):213-261.details
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(2 other versions)The Construction of Social Reality. Anthony Freeman in conversation with John Searle.J. Searle & A. Freeman - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2):180-189.details
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(1 other version)Why exactly is commitment important for rationality?Amartya Sen - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):5-14.details
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(1 other version)Trying (as the mental 'pineal gland').Brian O'Shaughnessy - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 365 - 386.details
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The importance of us: a philosophical study of basic social notions.Raimo Tuomela - 1995 - Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.details
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Evaluating new options in the context of existing plans.John F. Horty & Martha E. Pollack - unknown - Artificial Intelligence 127 (2):199-220.details
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Rationality and Freedom.Amartya Sen - 2005 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 67 (1):182-183.details
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(1 other version)Why exactly is commitment important for rationality?S. E. N. Amartya - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):5-14.details
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(1 other version)Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.details
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Epistemic Logic and Epistemology: The State of their Affairs.Johan Benthem - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):49-76.details
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(1 other version)Towards a theory of intention revision.Wiebe van der Hoek, Wojciech Jamroga & Michael Wooldridge - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):265-290.details
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(1 other version)Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of reason: new essays in the philosophy of normativity. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 29-61.details
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Rational Dynamics and Epistemic Logic in Games.Johan van Benthem - unknowndetails
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Trying (As the Mental "Pineal Gland").Brain O'Shaughnessy - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (13):365-386.details
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