Switch to: Citations

References in:

Risk and diversification in theory choice

Synthese 109 (2):263 - 280 (1996)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Decisions with Multiple Objectives.Ralph L. Keeney & Howard Raiffa - 1976 - New York: Wiley.
    This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1873 edition. Excerpt:...but it does not follow that knowledge is not good. It is more needful that I should be a good Christian, than that I should be able to make good shoes. But this, too, is needful for one who is a shoemaker, and his Christianity is to show (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   89 citations  
  • Review of Thomas S. Kuhn The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. [REVIEW]David Zaret - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (1):146.
    Review of T. S. Kuhn's The Essential Tension.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   261 citations  
  • (1 other version)Independence from Future Theories: A Research Strategy in Quantum Theory.Alexander Rueger - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:203-211.
    The paper argues that renormalization in quantum field theory was not a radically new - and possibly ad hoc - technique to save a badly flawed theory, but rather the culmination of a methodological strategy that physicists had been applying for a long time. The strategy was to obtain reliable results from unreliable theories by making the derivation of the results independent of possible future modifications of the theory. Examples of this practice include Bohr's use of the Correspondence Principle and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.
    This major work challenges some widely held positions in epistemology - those of Peirce and Popper on the one hand and those of Quine and Kuhn on the other.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   418 citations  
  • (4 other versions)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Otto Neurath.
    A scientific community cannot practice its trade without some set of received beliefs. These beliefs form the foundation of the "educational initiation that prepares and licenses the student for professional practice". The nature of the "rigorous and rigid" preparation helps ensure that the received beliefs are firmly fixed in the student's mind. Scientists take great pains to defend the assumption that scientists know what the world is like...To this end, "normal science" will often suppress novelties which undermine its foundations. Research (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2709 citations  
  • Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth.Larry Laudan - 1977 - University of California Press.
    (This insularity was further promoted by the guileless duplicity of scholars in other fields, who were all too prepared to bequeath "the problem of ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   636 citations  
  • (1 other version)Against method.Paul Feyerabend - 1988 - London: New Left Books.
    Feyerabrend argues that intellectual progress relies on the creativity of the scientist, against the authority of science.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   490 citations  
  • The advancement of science: science without legend, objectivity without illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    During the last three decades, reflections on the growth of scientific knowledge have inspired historians, sociologists, and some philosophers to contend that scientific objectivity is a myth. In this book, Kitcher attempts to resurrect the notions of objectivity and progress in science by identifying both the limitations of idealized treatments of growth of knowledge and the overreactions to philosophical idealizations. Recognizing that science is done not by logically omniscient subjects working in isolation, but by people with a variety of personal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   756 citations  
  • (4 other versions)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
    Thomas S. Kuhn's classic book is now available with a new index.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4756 citations  
  • A Response to My Critics.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  • The division of cognitive labor.Philip Kitcher - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5-22.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   353 citations  
  • Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism.Larry Laudan - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1):19 - 31.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   131 citations  
  • (1 other version)A Theory of Method.Husain Sarkar - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (2):315-317.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • (1 other version)A Theory of Method.Husain Sarkar - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):228-230.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Scientific rationality and human reasoning.Miriam Solomon - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (3):439-455.
    The work of Tversky, Kahneman and others suggests that people often make use of cognitive heuristics such as availability, salience and representativeness in their reasoning and decision making. Through use of a historical example--the recent plate tectonics revolution in geology--I argue that such heuristics play a crucial role in scientific decision making also. I suggest how these heuristics are to be considered, along with noncognitive factors (such as motivation and social structures) when drawing historical and epistemological conclusions. The normative perspective (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • Reflections on my critics.Ts Khn - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   137 citations  
  • Dominance and the disunity of method: Solving the problems of innovation and consensus.Rachel Laudan & Larry Laudan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (2):221-237.
    It is widely supposed that the scientists in any field use identical standards for evaluating theories. Without such unity of standards, consensus about scientific theories is supposedly unintelligible. However, the hypothesis of uniform standards can explain neither scientific disagreement nor scientific innovation. This paper seeks to show how the presumption of divergent standards (when linked to a hypothesis of dominance) can explain agreement, disagreement and innovation. By way of illustrating how a rational community with divergent standards can encourage innovation and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • The problem of “problem choice”.J. M. Ziman - 1987 - Minerva 25 (1-2):92-106.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • 13. A framework for the cognitive psychology of science.Ryan D. Tweney - 1989 - In Barry Gholson (ed.), Psychology of science: contributions to metascience. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 342.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations