Nearly all students believe academic cheating is wrong, yet few students say they would report witnessed acts of cheating. To explain this apparent tension, the present research examined college students’ reasoning about whether to report plagiarism or other forms of cheating. Study 1 examined students’ conflicts when deciding whether to report cheating. Most students gave reasons against reporting a peer (e.g., social and physical consequences, a lack of responsibility to report) as well as reasons in favor of reporting (e.g., concerns (...) about welfare, justice, and fairness). Study 2 provided experimental confirmation that the contextual factors referenced by Study 1 participants in fact influenced decisions about whether to report cheating. Overall, the findings indicate that students often decide against reporting peers’ acts of cheating, though not due to a lack of concern about integrity. Rather, students may refrain from reporting because of conflicting concerns, lack of information about school policy, and perceived better alternatives to reporting. (shrink)

When an agent learns of an expert's credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This is a popular thought about how agents ought to respond to (ideal) experts. In a Bayesian framework, it is often modelled by endowing the agent with a set of priors that achieves this result. But this model faces a number of challenges, especially when applied to non-ideal agents (who (...) nevertheless interact with ideal experts). I outline these problems, and use them as desiderata for the development of a new model. Taking inspiration from Richard Jeffrey's development of Jeffrey conditioning, I develop a model in which expert reports are taken as exogenous constraints on the agent's posterior probabilities. I show how this model can handle a much wider class of expert reports (for example reports of conditional probabilities), and can be naturally extended to cover propositions for which the agent has no prior. (shrink)

In recent years, some epistemologists have argued that practical factors can make the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. While proponents of this pragmatic thesis have proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, it is striking that they have failed to address Gettier cases. As a result, the proposed analyses of knowledge are either lacking explanatory power or susceptible to counterexamples. Gettier cases are also worth reflecting on because they raise foundational questions for the pragmatist. Underlying these challenges is (...) the fact that pragmatic epistemologies not only rely upon normative theories of rational choice but also require externalist standards to rule out epistemic luck. Unfortunately, we lack adequate externalist theories of rational choice. In response, I address these foundational challenges by offering the outlines of an externalist decision theory. While this task is an ambitious one that I cannot hope to complete, I survey the outlines of a decision-theoretic framework on which a richer pragmatic epistemology can be developed. My hope is that this framework opens up new avenues of exploration for the pragmatic epistemologist. (shrink)

Nowadays, product labels are often used to enable consumers choose products that are friendly to the environment and to animals, natural, healthful and socially responsible. However, certain features of commonly used labels limit their usefulness. This thesis identifies a number of these limitations and presents an innovative labeling approach designed to address them. More specifically, the following features limit the usefulness of the commonly used “endorsement” labels: they (1) offer a single certification grade, the requirements for which (2) are ‘static’ (...) in the sense that certification standards do not depend on the evolution of the market, (3) are voluntary, and (4) are defined by stakeholders. Consequently, common labels fail to remove information asymmetry regarding the ethical performance of non-certified products; limit the opportunities for moderately –yet positively– concerned consumers to reveal ethical preferences; fail to motivate product improvement beyond certification standard; allow the emergence of a confusing variety of overlapping labels; and allow production stakeholders to resist socially desirable certification requirements when these are unfavorable to their business. In shoft, ethical labels currently fail to unleash on ethical aspects of production the inherently ‘free-market’ dynamics according to which products and firms must continuously innovate and improve, or else become obsolete and vanish. As an alternative, this thesis proposes and works out an innovative “comparative” labeling approach that is designed to address these limitations. The proposed type of label is (1) multi-grade or continuous, (2) dynamic, (3) mandatory, and (4) society-defined. An example of this type of label is given at Figure 1. Figure 1: Two variations of an example intuitive color-coded label format. The variations depict different sets of product attributes, and also different aggregation levels of the Environmental Impact attribute. This type of labeling could motivate the creation of a ‘vitruous cyrcle’ or ‘race to the top’, in which the ethical performance of products moves to the direction that society at large regards as ‘positive’. This process is outlined at Figure 2. Figure 2: Expected effects on the environmental performance of marketed product substitutes from the introduction of the proposed labeling system, in three phases. In Phase 1, the label is introduced on product substitutes available in the market (supply). In Phase 2, the supply evolves. To the standard (negative) incentives for cost minimization, are now added (positive) incentives to avoid negative reputation and to improve further the environmental frontiers of production through innovation. In Phase 3, the label is adjusted (updated) to the evolved supply. Products that failed to improve since last update might become downgraded (blue arrows). It is argued that the proposed labeling approach has the potential to boost ethical consumerism as a force for the ethical optimization of the market. This can be directly relevant to issues about which society is concerned, and democratically elected goverments have limited ability to regulate. Among possible uses of the method developed to assess the relative performance of substitute products, are the comparative ranking of presently available labels (so as to inform consumers on the relative impact of different certified products), the justification of the allocation of incentives and discincentives in state policy, and also the ethical optimization and promotion of own production by socially responsible suppliers. Overall, the described approach aspires to transform markets into instruments that work to the direction willed by society, so as to bring market-driven and continuous improvement for production aspects of societal concern, such as environmental and socioeconomic aspects of the real economy. (shrink)

According to normative decision theory there exists a principle of procedure invariance which states that a decision maker's preference order should remain the same, independently of which response mode is used. For example, the decision maker should express the same preference independently of whether he or she has to judge or decide. Nevertheless, previous research in behavioral decision making has suggested that judgments and choices yield different preference orders in both the risky and the riskless domain. In the latter, the (...) prominence effect has been demonstrated. The main purpose of the present series of experiments was to test cognitive explanations which account for the prominence effect. One of the explanations provided a psychological account based primarily on decision-strategy compatibility. Two other explanations built on information structuring approaches. In the first one, the general idea was that decision makers differentiate between alternatives by value and belief restructuring. In the second approach, violations of invariance were assumed to be attributed to the information structure of the task which in many cases demand problem simplification. A prominence effect was in most experiments found for both choices and preference ratings. This finding spöke against the strategy compatibility explanation. Instead, the different forms of cognitive restructuring provided a better account. However, none of these provided a single explanation. Yet, the structure compatibility explanation appeared to be the more viable one, in particular of the relation between experimentäl manipulations and response mode outcomes. The predictions of the value-belief restructuring explanation, on the other hand, seemed to be more valid for the prominence effect found in choice than for preference ratings. (shrink)

We introduce a family of rules for adjusting one's credences in response to learning the credences of others. These rules have a number of desirable features. 1. They yield the posterior credences that would result from updating by standard Bayesian conditionalization on one's peers' reported credences if one's likelihood function takes a particular simple form. 2. In the simplest form, they are symmetric among the agents in the group. 3. They map neatly onto the familiar Condorcet voting results. 4. They (...) preserve shared agreement about independence in a wide range of cases. 5. They commute with conditionalization and with multiple peer updates. Importantly, these rules have a surprising property that we call synergy - peer testimony of credences can provide mutually supporting evidence raising an individual's credence higher than any peer's initial prior report. At first, this may seem to be a strike against them. We argue, however, that synergy is actually a desirable feature and the failure of other updating rules to yield synergy is a strike against them. (shrink)

We introduce a ranking of multidimensional alternatives, including uncertain prospects as a particular case, when these objects can be given a matrix form. This ranking is separable in terms of rows and columns, and continuous and monotonic in the basic quantities. Owing to the theory of additive separability developed here, we derive very precise numerical representations over a large class of domains (i.e., typically notof the Cartesian product form). We apply these representationsto (1)streams of commodity baskets through time, (2)uncertain social (...) prospects, (3)uncertain individual prospects. Concerning(1), we propose a finite horizon variant of Koopmans’s (1960) axiomatization of infinite discounted utility sums. The main results concern(2). We push the classic comparison between the exanteand expostsocial welfare criteria one step further by avoiding any expected utility assumptions, and as a consequence obtain what appears to be the strongest existing form of Harsanyi’s (1955) Aggregation Theorem. Concerning(3), we derive a subjective probability for Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) finite case by merely assuming that there are two epistemically independent sources of uncertainty. (shrink)

When we ask a decision maker to express her preferences, it is typically assumed that we are eliciting a pre-existing set of preferences. However, empirical research has suggested that our preferences are often constructed on the fly for the decision problem at hand. This paper explores the ramifications of this empirical research for our understanding of instrumental rationality. First, I argue that these results pose serious challenges for the traditional decision-theoretic view of instrumental rationality, which demands global coherence amongst all (...) of one's beliefs and desires. To address these challenges, I first develop a minimal notion of instrumental rationality that issues in localized, goal-relative demands of coherence. This minimal conception of instrumental rationality is then used to offer a more sophisticated account of the global aspects of instrumental rationality. The resulting view abandons all-or-nothing assessments of rationality and allows us to evaluate decision makers as being rational to varying degrees. My aim is to propose a theory that is both psychologically and normatively plausible. (shrink)

We present a method to characterize the preferences of a decision maker in decisions with multiple attributes. The approach modifies the outcomes of a multivariate lottery with a multivariate transformation and observes the change in the decision maker’s certain equivalent. If the certain equivalent follows this multivariate transformation, we refer to this situation as multiattribute transformation invariance, and we derive the functional form of the utility function. We then show that any additive or multiplicative utility function that is formed of (...) continuous and strictly monotonic utility functions of the individual attributes must satisfy transformation invariance with a multivariate transformation. This result provides a new interpretation for multiattribute utility functions with mutual utility independence as well as a necessary and sufficient condition that must be satisfied when assuming these widely used functional forms. We work through several examples to illustrate the approach. (shrink)

This article argues that there is a natural solution to carry out interpersonal comparisons of utility when the theory of gambles is supplemented with a group operation of joint receipts. If so, three types of people can exist, and the two types having multiplicative representations of joint receipt have, in contrast to most utility theories, absolute scales of utility. This makes possible, at least in principle, meaningful interpersonal comparisons of utility with desirable properties, thus resolving a long standing philosophical problem (...) and having potentially important implications in economics. Two behavioral criteria are given for the three classes of people. At this point the relative class sizes are unknown. (shrink)

This paper formulates and axiomatizes utility models for denumerable time streams that make no commitment in regard to discounting future outcomes. The models address decision under certainty and decision under risk. Independence assumptions in both contexts lead to additive or multiplicative utilities over time periods that allow unambiguous comparisons of the relative importance of different periods. The models accommodate all patterns of future valuation. This discount-neutral feature is attained by restricting preference comparisons to outcome streams or probability distributions on outcome (...) streams that differ in at most a finite number of periods. (shrink)

Being a formal and general as well as the most widely accepted approach to practical rationality, rational decision theory should be crucial for justifying rational morals. In particular, acting morally should also be rational in decision theoretic terms. After defending this thesis, in the critical part of the paper two strategies to develop morals following this insight are criticized: game theoretical ethics of cooperation and ethical intuitionism. The central structural objections to ethics of cooperation are that they too directly aim (...) at the rationality of moral action and that they to do not encompass moral values or a moral desirability function. The constructive half of the paper takes up these criticisms by developing a two-part strategy to bring rationality and morals in line. The first part is to define ‘moral desirability’. This is done, using multi-attribute utility theory, by equating several adequate components of an individual’s comprehensive utility function with the moral desirability function. The second part is to introduce mechanisms, institutions, in particular socially valid moral norms, that provide further motivation for acting in accordance with morals. (shrink)

How can anyone be rational in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury? Traditional models of unbounded rationality and optimization in cognitive science, economics, and animal behavior have tended to view decision-makers as possessing supernatural powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and endless time. But understanding decisions in the real world requires a more psychologically plausible notion of bounded rationality. In Simple heuristics that make us smart (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), we (...) explore fast and frugal heuristics – simple rules in the mind's adaptive toolbox for making decisions with realistic mental resources. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices quickly and with a minimum of information by exploiting the way that information is structured in particular environments. In this précis, we show how simple building blocks that control information search, stop search, and make decisions can be put together to form classes of heuristics, including: ignorance-based and one-reason decision making for choice, elimination models for categorization, and satisficing heuristics for sequential search. These simple heuristics perform comparably to more complex algorithms, particularly when generalizing to new data – that is, simplicity leads to robustness. We present evidence regarding when people use simple heuristics and describe the challenges to be addressed by this research program. Key Words: adaptive toolbox; bounded rationality; decision making; elimination models; environment structure; heuristics; ignorance-based reasoning; limited information search; robustness; satisficing; simplicity. (shrink)

Philosophers deny a proposal for actions can be deduced from arguments for or against the proposal because they may be incompatible. Nevertheless, people in general, and politicians especially, make decisions and present arguments they believe are convincing. We studied politicians who made decisions in complex situations. They spoke about possible actions, their consequences, the probabilities of these consequences and their evaluations, but rarely indicated why their arguments led to their choice. We hypothesized implicit argumentation rules involved and checked whether they (...) predicted those choices. We found seven implicit informal logic rules involved. We also found a random sample of people made the same choices based on the same arguments, suggesting basic warrants by which people argue about decisions. (shrink)

Policymakers who seek to make scientifically informed decisions are constantly confronted by scientific uncertainty and expert disagreement. This thesis asks: how can policymakers rationally respond to expert disagreement and scientific uncertainty? This is a work of non-ideal theory, which applies formal philosophical tools developed by ideal theorists to more realistic cases of policymaking under scientific uncertainty. I start with Bayesian approaches to expert testimony and the problem of expert disagreement, arguing that two popular approaches— supra-Bayesianism and the standard model of (...) expert deference—are insufficient. I develop a novel model of expert deference and show how it can deal with many of these problems raised for them. I then turn to opinion pooling, a popular method for dealing with disagreement. I show that various theoretical motivations for pooling functions are irrelevant to realistic policymaking cases. This leads to a cautious recommendation of linear pooling. However, I then show that any pooling method relies on value judgements, that are hidden in the selection of the scoring rule. My focus then narrows to a more specific case of scientific uncertainty: multiple models of the same system. I introduce a particular case study involving hurricane models developed to support insurance decision-making. I recapitulate my analysis of opinion pooling in the context of model ensembles, confirming that my hesitations apply. This motivates a shift of perspective, to viewing the problem as a decision theoretic one. I rework a recently developed ambiguity theory, called the confidence approach, to take input from model ensembles. I show how it facilitates the resolution of the policymaker’s problem in a way that avoids the issues encountered in previous chapters. This concludes my main study of the problem of expert disagreement. In the final chapter, I turn to methodological reflection. I argue that philosophers who employ the mathematical methods of the prior chapters are modelling. Employing results from the philosophy of scientific models, I develop the theory of normative modelling. I argue that it has important methodological conclusions for the practice of formal epistemology, ruling out popular moves such as searching for counterexamples. (shrink)

According to the mixed lexicographic/additive account of ‘better than’ and similar aggregative value comparatives like ‘healthier than’, values are multidimensional and different aspects of a value are aggregated into an overall assessment in a lexicographic way, based on an ordering of value aspects. It is argued that this theory can account for an acceptable definition of Chang’s notion of parity and that it also offers a solution to Temkin’s and Rachels’s Spectrum Cases without giving up the transitivity of overall betterness. (...) Formal details and proofs are provided in an “Appendix”. (shrink)

Per definition business sustainability demands the integration of environmental, social, and economic outcomes. Yet, managerial decision-making involving sustainability objectives is fraught with tension and the way managerial decision-makers frame sustainability issues in their mindset influences how sustainability tensions are managed at the organisational level. In the bid to better understand what types of managerial mindsets, or cognitive frames, foster integrative business sustainability practices that simultaneously advance environmental, social, and economic objectives, extant research has focussed on the underlying logics that drive (...) the acknowledgement of sustainability tensions. However, the existing logics-based constructs do not sufficiently explain this link, and it has been suggested that managers perceive and manage sustainability tensions based on the values that they hold. To clarify the roles of managerial values and logics as antecedents in business sustainability decision-making, we integrate Keeney’s value-focussed thinking approach with managerial and organisational cognition perspectives. Drawing on data from a survey with 169 senior procurement managers in Australia we found three types of cognitive frames which demonstrate that stronger sustainability values are associated with a more holistic perception of sustainability tensions and vice versa. We also found that managers’ cognitive framing of sustainability is strengthened by more holistic organisational cognitive frames and discuss according implications for managerial decision-making in theory and practice. (shrink)

We investigate the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare in a new framework of individual and social decisions, which distinguishes between two sources of uncertainty, here interpreted as an objective and a subjective source respectively. This framework makes it possible to endow the individuals and society not only with ex ante and ex post preferences, as is usually done, but also with interim preferences of two kinds, and correspondingly, to introduce interim forms of the (...) Pareto principle. After characterizing the ex ante and ex post criteria, we present a first solution to their conflict that extends the former as much possible in the direction of the latter. Then, we present a second solution, which goes in the opposite direction, and is also maximally assertive. Both solutions translate the assumed Pareto conditions into weighted additive utility representations, and both attribute to the individuals common probability values on the objective source of uncertainty, and different probability values on the subjective source. We discuss these solutions in terms of two conceptual arguments, i.e., the by now classic spurious unanimity argument and a novel informational argument labelled complementary ignorance. The paper complies with the standard economic methodology of basing probability and utility representations on preference axioms, but for the sake of completeness, also considers a construal of objective uncertainty based on the assumption of an exogeneously given probability measure. JEL classification: D70; D81. (shrink)

The ethical matrix is a participatory tool designed to structure ethical reflection about the design, the introduction, the development or the use of technologies. Its collective implementation, in the context of participatory decision-making, has shown its potential usefulness. On the contrary, its implementation by a single researcher has not been thoroughly analyzed. The aim of this paper is precisely to assess the strength of ethical matrixes implemented by a single researcher as a tool for conceptual normative analysis related to technological (...) choices. Therefore, the ethical matrix framework is applied to the management of high-level radioactive waste, more specifically to retrievable and non-retrievable geological disposal. The results of this analysis show that the usefulness of ethical matrixes is twofold and that they provide a valuable input for further decision-making. Indeed, by using ethical matrixes, implicit ethically relevant issues were revealed—namely issues of equity associated with health impacts and differences between close and remote future generations regarding ethical impacts. Moreover, the ethical matrix framework was helpful in synthesizing and comparing systematically the ethical impacts of the technologies under scrutiny, and hence in highlighting the potential ethical conflicts. (shrink)

Elicitation methods in decision-making under risk allow us to infer the utilities of outcomes as well as the probability weights from the observed preferences of an individual. An optimally efficient elicitation method is proposed, which takes the inevitable distortion of preferences by random errors into account and minimizes the effect of such errors on the inferred utility and probability weighting functions. Under mild assumptions, the optimally efficient method for eliciting utilities and probability weights is the following three-stage procedure. First, a (...) probability is elicited whose subjective weight is one half. Second, the utility function is elicited through the midpoint chaining certainty equivalent method using the probability elicited at the first stage. Finally, the probability weighting function is elicited through the probability equivalent method. (shrink)

Most of the existing literature on social preferences either tests whether certain characteristics of the social context influence individual decisions, or tries to estimate parameters of social preference functions describing such behavior at the level of the entire population. In the present paper, we are concerned with measuring parameters of social preference functions at the individual level. We draw upon concepts developed for eliciting other types of utility functions, in particular the literature on decision making under incomplete information. Our method (...) derives parameters of social preference functions from indifference statements about the distribution of payoffs a group. We apply our method in a controlled social preference experiment to establish the external validity of estimated parameters. Our results show the expected relationships to some external factors and also a strong correspondence between parameter estimates and factors that, according to the subjects’ own descriptions, influenced their behavior. We also find that some concepts discussed in the literature on social preferences, in particular envy toward players receiving a larger payoff, have very diverse and complex effects at the individual level. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that for various reasons there must be psychological laws governing beliefs and desires. One of the few serious examples that they offer is the _belief-desire law_, which states, roughly, that _ceteris paribus_ people do what they believe will satisfy their desires. This paper argues that, in fact, there is no such law. In particular, decision theory does not support the contention that there is such a law.

This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and, therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach allows the incorporation of partial information about the preferences of the agents into the model, and permits the identification of the set of equilibria in accordance with this information. We also propose an additional conservative criterion which can be applied in this framework (...) in order to predict the results of interaction. The potential application of the theoretical results is shown with an analysis of a mixed oligopoly in which the agents value additional objectives other than their own benefit. These objectives are related to social welfare and to the profit of the industry. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework for the analysis of a wide range of strategic economic models. (shrink)

Satisficing is a central concept in both individual and social multiagent decision making. In this paper we first extend the notion of satisficing by formally modeling the tradeoff between costs and decision failure. Second, we extend this notion of “neo”-satisficing into the context of social or multiagent decision making and interaction, and model the social conditioning of preferences in a satisficing framework.

Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: the discovery of less-is-more effects; the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; the (...) development of a systematic theory of heuristics that identifies their building blocks and the evolved capacities they exploit, and views the cognitive system as relying on an “adaptive toolbox;” and the development of an empirical methodology that accounts for individual differences, conducts competitive tests, and has provided evidence for people’s adaptive use of heuristics. Homo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies. (shrink)

This article starts with an overview of the author’s personal involvement—as an Operations Research consultant—in several engineering case-studies that may raise ethical questions; e.g., case-studies on nuclear waste, water management, sustainable ecology, military tactics, and animal welfare. All these case studies employ computer simulation models. In general, models are meant to solve practical problems, which may have ethical implications for the various stakeholders; namely, the modelers, the clients, and the public at large. The article further presents an overview of codes (...) of ethics in a variety of disciples. It discusses the role of mathematical models, focusing on the validation of these models’ assumptions. Documentation of these model assumptions needs special attention. Some ethical norms and values may be quantified through the model’s multiple performance measures, which might be optimized. The uncertainty about the validity of the model leads to risk or uncertainty analysis and to a search for robust models. Ethical questions may be pressing in military models, including war games. However, computer games and the related experimental economics may also provide a special tool to study ethical issues. Finally, the article briefly discusses whistleblowing. Its many references to publications and websites enable further study of ethical issues in modeling. (shrink)

This paper argues the thesis that a particular style of reasoning, qualitative comparative reasoning (QCR), plays a role in at least three areas of legal reasoning that are central in AI and law research, namely legal theory construction, case-based reasoning in the form of case comparison, and legal proof. The paper gives an informal exposition of one particular way to deal with QCR, based on the author’s previous work on reason-based logic (RBL). Then it contains a substantially adapted formalisation of (...) RBL, to make RBL suitable for dealing with QCR. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of related work. (shrink)

Incorporation of the behavioral issues of the decision maker (DM) is among the aspects that each Multicriteria Decision Making (MCDM) method implicitly or explicitly takes into account. As postulated by regret theory, the feelings of regret and rejoice are among the behavioral issues associated with the entire decision making process. Within the context of MCDM, the DM may feel regret, when the chosen alternative is compared with another one having at least one better criterion value. PROMETHEE II is a widely (...) known MCDM method that makes no explicit incorporation of regret attitude of the DM. In this paper, we elaborate on the applicability of regret theory to MCDM context. In particular, we investigate the findings of regret theory and explore the parallel between regret theory and PROMETHEE II method. Relying on the concepts of regret theory, we demonstrate how a decision that is made using a PROMETHEE II based outranking method conforms to the regret attitude of the DM. (shrink)

Since the middle of this century, the dominant prescriptive approach to decision theory has been a deductive viewpoint which is concerned with axioms of rational preference and their consequences. After summarizing important problems with the preference primitive, this paper argues for a constructive approach in which information is the foundation for decision-making. This approach poses comparability of uncertain acts as a question rather than an assumption. It is argued that, in general, neither preference nor subjective probability can be assumed given, (...) and that these need to be generated by using the relevant information available to the decision-agent in a given situation. A specific constructive model is discussed and illustrated with a real example from this viewpoint. (shrink)

Inspired by the operation of human social organisation, this paper presents a new architecture—a pyramid-committee—for developing society-oriented intelligence, whose structure imitates the organisation of human society in its decision making. The system takes a pyramid-like hierarchical structure with links in the pyramid forming a semi-lattice, which relate not only to nodes in the same layer, but also to others in different layers. The output of the system is a result of the negotiation and balancing of different interests. For such a (...) system to function, the main difficulties concern the complicated relationships between different factors or agents. Focussing on the airport environment audit, we discuss the development of a model framework and the role of neural networks. (shrink)

One resolution of the St. Petersburg paradox recognizes that a gamble carries a risk sensitive to the gamble's stakes. If aversion to risk increases sufficiently fast as stakes go up, the St. Petersburg gamble has a finite utility.

The rule to maximize expected utility is intended for decisions where options involve risk. In those decisions the decision maker's attitude toward risk is important, and the rule ought to take it into account. Allais's and Ellsberg's paradoxes, however, suggest that the rule ignores attitudes toward risk. This suggestion is supported by recent psychological studies of decisions. These studies present a great variety of cases where apparently rational people violate the rule because of aversion or attraction to risk. Here I (...) attempt to resolve the issue concerning expected utility and risk. I distinguish two versions of the rule to maximize expected utility. One adopts a broad interpretation of the consequences of an option and has great intuitive appeal. The other adopts a narrow interpretation of the consequences of an option and seems to have certain technical and practical advantages. I contend that the version of the rule that interprets consequences narrowly does indeed neglect attitudes toward risk. That version of the rule excludes the risk involved in an option from the consequences of the option and, contrary to what is usually claimed, cannot make up for this exclusion through adjustments in probability and utility assignments. I construct a new, general argument that establishes this in a rigorous way. On the other hand, I contend that the version of the rule that interprets consequences broadly takes account of attitudes toward risk by counting the risk involved in an option among the consequences of the option. I rebut some objections to this version of the rules, in particular, the objection that the rule lacks practical interest. Drawing upon the literature on 'mean-risk' decision rules, I show that this version of the rule can be used to solve some realistic decision problems. (shrink)

We propose a descriptive version of the classical multi-attribute utility model; to that end, we add a new parameter, momentary salience, to the customary formulation. The addition of this parameter allows the theory to accommodate changes in the decision maker’s mood and circumstances, as the saliencies of anticipated consequences are driven by concerns of the moment. By allowing for the number of consequences given attention at the moment of decision to vary, the new model mutes the criticism that SEU models (...) call for an omniscient decision maker. Use of the model is illustrated with a large-scale longitudinal study showing that adolescent smokers have higher utility for smoking than nonsmokers. We also propose to use the model hierarchically to describe everyday decisions that people deal with repeatedly. Big decisions, which set policy, guide a host of nested little decisions, which in turn lead to action. For a little decision, one of the options will be consistent with the policy, and will inherit its high utility. Accordingly, most little decisions will be made quickly and will follow the policy. However, people do sometimes decide to violate their own policies, and we describe how these lapses can lead to collapse of the policy. (shrink)

This paper discusses Jean-Yves Jaffray’s ideas on ambiguity and the views underlying his ideas. His models, developed 20 years ago, provide the most tractable separation of risk attitudes, ambiguity attitudes, and ambiguity beliefs available in the literature today.

Fairness can be incorporated into Harsanyi’s utilitarianism through all-inclusive utility. This retains the normative assumptions of expected utility and Pareto-efficiency, and relates fairness to individual preferences. It makes utilitarianism unfalsifiable, however, if agents’ all-inclusive utilities are not explicitly specified. This note proposes a two-stage model to make utilitarian welfare analysis falsifiable by specifying all-inclusive utilities explicitly through models of individual fairness preferences. The approach is applied to include fairness in widely discussed allocation examples.

Research on environmental-decision making is usually based on utilitarian models, which imply that people's decisions are only influenced by the outcomes. This research provides evidence for values and moral positions that reflect nonconsequentialist rather than consequentialist views. In doing this, this article refers to “sacred values,” which are values that are seen as not-substitutable and nontradable. Two studies were designed to examine evidence for sacred values and their role on act versus omission choices within the environmental domain. The studies revealed (...) that sacred values were closely associated with preferences for actions, trade-off reluctance, deontological focus, and position of moral universalism. The results suggest that it is important to account for sacred values and nonconsequentialist views in environmental decision-making research. (shrink)

GIS has captured planning practice to an unprecedented degree, and this article on how it reconfigures and is configured by institutional context. The author inquires into GIS as a technology for incorporating knowledge into institutional use and includes five propositions: GIS's efficiencies in data processing allows it unprecedented facility and scope of analysis, its use increases alienation, its mimetic language furthers its role in planning, its logic appears rational—purposive, but it conceals an underlying normative logic, and its most profound effect (...) is on the mapper, and the alienating and normative character of GIS necessitate new modes of “social ground-truthing.” The author studies the southeast Los Angeles initiatives to demonstrate these propositions. This article compares two studies: one GIS-based, and the other based on participatory action research and discusses how GIS might be recontextualized into a technology for liberating democratizing processes. (shrink)

Altruism is a popular economic explanation for a wide range of pro-social decisions and actions. It has been applied frequently in several different streams of literature, and is a descriptively compelling model of behavior. This paper provides a theoretical framework for the existence of ordinal and cardinal altruistic value functions, as well as altruistic utility functions, based on an altruistic preference relation. Representation theorems are developed to specify relatively weak conditions under which altruistic value and utility functions can be shown (...) to exist. In addition, conditions that lead to additive forms of these functions are provided. (shrink)

I examine the foundations of a just society using the lens of decision theory. The conception of just society is from an individual’s viewpoint: where would I rather live if I have an equal chance of being any individual? Three alternative designs for a just society are examined. These are: laissez-faire, maximin and social minimum. Two assumptions about human nature clarify the distinction among three societies. The first assumption is that a representative individual’s utility function is concave. The second assumption (...) recognizes that redistribution to achieve equality reduces total wealth. A rational individual would prefer a society where one is free to maximize one’s expected utility. A social minimum that includes both the provision of essential human needs and equality of opportunity (education, healthcare, access to capital) for a flourishing life emerges as a candidate solution for the basic structure of society. (shrink)

How can it be rational to work on a new theory that does not yet meet the standards for good or acceptable theories? If diversity of approaches is a condition for scientific progress, how can a scientific community achieve such progress when each member does what it is rational to do, namely work on the best theory? These two methodological problems, the problem of pursuit and the problem of diversity, can be solved by taking into account the cognitive risk that (...) is involved in theory choice. I compare this solution to other proposals, in particular T. S. Kuhn's and P. Kitcher's view that the two problems demonstrate the epistemic significance of the scientific community. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a multi-criteria model based on the fuzzy preferences approach which can be implemented in the prenegotiation phase to evaluate the negotiations packages. The applicability of some multi-criteria ranking methods were discussed for building a scoring function for negotiation packages. The first one is Simple Additive Weighting technique which determines the sum of the partial satisfactions from each negotiation issue and aggregate them using the issue weights. The other one is Distance Based Methods, with its extension (...) based on the distances to ideal or anti-ideal package, i.e. the TOPSIS procedure. In our approach the negotiator's preferences over the issues are represented by fuzzy membership functions and next a selected multi-criteria decision making method is adopted to determine the global rating of each package. The membership functions are used here as the equivalents of utility functions spread over the negotiation issues, which let us compare different type of data. One of the key advantages of the approach proposed is its usefulness for building a general scoring function in the ill-structured negotiation problem, namely the situation in which the problem itself as well as the negotiators preferences cannot be precisely defined, the available information is uncertain, subjective and vague. Secondly, all proposed variants of scoring functions produce consistent rankings, even though the new packages are added and do not result in rank reversal. (shrink)