First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s monumental _Phénoménologie de la perception _signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available to a new generation of readers. _Phenomenology of Perception _stands in the great phenomenological tradition of Husserl, (...) Heidegger, and Sartre. Yet Merleau-Ponty’s contribution is decisive, as he brings this tradition and other philosophical predecessors, particularly Descartes and Kant, to confront a neglected dimension of our experience: the lived body and the phenomenal world. Charting a bold course between the reductionism of science on the one hand and "intellectualism" on the other, Merleau-Ponty argues that we should regard the body not as a mere biological or physical unit, but as the body which structures one’s situation and experience within the world. Merleau-Ponty enriches his classic work with engaging studies of famous cases in the history of psychology and neurology as well as phenomena that continue to draw our attention, such as phantom limb syndrome, synaesthesia, and hallucination. This new translation includes many helpful features such as the reintroduction of Merleau-Ponty’s discursive Table of Contents as subtitles into the body of the text, a comprehensive Translator’s Introduction to its main themes, essential notes explaining key terms of translation, an extensive Index, and an important updating of Merleau-Ponty’s references to now available English translations. Also included is a new foreword by Taylor Carman and an introduction to Merleau-Ponty_ _by Claude Lefort. Translated by Donald A. Landes. (shrink)

It has been suggested that our experiences of embodiment in general appear to constitute an experiential ground for dualist philosophy and that this is particularly so with experiences of dissociation, in which one feels estranged from one’s body. Thus, Drew Leder argues that these play “a crucial role in encouraging and supporting Cartesian dualism” as they “seem to support the doctrine of an immaterial mind trapped inside an alien body”. In this paper I argue that as dualism does not capture (...) the character of such experiences there is not even an apparent separation of self and body revealed here and that one’s body is experienced as uncanny rather than alien. The general relationship between our philosophical theorizing and the phenomenology of lived experience is also considered. (shrink)

Challenging and rewarding in equal measure, _Phenomenology of Perception_ is Merleau-Ponty's most famous work. Impressive in both scope and imagination, it uses the example of perception to return the _body_ to the forefront of philosophy for the first time since Plato. Drawing on case studies such as brain-damaged patients from the First World War, Merleau-Ponty brilliantly shows how the body plays a crucial role not only in perception but in speech, sexuality and our relation to others. Perhaps above all, Merleau-Ponty's (...) insights about the embodied mind are a bold and refreshing challenge to the new era of virtual reality and artificial intelligence, as scientists and psychologists discover the centrality of the body to mind and intelligence. (shrink)

This work, the text of Martin Heidegger's lecture course of 1929/30, is crucial for an understanding of Heidegger's transition from the major work of his early years, Being and Time, to his later preoccupations with language, truth, and ...

Layers in Husserl's Phenomenology situates Husserl firmly within the trajectory of later Continental thought and contributes to the recent reconsideration of Husserl as a legitimate precursor to the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida.

What makes this work so important is that it returned the body to the forefront of philosophy for the first time since Plato.

In opposition to traditional forms of dualism and monism, the author holds that our bodily self includes certain aspects of otherness. This is shown concerning the phenomenological issues of intentionality, of self-awareness and of intersubjectivity, by emphasizing the dimension of pathos. We are affected by what happens to us before being able to respond to it by acts or actions. Every sense, myself and others are born out of pathos. The original alienness of our own body, including neurological processes, creates (...) shifting degrees of nearness and remoteness, and allows for pathological deviations such as depersonalisation, paranoia or trauma. Such a phenomenology of body crosses the borderlines of different disciplines. (shrink)

Infants who suffer severe neglect fail to thrive emotionally as well as bodily. The absence of early coexistential structures that provide well-being leads to a narrowing of the child's perceptual and social developmental horizon. What is the nature of these early structures? In this essay, an ontology of well-being or housedness is elaborated through phenomenological reflections on breast-feeding and infant perception. Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the flesh makes a contribution to the ontology of well-being: it gives us a conceptual and evocative (...) language to describe human existence in its pre-verbal, syncretic, and non-dualistic manifestations. It also allows for a re-evaluation and re-interpretation of the results of current research in infant perception. Through the structures of infant perception we perceive the coexistential fit between infants, other human beings, and the world of things. An infant's fundamental housedness in the flesh is taken up and cultivated or destroyed by the child's social and cultural environment. (shrink)

Le langage égocentré et son dépassement par la parole. Une étude de l’acquisition du langage inspirée de Merleau-PontyDans les notes de travail du Visible et l’invisible, Merleau-Ponty se proposait d’élucider la nature du dépassement de l’être pré-langagier par la parole. Dans ses cours de la Sorbonne, il avait en outre jeté les fondements théoriques d’une confrontation fructueuse entre la linguistique et la psychologie de l’enfant, en ouvrant un dialogue de fond avec la théorie linguistique et avec les recherches psychologiques de (...) son époque sur l’acquisition du langage. Le phénomène de l’acquisition du langage par l’enfant nous fait assister à la transition de l’être pré-langagier à l’être parlant ; nous y trouvons l’occasion d’une mise en relation de l’incarnation perceptive et charnelle avec le corps parlant qui agit dans le champ symbolique.Cette étude reprend le projet de Merleau-Ponty, en s’appuyant sur les résultats récents de la recherche en matière de développement psycho-linguistique afin de mettre à l’épreuve les thèses merleau-pontiennes sur le langage. L’analyse herméneutique et phénoménologique de trois moments clés de l’acquisition du langage – indication, premiers mots, babil – met en lumière la nature du symbolisme, la fonction interpersonnelle de l’acte de parole et la nature de la grammaire en tant qu’événement diacritique existentiel.Linguaggio egocentrico e oltrepassamento nella parola. Uno studio dell’acquisizione del linguaggio ispirato a Merleau-PontyNelle note di lavoro de Il visibile e l’invisibile Merleau-Ponty si propone di chiarire la rivoluzione che il linguaggio introduce nell’essere pre-linguistico. Valendosi della propria familiarità con la teoria linguistica e con la coeva ricerca psicologica sull’acquisizione del linguaggio da parte dei bambini, nelle sue lezioni alla Sorbonne Merleau-Ponty ha gettato le fondamenta per un fruttuoso dialogo tra la linguistica e la psicologia infantile. Nel fenomeno dell’acquisizione linguistica del bambino assistiamo alla transizione dal pre-linguistico all’essere parlante: ciò fornisce un punto di vista privilegiato sulla connessione tra la percezione, l’incarnazione ed il corpo linguistico che agisce nell’ambito simbolico. Questo contributo riprende il progetto teorico merleaupontiano e guarda alle recenti scoperte nel campo dello sviluppo psico-linguistico per mettere alla prova le tesi di Merleau-Ponty sul linguaggio. Un’analisi ermeneutico-fenomenologicadei tre momenti dell’acquisizione del linguaggio – l’indicazione gestuale, le prime parole, i monologhi infantili nella culla prima di addormentarsi – permette di far luce sulla natura del simbolismo, sulla funzione interpersonale dell’atto linguistico e sulla natura della grammatica come evento esistenziale diacritico. (shrink)

In his discussions of “sensibility” and “feeling,” Hegel has a compelling interpretation of the emotional foundations of experience. I begin by situating “mood” within the context of “sensibility,” and then focus on the inherently “outwardizing” or self-externalizing character of mood. I then consider the different modes of moody self-externalization, for the sake of determining why we express ourselves in language. I conclude by demonstrating why the notions of emotion and spirit are necessarily linked.

Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home” is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially an experience of passivity—i.e., one that (...) rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way of being to which we attain . This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving. (shrink)

Using the works of Merleau-Ponty and of Heidegger, this paper argues that our spatial experience is rooted in the way we are engaged with and in our world. Space is not a predetermined and uniform geometrical grid, but the network of engagement and alienation that provides one's orientation in the inter-humanworld. Drawing on a phenomenological conception of space, this paper demonstrates that the neuroses of agoraphobia and, more unexpectedly, hypochondria must not be understood as mere "psychological" problems, but rather as (...) problems of one's overall way of spatial being-in-the-world, that is, of "dwelling." With respect to both neuroses, the paper argues that subjects experience a sense of spatial contraction that mirrors a contraction in their abilities to engage with the people, the environment, and the situations that surround them. (shrink)

This brilliant study of the stages in the mind's necessary progress from immediate sense-consciousness to the position of a scientific philosophy includes an introductory essay and a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of the text to help the reader understand this most difficult and most influential of Hegel's works.

The "Cartesian Meditations" translation is based primarily on the printed text, edited by Professor S. Strasser and published in the first volume of Husserliana ...

In his discussions of “sensibility” and “feeling,” Hegel has a compelling interpretation of the emotional foundations of experience. I begin by situating “mood” within the context of “sensibility,” and then focus on the inherently “outwardizing” or self-externalizing character of mood. I then consider the different modes of moody self-externalization, for the sake of determining why we express ourselves in language. I conclude by demonstrating why the notions of emotion and spirit are necessarily linked.

We argue that theory-of-mind (ToM) approaches, such as “theory theory” and “simulation theory”, are both problematic and not needed. They account for neither our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others nor the true basis of our folk psychological understanding, even when narrowly construed. Developmental evidence shows that young infants are capable of grasping the purposeful intentions of others through the perception of bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions etc. Trevarthen’s notion of primary intersubjectivity can provide a theoretical framework for (...) understanding these capabilities and his notion of secondary intersubjectivity shows the importance of pragmatic contexts for infants starting around one year of age. The recent neuroscience of resonance systems (i.e., mirror neurons, shared representations) also supports this view. These ideas are worked out in the context of an embodied “Interaction Theory” of social cognition. Still, for more sophisticated intersubjective interactions in older children and adults, one might argue that some form of ToM is required. This thought is defused by appeal to narrative competency and the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (or NPH). We propose that repeated encounters with narratives of a distinctive kind is the normal route through which children acquire an understanding of the forms and norms that enable them to make sense of actions in terms of reasons. A potential objection to this hypothesis is that it presupposes ToM abilities. Interaction Theory is deployed once again to answer this by providing an alternative approach to understanding basic narrative competency and its development. (shrink)