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  1. Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Practical Reality is a lucid original study of the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. Jonathan Dancy maintains that current philosophical orthodoxy bowdlerizes this relation, making it impossible to understand how anyone can act for a good reason. By giving a fresh account of values and reasons, he finds a place for normativity in philosophy of mind and action, and strengthens the connection between these areas and ethics.
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  • (6 other versions)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
    Thomas S. Kuhn's classic book is now available with a new index.
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  • Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.
    I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate (...)
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  • Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations.Anthony Greenwald & L. H. Krieger - 2006
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  • Arational actions.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):57-68.
    According to the standard account of actions and their explanations, intentional actions are actions done because the agent has a certain desire/belief pair that explains the action by rationalizing it. Any explanation of intentional action in terms of an appetite or occurrent emotion is hence assumed to be elliptical, implicitly appealing to some appropriate belief. In this paper, I challenge this assumption with respect to the " arational " actions of my title---a significant subset of the set of intentional actions (...)
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  • Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious.Timothy Wilson - 2002 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    This is not your psychoanalyst's unconscious.
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  • (1 other version)Alief and Belief.Tamar Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
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  • (1 other version)The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
    In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the relation of consciousness, the will, and our intentional and voluntary actions. Wegner claims that our experience and common sense view according to which we can influence our behavior roughly the way we experience that we do it is an illusion.
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  • Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
    Since Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today the idea of ''first-person authority''--the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life--has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive relation to his or her own mental life, let alone a privileged one. In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran argues for (...)
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  • (1 other version)Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience.Max R. Bennett & P. M. S. Hacker - 2003 - Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by P. M. S. Hacker.
    Writing from a scientifically and philosophically informed perspective, the authors provide a critical overview of the conceptual difficulties encountered in many current neuroscientific and psychological theories.
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  • Consciousness and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Neil Levy presents a new theory of freedom and responsibility. He defends a particular account of consciousness--the global workspace view--and argues that consciousness plays an especially important role in action. There are good reasons to think that the naïve assumption, that consciousness is needed for moral responsibility, is in fact true.
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  • The mess inside: narrative, emotion, and the mind.Peter Goldie - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Narrative thinking -- Narrative thinking about one's past -- Grief : a case study -- Narrative thinking about one's future -- Self-forgiveness : a case study -- The narrative sense of self -- Narrative, truth, life, and fiction.
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  • The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.
    Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done (...)
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  • The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge.Peter Carruthers - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency.
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  • Attention.Alan R. White - 1964 - Oxford,: Oxford: Blackwell.
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  • Wittgenstein.Severin Schroeder - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 554–561.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Voluntary Action Reasons and Causes References.
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  • Verbal reports as data.K. Anders Ericsson & Herbert A. Simon - 1980 - Psychological Review 87 (3):215-251.
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  • The real reasons.Frederick Stoutland - 1998 - In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 43--66.
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  • The Importance of Awareness.Neil Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):221-229.
    A number of philosophers have recently argued that agents need not be conscious of the reasons for which they act or the moral significance of their actions in order to be morally responsible for them. In this paper, I identify a kind of awareness that, I claim, agents must have in order to be responsible for their actions. I argue that conscious information processing differs from unconscious in a manner that makes the following two claims true: (1) an agent’s values (...)
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  • Persons, situations, and virtue ethics.John M. Doris - 1998 - Noûs 32 (4):504-530.
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  • Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamarszabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552-585.
    I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by non‐conscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate (...)
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  • Review of Kenneth Burke: A Rhetoric of Motives[REVIEW]Henry W. Sams - 1952 - Ethics 62 (2):130-131.
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  • 7 Arguments from Illusion.Jonathan Dancy - 2009 - In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press. pp. 117.
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  • The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales.Carol Levine & Oliver Sacks - 1986 - Hastings Center Report 16 (2):42.
    Book reviewed in this article: The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales. By Oliver Sacks.
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  • Consciousness, Implicit Attitudes and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):21-40.
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  • Expressing who we are: Moral responsibility and awareness of our reasons for action.Neil Levy - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):243-261.
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  • (2 other versions)Review of Jonathan Haidt: The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion.Dale E. Miller - unknown
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  • The things we do and why we do them.Constantine Sandis - 2012 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    The Things We Do and Why We Do Them argues against the common assumption that there is a kind of thing called "action" which all reason-giving explanation of action are geared towards. Sandis explains why all theories concerned with the form which any such explanation must take fail from the outset, and shows how various debates on the nature of so-called motivating reasons only arise because the participants all share a number of mistaken views which follow from the basic assumption (...)
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  • (1 other version)Wittgenstein.S. Schroeder - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 554-561.
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  • (2 other versions)The Illusion of Conscious Will.R. Holton - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):218-221.
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  • Review of T he Nature of Mental Things. [REVIEW]Robert B. Brandom - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):119-121.
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  • Can Action Explanations Ever Be Non-Factive?Constantine Sandis - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 29.
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  • Attention.A. R. White - 1966 - Philosophy 41 (157):281-283.
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