- Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research.Martin Fishbein & Icek Ajzen - 1977 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 (2):130-132.details
|
|
Events as Property Exemplifications.Jaegwon Kim - 1976 - In M. Brand & Douglas Walton (eds.), Action Theory. Reidel. pp. 310-326.details
|
|
Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Personal agency: the metaphysics of mind and action.E. J. Lowe - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Psychology as philosophy.Donald Davidson - 1974 - In Stuart C. Brown (ed.), Philosophy Of Psychology. London: : Macmillan. pp. 41-52.details
|
|
The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.details
|
|
Rational animals.Donald Davidson - 1982 - Dialectica 36 (4):317-28.details
|
|
Skilled activity and the causal theory of action.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.details
|
|
Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.details
|
|
Doing without representing?Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio - 1994 - Synthese 101 (3):401-31.details
|
|
Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Intelligence without representation.Rodney A. Brooks - 1991 - Artificial Intelligence 47 (1--3):139-159.details
|
|
Two problems about human agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326.details
|
|
Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):35.details
|
|
Abnormalities in the awareness of action.Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Daniel M. Wolpert & Christopher D. Frith - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (6):237-242.details
|
|
A dynamical systems perspective on agent-environment interaction.Randall D. Beer - 1995 - Artificial Intelligence 72 (1-2):173-215.details
|
|
A Theory of Human Action.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1970 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.details
|
|
Some Observations on the Psychology of Thinking about Free Will.Daniel C. Dennett - 2008 - In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are we free?: psychology and free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Effective intentions: the power of conscious will.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Two kinds of agency.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Mental action: A case study.Alfred Mele - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17.details
|
|
Agency, ownership, and the standard theory.Markus E. Schlosser - 2010 - In Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New waves in philosophy of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 13-31.details
|
|
Free will and the unconscious precursors of choice.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):365-384.details
|
|
Actions, Explanations, and Causes.Alfred Mele - 2013 - In Giuseppina D'Oro & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Non-causalism in the Philosophy of Action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
|
|
Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility.Randolph K. Clarke - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
|
|
A Folk Model of the Mind.R. D'Andrade - 1987 - In Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn (eds.), Cultural Models in Language and Thought. Cambridge University Press. pp. 112-148.details
|
|
Dual-system theory and the role of consciousness in intentional action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2019 - In Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.), Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience. Leiden: Brill. pp. 35–56.details
|
|
How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?Donald Davidson - 1969 - In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral concepts. London,: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Life and action: elementary structures of practice and practical thought.Michael Thompson - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
Must There Be Basic Action?Douglas Lavin - 2012 - Noûs 47 (2):273-301.details
|
|
Freedom to act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Boston,: Routledge and Kegan Paul.details
|
|
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.details
|
|
What We Owe to Each Other.T. M. Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Harvard University Press.details
|
|
Thought and action.Stuart Hampshire - 1959 - Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.details
|
|
Action and purpose.Richard Taylor - 1966 - New York,: Humanities Press.details
|
|
Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control.Wayne Wu - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):101-26.details
|
|
Rethinking Relational Autonomy.Andrea C. Westlund - 2009 - Hypatia 24 (4):26-49.details
|
|
Confronting Many-Many Problems: Attention and Agentive Control.Wayne Wu - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):50-76.details
|
|
Beyond Button Presses.Robyn Repko Waller - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):441-462.details
|
|
Beyond the comparator model: A multi-factorial two-step account of agency.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.details
|
|
Mental ballistics: the involuntariness of spontaneity.Galen J. Strawson - unknowndetails
|
|
Processes, Continuants, and Individuals.Helen Steward - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):fzt080.details
|
|
Errors about errors: Virtue theory and trait attribution.Gopal Sreenivasan - 2002 - Mind 111 (441):47-68.details
|
|
The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.Steven A. Sloman - 1996 - Psychological Bulletin 119 (1):3-22.details
|
|
The essence of agency is discovered, not defined: a minimal mindreading argument.Andrew Sims - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2011-2028.details
|
|
The Experience of Acting and the Structure of Consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (8):422-448.details
|
|
Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.details
|
|
Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation.Scott Robert Sehon - 2005 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.details
|
|