- Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2012 - MIT Press.details
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Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What is it for a Machine Learning Model to Have a Capability?Jacqueline Harding & Nathaniel Sharadin - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Agency.Markus Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Beliefs as inner causes: the (lack of) evidence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877.details
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Resolving teleology's false dilemma.Gunnar Babcock & Dan McShea - 2023 - Biological Journal of the Linnean Society 139 (4):415-432.details
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Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action.Michael Brent - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):656-673.details
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Four objections to the standard story of action (and four replies).Michael Smith - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):387-401.details
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The narrative practice hypothesis: Clarifications and implications.Daniel D. Hutto - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):175 – 192.details
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Reasons explanations (of actions) as structural explanations.Megan Fritts - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12683-12704.details
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The Metaphysics of Science and Aim-Oriented Empiricism: A Revolution for Science and Philosophy.Nicholas Maxwell - 2018 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature.details
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The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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(1 other version)Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Reasons and Causes: The Philosophical Battle and The Meta-philosophical War.Giuseppina D'Oro - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):207 - 221.details
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Anscombe's and von Wright's non‐causalist response to Davidson's challenge.Christian Kietzmann - 2023 - Philosophical Investigations 46 (2):240-263.details
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Chimps as secret agents.Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2129-2158.details
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Evidence and simplicity: why we should reject homeopathy.Scott Sehon & Donald Stanley - 2010 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):276-281.details
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Causally efficacious intentions and the sense of agency: In defense of real mental causation.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):135-160.details
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How Beliefs are like Colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvaniadetails
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Reasonology and False Beliefs.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (1):91-118.details
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Empirical Adequacy and Virtue Ethics.Philip A. Reed - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):343-357.details
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Teleological Explanation.Scott Sehon - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis, A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 121–128.details
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Limited engagements and narrative extensions.Daniel D. Hutto - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):419 – 444.details
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The Davidsonian Challenge to the Non-Causalist.Guido Löhrer & Scott Sehon - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):85-96.details
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Action explanation and its presuppositions.Lilian O’Brien - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):123-146.details
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Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument.Alison Ann Springle & Justin Humphreys - 2021 - Synthese (3):7919-7955.details
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(1 other version)Guidance and Belief.David Hunter - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):63-90.details
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Beyond Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism.Lilian O’Brien - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):281-295.details
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Sneddon on Action and Responsibility.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2008 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):69-88.details
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Action explanation and the free will debate: How incompatibilist arguments go wrong1.Scott Sehon - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):351-368.details
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Constructing life and consciousness, how hard can it be?Ben Page - 2020 - Sapientia 76:27-53.details
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Design Hypotheses Behave Like Skeptical Hypotheses.René van Woudenberg & Jeroen de Ridder - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):69-90.details
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The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2009 - Disputatio 3 (26):1 - 16.details
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Kan God een goede verklaring zijn? Over theïstische verklaringen in de wetenschap.Jeroen de Ridder - 2008 - Philosophia Reformata 73 (1):44-60.details
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Introduction: Final Causes and Teleological Explanations.Dominik Perler & Stephan Schmid - 2011 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 14 (1):11-19.details
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Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action.Zachary Martin - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):925 - 928.details
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Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Normative Functionalism about Intentional Action.Chauncey Maher - 2012 - Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.details
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Self-Movement and Natural Normativity: Keeping Agents in the Causal Theory of Action.Matthew McAdam - 2007 - Dissertation, Georgetown Universitydetails
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Acting on a Ground : Reasons, Rational Motivation, and Explanation.Magnus Frei - 2016 - Dissertation, Fribourgdetails
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Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal Combatibilist Account, by Scott Sehon: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. xii + 239, £45. [REVIEW]Derek Baker - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):411-413.details
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