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A computational foundation for the study of cognition.David Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.details
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(1 other version)An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.details
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Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton?David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Synthese 108 (3):309-33.details
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(1 other version)Neural reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brain.Michael L. Anderson - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):245.details
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(1 other version)Defining 'intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.details
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Representation and Reality.H. Putnam - 1988 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 52 (1):168-168.details
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Multiple realizations.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):635-654.details
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Representation and Reality.Robert Stalnaker - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):359.details
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The varieties of computation: A reply.David Chalmers - 2012 - Journal of Cognitive Science 2012 (3):211-248.details
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(1 other version)An Argument for the Identity Theory.David Lewis - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Is the brain a digital computer?John R. Searle - 1990 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 64 (3):21-37.details
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Minimal models and canonical neural computations: the distinctness of computational explanation in neuroscience.M. Chirimuuta - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):127-153.details
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(1 other version)Defining ‘Intrinsic’.David Lewis & Rae Langton - 2014 - In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 17-30.details
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Computation, individuation, and the received view on representation.Mark Sprevak - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):260-270.details
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Triviality arguments against functionalism.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295.details
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A theory of computational implementation.Michael Rescorla - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1277-1307.details
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What does functionalism tell us about personal identity?Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Noûs 36 (4):682-698.details
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Functionalism and personal identity: A reply.Sydney Shoemaker - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):525-533.details
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