- Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception.Gary Hatfield - 1988 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (2):175-214.details
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Cognitive psychology and principled skepticism.Barbara von Eckardt - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (February):67-88.details
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The present status of the innateness controversy.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - In Representations: philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 257-316.details
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From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - MIT Press.details
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(2 other versions)What is Functionalism?Ned Block - 1980 - In Ned Joel Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.details
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(2 other versions)Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.details
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(1 other version)The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.details
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(1 other version)Why there still has to be a language of thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - In Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.details
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(2 other versions)Troubles with functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.details
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Vindicating Intentional Realism: A Review of Jerry Fodor's "Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind". [REVIEW]Frances Egan - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59-61.details
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(1 other version)Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):384-389.details
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Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.details
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精神状态的性质.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In William H. Capitan & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Art, mind, and religion. [Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 1--223.details
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A modal argument for narrow content.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.details
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Propositional attitudes.Jerry Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (4):501-23.details
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The postulates and methods of "behaviorism.".Kenneth W. Spence - 1948 - Psychological Review 55 (2):67-78.details
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(2 other versions)Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1991 - In David M. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 536-568.details
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The nature and plausibility of cognitivism.John Haugeland - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):215-26.details
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The causal theory of the mind.David M. Armstrong - 1980 - In David Malet Armstrong (ed.), The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Ithaca, N.Y.: University of Queensland Press.details
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(1 other version)Autonomous psychology and the belief/desire thesis.Stephen P. Stich - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):573-591.details
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Representation in perception and cognition: Connectionist affordances.Gary Hatfield - 1991 - In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. M. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 163--95.details
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Some evidence against narrow causal theories of belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - In From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.details
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From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science.Stephen Stich - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):261-278.details
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In Defense of a Different Taxonomy: A Reply to Owens.Valerie Walker - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (3):425 - 431.details
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Functionalism and broad content.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1988 - Mind 97 (July):318-400.details
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Computing and cognitive science.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1989 - In Michael I. Posner (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.details
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