- From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):262-280.details
|
|
Rejecting epiphobia.Umut Baysan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2773-2791.details
|
|
Functional Properties are Epiphenomenal.Matthew Rellihan - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1171-1195.details
|
|
Self-knowledge as a Result of the Embodied and Social Cognition.Anita Pacholik-Żuromska - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
|
|
Truth-Conditional Cognitivism and the Lexical Problem.Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2019 - Topoi 40 (1):43-54.details
|
|
Externalism and Internalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Robert A. Wilson - 2017 - Oxford Bibliographies.details
|
|
Subjective Externalism.Sarah Sawyer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (1):4-22.details
|
|
Causality in the McDowellian World.Alan Charles McKay - 2014 - Dissertation, Queen's University Belfastdetails
|
|
How Counterpart Theory Saves Nonreductive Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):139-174.details
|
|
Reid on the Autonomy of Ethics: From Active Power to Moral Nonnaturalism.Terence Cuneo & Randall Harp - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (4):523-541.details
|
|
VI*—Externalism, Content and Causation1.Martha Klein - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):159-176.details
|
|
(1 other version)Externalism and Action-Guiding Epistemic Norms.Stephen Jacobson - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):381-397.details
|
|
Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content?Murat Aydede - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-458.details
|
|
(1 other version)Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
L'argument sémantique pour la dépendance corporelle de la pensée.Michael Esfeld - 2003 - Studia Philosophica 62:119-131.details
|
|
Two tales of functional explanation.Martin Roth & Robert Cummins - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):773-788.details
|
|
Folk psychology as science.Martin Roth - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3971-3982.details
|
|
(1 other version)Darwin’s Algorithm, Natural Selective History, and Intentionality Naturalized.Philip Hanson - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (sup1):53-83.details
|
|
(4 other versions)Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
The mind-body problem: An overview.Kirk Ludwig - 2003 - In Ted Warfield (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 1-46.details
|
|
Narrow mental content.Curtis Brown - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Cause and essence.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Synthese 93 (3):403 - 449.details
|
|
The nomic role account of carving reality at the joints.Peter Vallentyne - 1998 - Synthese 115 (2):171-198.details
|
|
(1 other version)Externalism and action-guiding epistemic norms.Stephen Jacobson - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):343-355.details
|
|
Two types of mental causation.Wim de Muijnck - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):21-35.details
|
|
Functional role and intentionality.Amir Horowitz - 1992 - Theoria 58 (2-3):197-218.details
|
|
A dilemma for asymmetric dependence.Joseph Mendola - 2003 - Noûs 37 (2):232-257.details
|
|
Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks.Bryan Frances - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):199-232.details
|
|
Two routes to narrow content: Both dead ends.Pat A. Manfredi - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.details
|
|
Belief states and narrow content.Curtis Brown - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.details
|
|
(1 other version)The components of content.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Fodor, Adams and causal properties.Lilly‐Marlene Russow - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):57-61.details
|
|
Individualism, causal powers, and explanation.Robert A. Wilson - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (2):103-39.details
|
|
Content, causal powers, and context.Keith Butler - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (1):105-14.details
|
|
Causal depth, theoretical appropriateness, and individualism in psychology.Robert A. Wilson - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (1):55-75.details
|
|
Handbook of Evolutionary Thinking in the Sciences.Thomas Heams, Philippe Huneman, Guillaume Lecointre & Marc Silberstein (eds.) - 2014 - Springer.details
|
|
Truthmaker Internalism and the Mind-Dependence of Propositions.Robin Stenwall - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):59-76.details
|
|
Belief ascriptions and social externalism.Ronald Loeffler - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):211-239.details
|
|
Behavior, ISO functionalism, and psychology.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (2):191-209.details
|
|
Biological thinking in evolutionary psychology: Rockbottom or quicksand?H. Looren De Jong & W. J. Van Der Steen - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):183 – 205.details
|
|
Reply to Russow.Frederick Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65.details
|
|
Semantic holism in social science.Finn Collin - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (3):201 – 214.details
|
|
Classical and connectionist models: Levels of description.Josep E. Corbí - 1993 - Synthese 95 (2):141 - 168.details
|
|
Functions and goal directedness.Berent Enç & Fred Adams - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (4):635-654.details
|
|
On the objects of belief.Wolfgang Spohn - 1996 - In C. Stein & M. Textor (eds.), Intentional Phenomena in Context. Hamburg.details
|
|
The computational theory of mind.Steven Horst - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Reference, causal powers, externalist intuitions, and unicorns.Gabriel Segal - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 329.details
|
|
Computation, external factors, and cognitive explanations.Amir Horowitz - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.details
|
|
Alternative individualism.Denis M. Walsh - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):628-648.details
|
|
Fodor's modal argument.Frederick Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.details
|
|