I defend a view of the species category, pluralistic realism, which is designed to do justice to the insights of many different groups of systematists. After arguing that species are sets and not individuals, I proceed to outline briefly some defects of the biological species concept. I draw the general moral that similar shortcomings arise for other popular views of the nature of species. These shortcomings arise because the legitimate interests of biology are diverse, and these diverse interests are reflected (...) in different legitimate approaches to the classification of organisms. In the final section, I show briefly how the pluralistic approach can help to illuminate some areas of biological and philosophical dispute. (shrink)

Biological species have been treated traditionally as spatiotemporally unrestricted classes. If they are to perform the function which they do in the evolutionary process, they must be spatiotemporally localized individuals, historical entities. Reinterpreting biological species as historical entities solves several important anomalies in biology, in philosophy of biology, and within philosophy itself. It also has important implications for any attempt to present an "evolutionary" analysis of science and for sciences such as anthropology which are devoted to the study of single (...) species. (shrink)

The history of science is that of older theories being challenged and eventually being superseded by newer theories. The rationality of this process of scientific theory change is a central issue in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper aims to elucidate this topic by examining an episode in the history of medical science, namely the change from Galen's theory of the movement of the heart and blood to Harvey’s theory of the circulation of the blood. In Part I the historical (...) details include Galen's theory, the generation of Harvey's theory, Harvey's arguments for his theory, the reception of and arguments against Harvey’s theory, and the fate of Galen's theory. In Part II to elucidate the topic, the change from Galen's theory to Harvey's theory is assumed to be rational, and the ideas of Imre Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn are examined in turn to see if they can account for this rationality. It is argued that they cannot. In Part III a different conception, which does account for the rationality of this scientific theory change, is presented. One noteworthy consequence of this conception is that it provides an argument against the context of discovery/context of justification distinction as an adequate basis for understanding the rational process of scientific theory change. (shrink)

The prevailing case study approach to teaching biomedical ethics is compared with a new methodology using short written exercises designed to develop decision making skills. Course content of this new approach and its adaptability to computer assisted instruction with student-faculty interactive software are outlined.

Both William Dray's and Carl Hempel's models of rational explanation share a common paradigm of decision-making in history. They define a rational decision as a deliberative selection of a particular deed, according to a rationale and after a consideration of circumstances and possible consequences, in order to achieve some pre-determined objective. But Dray's and Hempel's own examples of historiographical practice reveal that decisions are generally concerned not with which deed to perform, but with whether or not to perform a certain (...) deed. A paradigm of "opportune" decision-making would more correctly view a decision as a matching of a set of objectives with the probable consequences of the action in question, on the basis of the apparent opportuneness of circumstances. (shrink)

The likelihood justification of cladistic parsimony suggested in Sober (1984) is here shown to be incomplete. Even so, cladistic parsimony remains a counter-example to the principle of the common cause formulated by Reichenbach (1956) and Salmon (1975, 1979, 1984).

The positivists suggest that some truths may be immune from empirical refutation and yet lacking in rational justification. Quine holds that every proposition is in principle empirically refutable so there are no a priori truths. I’ll provide a working characterization of the idea of “rational revisability” and argue it’s impossible for us to take a chain of rational revision and end up revising everything which we now believe. Quine's position on revisability is also in tension with certain theses about epistemic (...) holism. Finally, I discuss a more general context in which rational argument is viewed as one mechanism among many for reliably modifying beliefs. This more biological perspective allows us to formulate Quine's claims about revisability in a new way and to raise some interesting questions about the potential impact of natural selection on our cognitive capacities. (shrink)

A common complaint of biologists is that their subject receives poor treatment from philosophers—it gets but a fraction of the attention accorded to physics and chemistry, and what little it does receive, is usually of the type where ‘All swans are white’ is taken to be a paradigmatic example of the state of biological thinking. It cannot be denied that this complaint is, to a great extent, justified; however, there are some notable breaches in the wall of ignorance and silence, (...) amongst which must be numbered The Ascent of Life by T.A. Goudge. In this book, starting from what is obviously a very wide knowledge of biology, Goudge attempts a careful and thorough analysis of one of the major achievements of biological thought, evolutionary theory. The conclusions that Goudge draws are many; nevertheless, one can discern running through them a common theme, namely that whilst evolutionary theory is indeed a legitimate branch of science, to assume that it is a science of the same nature as physics and chemistry would be a grave error. Goudge argues that, despite certain similarities to other branches of science, the essential aims, methods and results of evolutionary theory are peculiar unto itself. (shrink)

The task of preparing a case is similar to writing a legal brief or an essay insofar as all three should contain a thesis or main point and argumentation or logically arranged facts and inferences. However, different from a brief or an essay, case studies should not contain a conclusion. A case should lead the reader through the facts, but it should not offer a firm or fixed resolution or moral judgment. Ideally it should leave the reader with the opportunity (...) to create and insert their own conclusion.A good case study should be amenable to the following kinds of questions or analysis procedures:A. What is the problem? or What is at stake? B. What are the non-normative or factual issues involved? C. What are the normative or ethical issues involved? D. What are the alternatives available? E. What decision would you make? (shrink)

In my 1984 book on The Foundations of Psychoanalysis, I addressed two main questions: Are the analyst’s observations in the clinical setting reliable as ‘data,’ and if so, can they actually support the major hypotheses of the theory of repression or psychic conflict, which is the cornerstone of the psychoanalytic edifice, as we know? In the book, I argued for giving a negative answer to both of these questions. Clearly, if the evidence from the couch is unreliable from the outset, (...) then this defect alone suffices to jeopardize the very foundations of the clinical theory. But, as I strongly emphasized, even if clinical data were not contaminated by the analyst’s influence, the inability of the psychoanalytic method of clinical investigation by free association to warrant the required sort of causal inferences leaves the major pillars of the theory of psychic conflict ill-supported. Thus, I see a two-fold threat to the psychoanalytic case-study method as a means of scientific inquiry.It is an immediate corollary of my challenge that it applies not only to Freud’s own original hypotheses, but also to any and all post-Freudian versions of psychoanalysis that rely on his clinical methods of validating causal inferences, though the specific content of their theories of psychic conflict is different. After all, the alteration in the content of the hypotheses hardly makes their validation more secure. Therefore, as Morris Eagle documented in a recent publication, those analysts who have objected to my critique as anachronistic have simply not come to grips with it. For example, such inadequate engagement is present, in my view, in the recent Freud Anniversary Lecture ‘Psychoanalysis as a Science: A Response to the New Challenges,’ given by Robert Wallerstein, the current president of the International Psychoanalytical Association. As he tells us, ‘The Freud Anniversary Lecture was intended primarily as a response to Grünbaum.’ Yet he does not come to grips at all with the gravamen of my challenge: Even if clinical data could be taken at face value as being uncontaminated epistemically, the inability of the psychoanalytic method of clinical investigation by free association to warrant causal inferences leaves the major pillars of the clinical theory of repression ill-supported. (shrink)

The prevailing case study approach to teaching biomedical ethics is compared with a new methodology using short written exercises designed to develop decision making skills. Course content of this new approach and its adaptability to computer assisted instruction with student-faculty interactive software are outlined.

This book consists thematically of three broad sections: a lengthy introduction in which Grünbaum critically assesses the hermeneutic construal of psychoanalysis, as represented in the work of Habermas, G. S. Klein, and Ricoeur; a critical examination of Popper's assessment of both psychoanalysis and inductivism; and a logical analysis of core psychoanalytic ideas that constitute the foundation for much of psychoanalytic theory. This last section is, in my view, the heart of the book and therefore, it is that section on which (...) I will focus in this review. (shrink)

Exemplars, or concrete problems and resolutions, play a far more central role in business ethics than do detailed rules. Exemplars, such as case studies, anecdotes, parables, and fables, are nearly as important as general ethical principles.There are four arguments for recognizing this essential role for exemplars in business ethics. First, exemplars facilitate impartial agreement where agreement on detailed moral rules eludes us. Second, exemplars uniquely facilitate, for the purposes of training and decision making, the balanced integration of diverse sets of (...) values. Third, the use of exemplars appropriately cultivates personal judgment, making detailed moral roles useful in exceptional cases only. Fourth, exemplars provide the flexibility necessary for making moral decisions within the continued flux of responsible business life. (shrink)

Teaching medical ethics by the case method may be enriched by adding to the principles-and-rules approach to practical reasoning modes of inquiry and interpretation that engage the moral imagination.