- Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
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Practical reason.R. Jay Wallace & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2024 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Knowledge and practical reasoning.Igor Douven - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):101–118.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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The teleological notion of 'function'.Karen Neander - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):454 – 468.details
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Skepticism about practical reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.details
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Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
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Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.details
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Etiological theories of function: A geographical survey.David J. Buller - 1998 - Biology and Philosophy 13 (4):505-527.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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(1 other version)Assertion and practical reasoning : common or divergent epistemic standards?Jessica Brown - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding.Christoph Kelp - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Inquiry, knowledge and understanding.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1583-1593.details
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Knowledge From Non-Knowledge: Inference, Testimony and Memory.Federico Luzzi - 2019 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Unity of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-45.details
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Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Jonathan Dancy - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Hugh J. McCann & M. E. Bratman - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):230.details
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Commodious knowledge.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1487-1502.details
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What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.J. Stanley & J. Hawthorne - 2008 - Revista Cultura E Fé 37 (144).details
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Pragmatic encroachment: It's not just about knowledge.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):27-42.details
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No Epistemic Norm for Action.SImion Mona - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):231-238.details
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What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.details
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Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.details
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(1 other version)I—Alan Millar: Why Knowledge Matters.Alan Millar - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.details
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Two for the Knowledge Goal of Inquiry.Christoph Kelp - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):227-32.details
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Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Knowledge Norms.Matthew A. Benton - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:nn-nn.details
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Knowledge in Action.Jonathan Weisberg - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
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A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The unity of reason.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Resisting Encroachment. [REVIEW]Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):465-472.details
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(1 other version)A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.details
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(1 other version)Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.details
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Treating something as a reason for action.Ram Neta - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):684-699.details
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Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context.Mona Simion - 2021 - Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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