- Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Varieties of externalism.J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):63-109.details
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Two Kinds of Stakes.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):307-324.details
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Perception and evidence.Alex Byrne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170:101-113.details
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Foundations of Everyday Practical Reasoning.Hanti Lin - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):831-862.details
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Rational Faith and Justified Belief.Lara Buchak - 2014 - In Laura Frances Callahan & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 49-73.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Defending interest-relative invariantism.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):591-609.details
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Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation.Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):237-260.details
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Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment.Hamid Vahid - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):25-41.details
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Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):179-192.details
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Can There Be a Knowledge-First Ethics of Belief?Dennis Whitcomb - 2014 - In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm.Martin Montminy - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):57-68.details
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Normative Reasons Contextualism.Tim Henning - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):593-624.details
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Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes.Wesley Buckwalter & Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):201–234.details
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Some Thoughts on the JK-Rule1.Martin Smith - 2012 - Noûs 46 (4):791-802.details
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Practial reasoning, decision theory and anti-intellectualism.Jessica Brown - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):1-20.details
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Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief from Cognitive Science.Kelly James Clark & Dani Rabinowitz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):67 - 81.details
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The Epistemological Bases of the Slow Switching Argument.Mahmoud Morvarid - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):17-38.details
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The practical rationality of trust.Paul Faulkner - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9).details
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Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):89-100.details
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Discursive justification and skepticism.Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):373-394.details
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Epistemic closure under deductive inference: what is it and can we afford it?Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.details
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Factive Verbs and Protagonist Projection.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):391-409.details
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Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):3-26.details
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What Liars Can Tell Us about the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning.Don Fallis - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):347-367.details
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Non-Traditional Factors in Judgments about Knowledge.Wesley Buckwalter - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):278-289.details
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Freges Puzzle from a Model-Based Point of View.Karlis Podnieks - 2012 - The Reasoner 6 (1):5--6.details
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Justification as the appearance of knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.details
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Epistemology.John Turri - 2013 - In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.details
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What we know and what to do.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2291-2323.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Acting on knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):361-382.details
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Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.details
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Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI.Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.details
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Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):675-708.details
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Some Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology.Nestor Ángel Pinillos - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):675-688.details
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Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Action Trees and Moral Judgment.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):555-578.details
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Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.details
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What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.details
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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Knowledge, Experiments, and Practical Interests.Ángel Pinillos - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 192.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Assertion and isolated second-hand knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 251--276.details
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Moore's paradox and epistemic norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.details
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