- Agency and the Metaphysics of Nature.Andrew Sims - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):194-198.details
|
|
If free will doesn't exist, neither does water.Manuel Vargas - 2013 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. pp. 177-202.details
|
|
Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds.Richard Boyd - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1):127-148.details
|
|
Actions as Prime.Lucy O'Brien - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:265-285.details
|
|
(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.details
|
|
(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.details
|
|
(1 other version)From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.details
|
|
(1 other version)Is Responsible Essentially Impossible.S. L. Hurley - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (2):229-268.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The Illusion of Conscious Will.R. Holton - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):218-221.details
|
|
(1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.details
|
|
The Mad Scientist Meets the Robot Cats.Mark Heller - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):333-337.details
|
|
Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):687.details
|
|
(1 other version)How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (5):606-637.details
|
|
Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.details
|
|
Is goal ascription possible in minimal mindreading?Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (2):228-233.details
|
|
Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action.John Bishop - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.details
|
|
Two Systems for Mindreading?Peter Carruthers - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):141-162.details
|
|
(1 other version)How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.Ian A. Apperly Stephen A. Butterfill - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (5):606-637.details
|
|
Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility.Shaun Nichols - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):319-334.details
|
|
(1 other version)Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction.Michael McKenna & Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Derk Pereboom.details
|
|
Companions in innocence: defending a new methodological assumption for theorizing about moral responsibility.Kelly McCormick - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):515-533.details
|
|
Is semantics possible?Hilary Putnam - 1970 - Metaphilosophy 1 (3):187–201.details
|
|
Building better beings: a theory of moral responsibility.Manuel Vargas - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness.Nicholas Shea & Tim Bayne - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):459-484.details
|
|
Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa.Richard Boyd - 1999 - In Robert Andrew Wilson (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. MIT Press. pp. 141-85.details
|
|
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.details
|
|
Intention.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
Reference and definite descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.details
|
|
The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Is responsibility essentially impossible?Susan L. Hurley - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (2):229-268.details
|
|
The mad scientist meets the robot cats: Compatibilism, kinds, and counterexamples.Mark Heller - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):333-37.details
|
|
(1 other version)The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.details
|
|
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Preface by.Daniel Wegner - 2002 - In Daniel M. Wegner (ed.), The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Mental files.François Recanati - 2021 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Mental files.François Recanati - 2021 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|