Argues for the humean theory of motivation on the grounds that rejecting it requires rejecting decision theory.

Abstract The paper explicates a set of criteria the joint satisfaction of which is taken to qualify moral judgements as cognitive. The paper examines evidence that some moral judgements meet these criteria, and relates the resulting conception of moral judgements to ongoing controversies about cognitivism in ethics.

This paper outlines a new approach to the task of giving an account of the meaning of moral statements: a sort of "conceptual role semantics", according to which the meaning of moral terms is given by their role in practical reasoning. This role is sufficient both to distinguish the meaning of any moral term from that of other terms, and to determine the property or relation (if any) that the term stands for. The paper ends by suggesting reasons for regarding (...) this "conceptual role semantics" approach as preferable to noncognitivism, the causal theory of reference, and noncircular conceptual analysis. (shrink)

Much of the plausibility of non-cognitivism in meta-ethics rests on the following argument derived from hume: 1) cognitive judgments alone can never have any motivational influence on our actions, 2) moral judgments have a motivational influence on our actions, and 3) therefore, no moral judgment is simply a cognitive judgment. this paper subjects various forms of this argument to criticism.