This chapter contains sections titled: The Norwich Lectures The Oxford Lectures Lost works by Wodeham Conclusion Note.

Die Intentionalitätsproblematik steht nicht nur im Mittelpunkt der heutigen philosophischen und kognitionstheoretischen Debatten. Sie wurde bereits im Mittelalter scharfsinnig diskutiert, ja die scholastischen Autoren prägten als Erste die Fachausdrücke "Intentionalität" und "intentionale Existenz" und entwarfen verschiedene Modelle, um das Rätsel der kognitiven Bezugnahme zu lösen. Dieses Buch stellt fünf einflußreiche Intentionalitätsmodelle vor, die im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert entstanden sind. Dabei werden so unterschiedliche Autoren wie Thomas von Aquin, Petrus Johannes Olivi, Dietrich von Freiberg, Johannes Duns Scotus, Petrus Aureoli, Hervaeus (...) Natalis, Wilhelm von Ockham und Adam Wodeham berücksichtigt. -/- "Die anschauliche und präzise Art, in der Perler mit den Denkern des Mittelalters und der Gegenwart argumentierend spricht, lockert seine gestrenge Gedankenarbeit auf, ohne darüber hinwegzutäuschen, daß dieses Buch eine Reihe von Entdeckungen und Klärungen enthält, wie sie auf diesem schwierigen Feld selten vorkommen. Er bietet eine Meisterleistung an Konzentration und Darstellungskunst. Wenige Bücher zur Philosophie des Mittelalters vereinen so glücklich wie dieses geschichtlichen Takt und Problemsinn." Kurt Flasch -/- The problem of intentionality is not only at the centre of today's philosophical and cognitive theory debates. It was already discussed astutely in the Middle Ages; indeed the scholastic authors were the first to coin the technical terms "intentionality" and "intentional existence" and designed various models to solve the riddle of cognitive reference. This book presents five influential models of intentionality that emerged in the 13th and 14th centuries. It takes into account authors as different as Thomas Aquinas, Petrus Johannes Olivi, Dietrich von Freiberg, Johannes Duns Scotus, Petrus Aureoli, Hervaeus Natalis, Wilhelm von Ockham and Adam Wodeham. Upun reading this book, Kurt Flasch remarks that it "contains a wealth of discoveries and clarifications that are rare in this difficult field. [Perler] offers a masterly performance of concentration and art of representation [...]. Few books on medieval philosophy succeed so thoroughly in uniting historical and philosophical perspicacity such as this one". (shrink)

This paper looks at the critical reception of two central claims of Peter Auriol’s theory of cognition: the claim that the objects of cognition have an apparent or objective being that resists reduction to the real being of objects, and the claim that there may be natural intuitive cognitions of nonexistent objects. These claims earned Auriol the criticism of his fellow Franciscans, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham. According to them, the theory of apparent being was what had led Auriol to (...) allow for intuitive cognitions of nonexistents, but the intuitive cognition of nonexistents, at its turn, led to scepticism. Modern commentators have offered similar readings of Auriol, but this paper argues, first, that the apparent being provides no special reason to think there could be intuitions of nonexistent objects, and second, that despite his idiosyncratic account of intuition, Auriol was no more vulnerable to scepticism than his critics. (shrink)

When William of Ockham lectured on Lombard's Sentences in 1317-1319, he articulated a new theory of knowledge. Its reception by fourteenth-century scholars was, however, largely negative, for it conflicted with technical accounts of vision and with their interprations of Duns Scotus. This study begins with Roger Bacon, a major source for later scholastics' efforts to tie a complex of semantic and optical explanations together into an account of concept formation, truth and the acquisition of certitude. After considering the challenges of (...) Peter Olivi and Henry of Ghent, Part I concludes with a discussion of Scotus's epistemology. Part II explores the alternative theories of Peter Aureol and William of Ockham. Part III traces the impact of Scotus, and then of Aureol, on Oxford thought in the years of Ockham's early audience, culminating with the views of Adam Wodeham. Part IV concerns Aureol's intellectual legacy at Paris, the introduction of Wodeham's thought there, and Autrecourt's controversies. (shrink)

Against the background of changing assessments of Nominalism and its meanings before Ockham, this book examines the reception of Ockham's thought at Oxford and ...

The aim of the series Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind is to foster historical research into the nature of thinking and the workings of the mind. The volumes address topics of intellectual history that would nowadays fall into different disciplines like philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, etc. The monographs and collections of articles in the series are historically reliable as well as congenial to the contemporary reader. They provide original insights into central contemporary (...) problems by looking at them in historical contexts, addressing issues like consciousness, representation and intentionality, mind and body, the self and the emotions. In this way, the books open up new perspectives for research on these topics. (shrink)

This volume continues this discussion with particular reference to medieval philosophy.Inglis shows that the modern historiography of medieval philosophy had ...

INTRODUCTION Adam Wodeham, OFM (d.) has received only passing mention in the textbooks on the history of medieval philosophy. Although recognized as a major ...

The dissertation describes the way that theories of human concept formation came to play a pivotal role in the trinitarian discussion during the period 1250-1325, medieval theologians taking as their point of departure the identification--made by John in his Gospel and later Augustine of Hippo--of the second person of the trinity, the Son, with a mental word or concept. Beginning with Bonaventure, I trace the development of a Franciscan tradition in trinitarian theology that made emanations the significant source of distinction (...) between the persons in the trinity, deemphasizing the more traditional explanation based on relation. I argue that Henry of Ghent should be seen as part of this Franciscan theological current, and that he combined the Franciscan stress on emanations with Aquinas' development of the notion of the verbum mentis. Thus, for Henry, the emanation by which the Son takes being and is distinct from the other two persons is intellectual emanation as a Word, and he uses philosophical psychology to solve trinitarian questions. This identification became the predominate model of the trinity in the Franciscan trinitarian tradition. I show that John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureol adopted Henry's strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology. Ghent's, Scotus', and Aureol's trinitarian thought, their theories of concepts and concept formation, and the way that they use their concept theory in their trinitarian theologies are detailed. Further I give historical background for understanding the development of their thought, including where they stand in the Franciscan trinitarian tradition, and how they interacted with a rival Dominican trinitarian tradition. One manifestation of the Franciscan trinitarian tradition's emphasis on emanation that we see in the three focal figures of the dissertation is their "marginalization strategies": the different ways various Franciscan scholars tried to minimize their deemphasization of a relation account of personal distinction with a great deal of authority behind it. ;In appendices I provide editions of relevant texts by Peter Aureol, Gerard of Abbeville, Matthew of Aquasparta, William of Ware, Robert Cowton, Thomas of Sutton, Henry of Harclay, and Francis of Marchia. (shrink)