Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (3 other versions)Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
    Editorial preface to the fourth edition and modified translation -- The text of the Philosophische Untersuchungen -- Philosophische untersuchungen = Philosophical investigations -- Philosophie der psychologie, ein fragment = Philosophy of psychology, a fragment.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2248 citations  
  • (1 other version)A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
    Breaking new ground in the debate about the relation of mind and body, David Armstrong's classic text - first published in 1968 - remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In the preface to this new edition, the author reflects on the book's impact and considers it in the light of subsequent developments. He also provides a bibliography of all the key writings to have appeared in the materialist debate.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   925 citations  
  • A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - MIT Press.
    Philosophers from Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein to the recent realists and antirealists have sought to answer the question, What are concepts? This book provides a detailed, systematic, and accessible introduction to an original philosophical theory of concepts that Christopher Peacocke has developed in recent years to explain facts about the nature of thought, including its systematic character, its relations to truth and reference, and its normative dimension. Particular concepts are also treated within the general framework: perceptual concepts, logical concepts, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   697 citations  
  • (4 other versions)Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3246 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
    How do rational minds make contact with the world? The empiricist tradition sees a gap between mind and world, and takes sensory experience, fallible as it is, to provide our only bridge across that gap. In its crudest form, for example, the traditional idea is that our minds consult an inner realm of sensory experience, which provides us with evidence about the nature of external reality. Notoriously, however, it turns out to be far from clear that there is any viable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1065 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):389-394.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   885 citations  
  • A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   635 citations  
  • A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - Studia Logica 54 (1):132-133.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   716 citations  
  • Nonconceptual content and the "space of reasons".Richard G. Heck - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523.
    In Mind and World, John McDowell argues against the view that perceptual representation is non-conceptual. The central worry is that this view cannot offer any reasonable account of how perception bears rationally upon belief. I argue that this worry, though sensible, can be met, if we are clear that perceptual representation is, though non-conceptual, still in some sense 'assertoric': Perception, like belief, represents things as being thus and so.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   258 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.Tim Crane - 1992 - In The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-57.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   182 citations  
  • Does perception have a nonconceptual content?Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):239-264.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   201 citations  
  • Perception and conceptual content.Alex Byrne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 231--250.
    Perceptual experiences justify beliefs—that much seems obvious. As Brewer puts it, “sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs” (this volume, xx). In Mind and World McDowell argues that we can get from this apparent platitude to the controversial claim that perceptual experiences have conceptual content: [W]e can coherently credit experiences with rational relations to judgement and belief, but only if we take it that spontaneity is already implicated in receptivity; that is, only if we take it that experiences have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   123 citations  
  • Understanding demonstratives.Gareth Evans - 1981 - In Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding. New York: W. de Gruyter. pp. 280--304.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   158 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Waterfall Illusion.Tim Crane - 1988 - Analysis 48 (June):142-47.
    If you stare for a period of time at a scene which contains movement in one direction, and then turn your attention to an object in a scene which contains no movement, this object will appear to move in the opposite direction to that of the original movement. The effect can be easily achieved by attaching a piece of paper with a spiral drawn on it to the spinning turntable of a record player, and then turning the turntable off while (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  • (2 other versions)What might nonconceptual content be?Robert Stalnaker - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:339-352.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  • Perception, concepts, and memory.Michael G. F. Martin - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):745-63.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  • Scenarios, concepts, and perception.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  • Phenomenology and nonconceptual content.Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):609-615.
    This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly’s position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conceptualism stem from animal perception, and from a distinction, elaborated in the final section of the paper, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  • Demonstrative concepts and experience.Sean Dorrance Kelly - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):397-420.
    A number of authors have argued recently that the content of perceptual experience can, and even must, be characterized in conceptual terms. Their claim, more precisely, is that every perceptual experience is such that, of necessity, its content is constituted entirely by concepts possessed by the subject having the experience. This is a surprising result. For it seems reasonable to think that a subject’s experiences could be richer and more fine-grained than his conceptual repertoire; that a subject might be able, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  • The non-conceptual content of perceptual experience: Situation dependence and fineness of grain.Sean D. Kelly - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):601-608.
    I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke’s claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over-emphasis on the "fine-grainedness" of perceptual content - a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non-conceptual structure. I go on to describe two other features of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  • (2 other versions)What might nonconceptual content be?Robert Stalnaker - 2003 - In York Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. pp. 95-106.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn.Nathan Salmon - 1990 - In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Language, Logic, and Mind. CSLI Publications. pp. 215-247.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Perceptual content.Christopher Peacocke - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • (1 other version)The waterfall illusion.Tim Crane - 2003 - In York Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. pp. 142.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • (2 other versions)What might nonconceptual content be?Robert C. Stalnaker - 2003 - In York Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. pp. 339-352.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Reply to Gibson, Byrne, and Brandom.John McDowell - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:283-300.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind[REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (22):812-818.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   265 citations  
  • Afterword.[author unknown] - 2007 - Mediaevalia 28 (Special Issue):187-188.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • Nonconceptual content defended. [REVIEW]Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):381-388.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   95 citations