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Philosophical Investigations

New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell (1953)

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  1. RECkoning with the Stakes in Overcoming Representation-Hungry Problem Domains.Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):517-532.
    The paper reviews the current state of play around anti-representationalist attempts at countering Clark and Toribio’s representation-hunger thesis. It introduces a distinction between different approaches to Chemero’s Radical embodied cognition thesis in the form of, on the one hand, those pushing a hard line and, on the other, those who are more relaxed about their anti-representationalist commitments. In terms of overcoming Clark and Toribio’s thesis, hardliners seek to avoid any mentioning of mental content in the activity they purport to explain. (...)
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  • Lewis Carroll’s regress and the presuppositional structure of arguments.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (1):1-38.
    This essay argues that the main lesson of Lewis Carroll's Regress is that arguments are constitutively presuppositional.
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  • Substantialism, Essentialism, Emptiness: Buddhist Critiques of Ontology.Rafal K. Stepien - 2021 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 49 (5):871-893.
    This article seeks to introduce a greater degree of precision into our understanding of Madhyamaka Buddhist ontological non-foundationalism, focussing specifically on the Madhyamaka founder Nāgārjuna. It distinguishes four senses of what the ‘foundation’ whose existence Mādhyamikas deny means; that is, as ‘something that stands under or grounds things’ ; as ‘a particular kind of basic entity’ ; as ‘an individual essence by means of which it is identical to that very object, to itself’ ; and as ‘an essence in the (...)
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  • The Calculus of Natural Calculation.René Gazzari - 2021 - Studia Logica 109 (6):1375-1411.
    The calculus of Natural Calculation is introduced as an extension of Natural Deduction by proper term rules. Such term rules provide the capacity of dealing directly with terms in the calculus instead of the usual reasoning based on equations, and therefore the capacity of a natural representation of informal mathematical calculations. Basic proof theoretic results are communicated, in particular completeness and soundness of the calculus; normalisation is briefly investigated. The philosophical impact on a proof theoretic account of the notion of (...)
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  • Let Me Go and Try.Kirk Ludwig - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):340-358.
    This paper argues for a deflationary account of trying on which ‘x tried to ϕ’ abbreviates ‘x did something with the intention of ϕ-ing’, where ‘did something’ is treated as a schematic verb. On this account, tryings are not a distinctive sort of episode present in some or all cases of acting. ‘x tried to ϕ’ simply relates some doing of x’s to a further aim x had, which may or may not have been achieved. Consequently, the analysis of ‘x (...)
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  • The Downgrading of Pain Sufferers’ Credibility.Mar Rosàs Tosas - 2021 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 16 (1):1-12.
    BackgroundThe evaluation of pain remains one of the most difficult challenges that healthcare practitioners face. Chronic pain appears to affect more than 35% of the population in the West, and indeed, pain is the most common reason patients seek medical care. Despite its ubiquity, studies in the last decades reveal that many patients feel their pain is dismissed by healthcare practitioners and that, as a result, they are denied proper medical care. Buchman, Ho, and Goldberg point to this phenomenon as (...)
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  • Taking a Look at History.Vasso Kindi - 2014 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 8 (1):96-117.
    Ian Hacking urged that philosophers take a look at history. He called his recommendation the “Lockean imperative”. In the present paper I examine how Hacking understands the relation between philosophy and history by concentrating on his 1990 essay “Two kinds of ‘New Historicism’ for philosophers”. In this particular paper Hacking uses the visual metaphor of ‘taking a look’ which can also be found in the work of two other philosophers, Kuhn and Foucault, who are called by Hacking his mentors. I (...)
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  • Recollecting the Religious: Augustine in Answer to Meno’s Paradox.Ryan Haecker & Daniel Moulin-Stożek - 2021 - Studies in Philosophy and Education (6):1-12.
    Philosophers of education often view the role of religion in education with suspicion, claiming it to be impossible, indoctrinatory or controversial unless reduced to secular premises and aims. The ‘post-secular’ and ‘decolonial’ turns of the new millennium have, however, afforded opportunities to revaluate this predilection. In a social and intellectual context where the arguments of previous generations of philosophers may be challenged on account of positivist assumptions, there may be an opening for the reconsideration of alternative but traditional religious epistemologies. (...)
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  • Love As If.John Shand - 2011 - Essays in Philosophy 12 (1):2.
    The primary focus here is romantic love, but it may be applied to other cases of love such as those within a family. The first issue is whether love is a non-rational occurrence leading to a state of affairs to which the normative constrains of reason do not apply. If one assumes that reasons are relevant to determining love, then the second issue is the manner in which love is and should be reasonable and governed by the indications of reason. (...)
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  • Memory And The True Self: When Moral Knowledge Can And Cannot Be Forgotten.André Bilbrough - 2018 - Essays in Philosophy 19 (2):274-302.
    Why is it that forgetting moral knowledge, unlike other paradigmatic examples of knowledge, seems so deeply absurd? Previous authors have given accounts whereby moral forgetting in itself either is uniformly absurd and impossible or is possible and only the speech act is absurd. Considering findings in moral psychology and the experimental philosophy of personal identity, I argue that the knowledge of some moral truths—especially those that are emotional, widely held, subjectively important, and contribute to social relationships—cannot be forgotten because they’re (...)
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  • The Dual Aspects Theory of Truth.Benjamin Jarvis - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):209-233.
    Consider the following 'principles':2(Norm of Belief Schema) Necessarily, a belief of is correct (relative to some scenario) if and only if p (at that scenario) — where 'p' has the aforementioned content .(Generalized Norm of Belief) Necessarily, for all propositions , a belief of is correct (relative to some scenario) if and only if is true (at that scenario).Both 'principles' appear to capture the aim(s) of belief. (NBS) particularizes the aims to beliefs of distinct content-types. (GNB) generalizes these aims of (...)
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  • Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo‐Logicism.Fraser MacBride - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):103-163.
    According to the species of neo-logicism advanced by Hale and Wright, mathematical knowledge is essentially logical knowledge. Their view is found to be best understood as a set of related though independent theses: (1) neo-fregeanism-a general conception of the relation between language and reality; (2) the method of abstraction-a particular method for introducing concepts into language; (3) the scope of logic-second-order logic is logic. The criticisms of Boolos, Dummett, Field and Quine (amongst others) of these theses are explicated and assessed. (...)
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  • How to Reconcile a Unified Account of Explanation with Explanatory Diversity.Collin Rice & Yasha Rohwer - 2021 - Foundations of Science 26 (4):1025-1047.
    The concept of explanation is central to scientific practice. However, scientists explain phenomena in very different ways. That is, there are many different kinds of explanation; e.g. causal, mechanistic, statistical, or equilibrium explanations. In light of the myriad kinds of explanation identified in the literature, most philosophers of science have adopted some kind of explanatory pluralism. While pluralism about explanation seems plausible, it faces a dilemma Explanation beyond causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 39–56, 2018). Either there is nothing that (...)
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  • Review of Sabina Leonelli’s Data-Centric Biology: A Philosophical Study. [REVIEW]Beckett Sterner - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (3):540-550.
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  • Bird Identification as a Family of Activities: Motives, Mediating Artifacts, and Laminated Assemblages.Paul Prior & Spencer Schaffner - 2011 - Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 39 (1):51-70.
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  • Why Human Virtues Obtain in the Natural World.Jerker Karlsson - forthcoming - Religious Studies.
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  • What Reasoning Might Be.Markos Valaris - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).
    The philosophical literature on reasoning is dominated by the assumption that reasoning is essentially a matter of following rules. This paper challenges this view, by arguing that it misrepresents the nature of reasoning as a personal level activity. Reasoning must reflect the reasoner’s take on her evidence. The rule-following model seems ill-suited to accommodate this fact. Accordingly, this paper suggests replacing the rule-following model with a different, semantic approach to reasoning.
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  • The Demarcation Problem: A (Belated) Response to Laudan.Massimo Pigliucci - 2013 - In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. pp. 9.
    The “demarcation problem,” the issue of how to separate science from pseu- doscience, has been around since fall 1919—at least according to Karl Pop- per’s (1957) recollection of when he first started thinking about it. In Popper’s mind, the demarcation problem was intimately linked with one of the most vexing issues in philosophy of science, David Hume’s problem of induction (Vickers 2010) and, in particular, Hume’s contention that induction cannot be logically justified by appealing to the fact that “it works,” (...)
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  • Investigating Philosophical Discussion with Children as Co-Researchers : A Case Story of Doing Educative Research Using Collaborative Philosophical Inquiry.Judy A. Kyle - unknown
    This thesis is about an investigation of how children with philosophical experience use philosophical discussion as a way of doing research. A Lawrence Stenhouse description of 'research' as "systematic and sustained enquiry made public" served as my starting point for what to count as 'research'. As an interpretive case story of children participating in research as co-researchers, this research is about how I engaged in an after-school Discussion Research Group co-research project with seventeen volunteer students from my Philosophy for Children (...)
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  • Logical Constants.John MacFarlane - 2008 - Mind.
    Logic is usually thought to concern itself only with features that sentences and arguments possess in virtue of their logical structures or forms. The logical form of a sentence or argument is determined by its syntactic or semantic structure and by the placement of certain expressions called “logical constants.”[1] Thus, for example, the sentences Every boy loves some girl. and Some boy loves every girl. are thought to differ in logical form, even though they share a common syntactic and semantic (...)
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  • Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities.Alex Byrne - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers of mind have distinguished (and sometimes conflated) various qualities. This article tries to sort things out.
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  • Lexical Flexibility, Natural Language, and Ontology.Christopher A. Vogel - 2016 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):1-44.
    The Realist that investigates questions of ontology by appeal to the quantificational structure of language assumes that the semantics for the privileged language of ontology is externalist. I argue that such a language cannot be (some variant of) a natural language, as some Realists propose. The flexibility exhibited by natural language expressions noted by Chomsky and others cannot obviously be characterized by the rigid models available to the externalist. If natural languages are hostile to externalist treatments, then the meanings of (...)
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  • Kripkenstein and Non-Reductionism About Meaning-Facts.Florian Demont - unknown
    In 1982 Saul A. Kripke proposed a reconstruction of the central insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following. The reconstruction prominently featured a sceptical challenge which soon was recognised as a new and very radical form of scepticism. According to the challenge there is no fact of the matter which constitutes meaning. As there is no such fact, the first-person authority people intuitively seem to have concerning what they mean is also baseless. In response to the sceptic, many solutions have (...)
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  • Strawson on the Notion of the First Person.Manidipa Sen - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (4):477-492.
    The paper is an attempt to understand Strawson’s notion of the first person in the context of his general theory of a person. More specifically it will relook into the idea that the concept of a person is ‘primitive’, and see how Strawson’s idea of primitiveness of the concept of a person can be extended to his notion of the first person. One way of cashing out the notion of primitiveness in the context of the first person is in terms (...)
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  • Why the Idea of Framework Propositions Cannot Contribute to an Understanding of Delusions.Tim Thornton - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):159-175.
    One of the tasks that recent philosophy of psychiatry has taken upon itself is to extend the range of understanding to some of those aspects of psychopathology that Jaspers deemed beyond its limits. Given the fundamental difficulties of offering a literal interpretation of the contents of primary delusions, a number of alternative strategies have been put forward including regarding them as abnormal versions of framework propositions described by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. But although framework propositions share some of the apparent (...)
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  • Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations.Adam M. Croom - 2010 - South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian considerations upon (...)
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  • Individuality, Collectivity and the Intersubjective Constitution of Intentionality.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2020 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 11 (2).
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  • Quantum Bayesianism: A Study.Christopher Gordon Timpson - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39 (3):579-609.
    The Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics of Caves, Fuchs and Schack is presented. Its conjunction of realism about physics along with anti-realism about much of the structure of quantum theory is elaborated; and the position defended from common objections: that it is solipsist; that it is too instrumentalist; that it cannot deal with Wigner's friend scenarios. Three more substantive problems are raised: Can a reasonable ontology be found for the approach? Can it account for explanation in quantum theory? Are subjective (...)
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  • Just Another Article on Moore’s Paradox, but We Don’T Believe That.Iskra Fileva & Linda A. W. Brakel - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5153-5167.
    We present counterexamples to the widespread assumption that Moorean sentences cannot be rationally asserted. We then explain why Moorean assertions of the sort we discuss do not incur the irrationality charge. Our argument involves an appeal to the dual-process theory of the mind and a contrast between the conditions for ascribing beliefs to oneself and the conditions for making assertions about independently existing states of affairs. We conclude by contrasting beliefs of the sort we discuss with the structurally similar but (...)
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  • Expressing Experience: The Promise and Perils of the Phenomenological Interview.Elizabeth Pienkos, Borut Škodlar & Louis Sass - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):53-71.
    This paper outlines several of the challenges that are inherent in any attempt to communicate subjective experience to others, particularly in the context of a clinical interview. It presents the phenomenological interview as a way of effectively responding to these challenges, which may be especially important when attempting to understand the profound experiential transformations that take place in schizophrenia. Features of language experience in schizophrenia—including changes in interpersonal orientation, a sense of the arbitrariness of language, and a desire for faithful (...)
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  • Infallibilism and Easy Counter-Examples.Alex Davies - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (4):475-499.
    Infallibilism is commonly rejected because it is apparently subject to easy counter-examples. I describe a strategy that infallibilists can use to resist this objection. Because the sentences used in the counter-examples to express evidence and belief are context-sensitive, the infallibilist can insist that such counter-examples trade on a vacillation between different readings of these sentences. I describe what difficulties await those who try to produce counter-examples against which the proposed strategy is ineffective.
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  • Perceiving Mental States: Co-Presence and Constitution.Laura Danón & Daniel Kalpokas - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (2).
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  • Metaphysical Minimalism.Fritz J. McDonald - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (1):39-52.
    Properties and facts play a central role within metaphysics, yet there is no widely accepted account of what constitutes a property or a fact. Traditional conceptions of these metaphysical notions raise serious philosophical puzzles, making the existence of each seem dubious. Drawing on the minimalist theory of truth, I argue in favor of a minimalist conception of properties and facts. A minimalist theory of properties and facts explains these matters in terms of the acceptance of trivial schemas. To make the (...)
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  • Metafizički minimalizam.Fritz J. McDonald - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (1):39-52.
    Properties and facts play a central role within metaphysics, yet there is no widely accepted account of what constitutes a property or a fact. Traditional conceptions of these metaphysical notions raise serious philosophical puzzles, making the existence of each seem dubious. Drawing on the minimalist theory of truth, I argue in favor of a minimalist conception of properties and facts. A minimalist theory of properties and facts explains these matters in terms of the acceptance of trivial schemas. To make the (...)
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  • The Theory-Ladenness of Observations.John Weckert - 1985 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 17 (1):115.
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  • Training and Mastery of Techniques in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy: A Response to Michael Luntley.Jeff Stickney - 2008 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (5):678-694.
    Responding to Michael Luntley's article, ‘Learning, Empowerment and Judgement’, the author shows he cannot successfully make the following three moves: dissolve the analytic distinction between learning by training and learning by reasoning, while advocating the latter; diminish the role of training in Wittgenstein's philosophy, nor attribute to him a rationalist model of learning; and turn to empirical research as a way of solving the philosophical problems he addresses through Wittgenstein. Drawing on José Medina's analysis of the fundamental role of training (...)
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  • Philosophy as Undogmatic Procedure: Is Perfect Knowledge Good Enough?Stratos Ramoglou - 2013 - Philosophy of Management 12 (1):7-15.
    In the effort to defend and demonstrate the role of philosophy as an activity aiming at uncovering and questioning dogmas underlying our cognitive practices, the present article places under critical scrutiny the epistemic axiology informing organisation/management studies. That is, the plausibility of the largely unquestioned presumption that it is only the quest for truth that matters. This critical endeavour is effected by juxtaposing the conditions under which this would be the case, and in the prism of present conditions concludes that (...)
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  • A Plea for Rhees’ Reading of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: Is Grammar Conditioned by Certain Facts?Sergio Mota - 2017 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):77-102.
    This paper is more than a plea for Rhees’ reading of the work of Wittgenstein (particularly of On Certainty). My interest in Rhees’ interpretation lies on its resemblance with my own reading, on the one hand, and on its being (surprisingly) unmentioned by other interpreters, on the other. The two core aims of this paper focus on Rhees’ main ideas. First, I argue that although certain facts that are accepted beyond doubt belong to the method, which in turn is included (...)
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  • The Shared Perception of Social Contexts and Its Conditions for Possibility.Alessio Lo Giudice - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (3):395-415.
    Pragmatist reinterpretations of both deliberative-communicative theory and legal positivism point out the mentalist fallacy entailed by these prevalent models. I argue that pragmatist approaches imply analogous erroneous beliefs since they presuppose as given the shared perception of social contexts. Therefore they take for granted the shared interpretation of social problems and shared selection of common goals. Hence I advance the necessity of inquiring into the possibility conditions for a shared perception of social contexts. This would entail the organization of institutional (...)
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  • Saving the Strong Programme? A Critique of David Bloor’s Recent Work.Stephen Kemp - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):707-720.
    This article critically appraises David Bloor’s recent attempts to refute criticisms levelled at the Strong Programme’s social constructionist approach to scientific knowledge. Bloor has tried to argue, contrary to some critics, that the Strong Programme is not idealist in character, and it does not involve a challenge to the credibility of scientific knowledge. I argue that Bloor’s attempt to deflect the charge of idealism, which calls on the self-referential theory of social institutions, is partially successful. However, I suggest that although (...)
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  • Imagining Wittgenstein's Adolescent: The Educational Significance of Expression.Jeff Frank - 2012 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 44 (4):343-350.
    This paper highlights the philosophical and educational significance of expression in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. When the role of expression is highlighted, we will be better able to appreciate Stanley Cavell's insistence that: Wittgenstein offers ways of responding to, though not a refutation of, the problem of skepticism concerning other minds, and Wittgenstein's writing style is an important aspect of his philosophy. The educational implications of this appreciation will be explored with reference to the lives of adolescences.
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  • Does Meaning Evolove?Mark D. Roberts - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations.
    A common method of improving how well understood a theory is, is by comparing it to another theory which has been better developed. Radical interpretation is a theory which attempts to explain how communication has meaning. Radical interpretation is treated as another time dependent theory and compared to the time dependent theory of biological evolution. Several similarities and differences are uncovered. Biological evolution can be gradual or punctuated. Whether radical interpretation is gradual or punctuated depends on how the question is (...)
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  • Illusions of Affection: A Hyper-Illusory Account of Normative Valence.Mihailis Diamantis - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (5-6):6-29.
    This article challenges the orthodox position that some smells are pleasantly fragrant and some tactile sensations are painful. It proposes that the affective components of our experiences are a kind of illusion. Under this alternative picture, experiences that seem to have positive or negative affect never actually do. Rather, the affective component is hyper-illusory, a second-order misrepresentation of the way things actually seem to us. While perceptual hyperillusions have elicited scepticism in other contexts, affective hyperillusions can withstand common critiques. Focusing (...)
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  • Wittgenstein, Meta-Ethics and the Subject Matter of Moral Philosophy.Benjamin7 De Mesel - 2015 - Ethical Perspectives 22 (1):69-98.
    Several authors claim that, according to Wittgenstein, ethics has no particular subject matter and that, consequently, there is and can be no such thing as meta-ethics. These authors argue that, for Wittgenstein, a sentence’s belonging to ethics is a classification by use rather than by subject matter and that ethics is a pervasive dimension of life rather than a distinguishable region or strand of it. In this article, I will critically examine the reasons and arguments given for these claims. In (...)
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  • ‘Ontological’ Arguments From Experience: Daniel A. Dombrowski, Iris Murdoch, and the Nature of Divine Reality.Elizabeth D. Burns - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (4):459-480.
    Dombrowski and Murdoch offer versions of the ontological argument which aim to avoid two types of objection – those concerned with the nature of the divine, and those concerned with the move from an abstract concept to a mind-independent reality. For both, the nature of the concept of God/Good entails its instantiation, and both supply a supporting argument from experience. It is only Murdoch who successfully negotiates the transition from an abstract concept to the instantiation of that concept, however, and (...)
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  • Representation Re-Construed: Construal-Based Norms for Ascribing Natural Representations.Akagi Mikio - manuscript
    Many philosophers worry that cognitive scientists apply the concept REPRESENTATION too liberally. For example, William Ramsey argues that scientists often ascribe natural representations according to the “receptor notion,” a causal account with absurd consequences. I rehabilitate the receptor notion by augmenting it with a background condition: that natural representations are ascribed only to systems construed as organisms. This Organism-Receptor account rationalizes our existing conceptual practice, including the fact that scientists in fact reject Ramsey’s absurd consequences. The Organism-Receptor account raises some (...)
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  • Philosophical Commitments, Empirical Evidence, and Theoretical Psychology.Allen Pamela - 2015 - Theory and Psychology 25 (1):03-24.
    The philosophical or theoretical commitments informing psychological research are sometimes characterized, even by theoretical psychologists themselves, as nonempirical, outside the bounds of methodological consideration, and/or nonrational. We argue that this characterization is incoherent. We illustrate our concern by analogy with problematic appeals to Kuhn’s work that have been influential in theoretical psychology. Following the contemporary pragmatist tradition, we argue that our philosophical/theoretical commitments are part of our larger webs of belief, and that for any of these beliefs to have meaning (...)
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  • Neo-Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance.Theodore Sider - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):201–232.
    NeoFregeanism is an intriguing but elusive philosophy of mathematical existence. At crucial points, it goes cryptic and metaphorical. I want to put forward an interpretation of neoFregeanism—perhaps not one that actual neoFregeans will embrace—that makes sense of much of what they say. NeoFregeans should embrace quantifier variance.
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  • Necessary Truth and Grammatical Propositions.Hans Johann Glock - 2008 - In .
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  • In Defense of an End-Relational Account of Goodness.Brian Coffey - 2014 - Dissertation, University of California, Davis
    What is it exactly that we are attributing to a thing when we judge it to be good? According to the orthodox answer, at least in some cases when we judge that something is good we are attributing to it a monadic property. That is, good things are “just plain good.” I reject the orthodox view. In arguing against it, I begin with the idea that a plausible account of goodness must take seriously the intuitive claim that there is something (...)
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