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The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.details
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Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.details
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The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.Steven A. Sloman - 1996 - Psychological Bulletin 119 (1):3-22.details
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A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.Daniel Kahneman - 2003 - American Psychologist 58 (9):697.details
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Underestimating Self-control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and Toad.A. R. Mele - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):119-123.details
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Willing, Wanting, Waiting.Richard Holton - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Robot's Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin.Keith E. Stanovich - 2005 - University of Chicago Press.details
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The cognitive control of emotion.K. N. Ochsner & J. J. Gross - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):242-249.details
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Philosophical Questions about the Nature of Willpower.Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (9):793–805.details
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Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'.Neil Levy - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):134 - 155.details
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Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
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What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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The passions.Robert C. Solomon (ed.) - 1976 - Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.details
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Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):645-665.details
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Underestimating self-control: Kennett and Smith on frog and toad.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):119–123.details
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The Humean theory of motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.details
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Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.details
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Control, responsibility, and moral assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.details
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Synchronic self-control revisited: Frog and toad shape up.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):305–310.details
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Motivational strength.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Noûs 32 (1):23-36.details
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Free action and free will.Gary Watson - 1987 - Mind 96 (April):154-72.details
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Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.details
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Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Hugh J. McCann & M. E. Bratman - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):230.details
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The Passions.Robert Solomon - 1976 - Noûs 12 (1):78-81.details
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A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification: Dynamics of willpower.Janet Metcalfe & Walter Mischel - 1999 - Psychological Review 106 (1):3-19.details
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Synchronic Self-control is Always Non-actional.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):123-131.details
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Frog and Toad lose control.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63-73.details
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Doing What One Wants Less: A Reappraisal of the Law of Desire.Randolph Clarke - 1994 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):1-11.details
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Neuroeconomics: cross-currents in research on decision-making.Alan G. Sanfey, George Loewenstein, Samuel M. McClure & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):108-116.details
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Synchronic self-control is always non-actional.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):123–131.details
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Frog and toad lose control.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63–73.details
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