Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Hypothetical Consent and the Value (s) of Autonomy.David Enoch - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):6-36.
    Hypothetical consent is puzzling. On the one hand, it seems to make a moral difference across a wide range of cases. On the other hand, there seem to be principled reasons to think that it cannot. In this article I put forward reasonably precise formulations of these general suspicions regarding hypothetical consent; I draw several distinctions regarding the ways in which hypothetical consent may make a moral difference; I distinguish between two autonomy-related concerns, nonalienation and sovereignty; and, utilizing these distinctions, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • In Solidarity with the Imprudent: A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism.Shlomi Segall - 2007 - Social Theory and Practice 33 (2):177-198.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • In Solidarity with the Imprudent: A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism.Shlomi Segall - 2007 - Social Theory and Practice 33 (2):177-198.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Luck and Equality: A Reply to Hurley. [REVIEW]G. A. Cohen - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):439 - 446.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality.Kok-Chor Tan - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Kok-Chor Tan addresses three key questions in political philosophy: Where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? He argues for an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck-egalitarian ideal of why equality matters, and a global scope for distributive justice.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • The Right to Be Presumed Innocent.Hamish Stewart - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):407-420.
    The presumption of innocence has often been understood as a doctrine that can be explained primarily by instrumental concerns relating to accurate fact-finding in the criminal trial and that has few if any implications outside the trial itself. In this paper, I argue, in contrast, that in a liberal legal order everyone has a right to be presumed innocent simply in virtue of being a person. Every person has a right not to be subjected to criminal punishment unless and until (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice.G. A. Cohen - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (1):3-30.
    The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected]
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   115 citations  
  • Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawisian Political Philosophy.Samuel Freeman - 2006 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Samuel Freeman was a student of the influential philosopher John Rawls, he has edited numerous books dedicated to Rawls' work and is arguably Rawls' foremost interpreter. This volume collects new and previously published articles by Freeman on Rawls. Among other things, Freeman places Rawls within historical context in the social contract tradition, and thoughtfully addresses criticisms of this position. Not only is Freeman a leading authority on Rawls, but he is an excellent thinker in his own right, and these articles (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • Hurley on Egalitarianism and the Luck-Neutralizing Aim.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2005 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (2):249-265.
    s admirable new book, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge , brings together recent developments in the fields of responsibility and egalitarian justice. This article focuses on Hurley’s critique of luck-neutralizing egalitarianism. The article concludes that the bad-luck-neutralizing aim serves better as a justificatory basis for egalitarianism than the more general luck-neutralizing aim. Since the former does not simply assume that we should aim for equality, Hurley has not demonstrated (nor indeed does she claim to have shown) that this concern cannot form (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice.Nir Eyal - 2006 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (1):1-19.
    This article argues that, in its standard formulation, luck-egalitarianism is false. In particular, I show that disadvantages that result from perfectly free choice can constitute egalitarian injustice. I also propose a modified formulation of luck-egalitarianism that would withstand my criticism. One merit of the modification is that it helps us to reconcile widespread intuitions about distributive justice with equally widespread intuitions about punitive justice.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Equality or Priority?Derek Parfit - 2002 - In Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 81-125.
    One of the central debates within contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy concerns how to formulate an egalitarian theory of distributive justice which gives coherent expression to egalitarian convictions and withstands the most powerful anti-egalitarian objections. This book brings together many of the key contributions to that debate by some of the world’s leading political philosophers: Richard Arneson, G.A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, and Larry Temkin.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   189 citations  
  • Equality, Priority, and the Levelling-Down Objection.Larry Temkin - 2000 - In Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality. Macmillan. pp. 126-61.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • Brute Luck Equality and Desert.Peter Vallentyne - 2003 - In Sabrina Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press. pp. 169--185.
    In recent years, interest in desert-based theories of justice has increased, and this seems to represent a challenge to equality-based theories of justice.[i] The best distribution of outcomeadvantage with respect to desert, after all, need not be the most equal distribution of outcomeadvantage. Some individuals may deserve more than others. Outcome egalitarianism is, however, implausible, and so the conflict of outcome desert with outcome equality is of little significance.[ii] Most contemporary versions of egalitarianism are concerned with neutralizing the differential effects (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Equality.Richard Wollheim & Isaiah Berlin - 1956 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56:281--326.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Hypothetical Consent and Justification.Cynthia A. Stark - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (6):313.
    Hypothetical contracts have been said to be not worth the paper they are not written on. This paper defends hypothetical consent theories of justice, such as Rawls's, against the view that they lack justificatory power. I argue that while hypothetical consent cannot generate political obligation, it can generate political legitimacy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • The Pareto Argument and Inequality.Patrick Shaw - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):353-368.
    The Pareto argument for inequality holds that any change from a position of equality to one of inequality is justified so long as everyone benefits from the change. G.A. Cohen criticizes this argument (which he attributes to Rawls) on the ground that changes can normally be found which preserve both equality and Pareto‐efficiency. However, this does not resolve the basic conflict between the two desiderata. Strong egalitarians hold that Pareto changes are not for the better if they increase inequality too (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Justice, Luck, and Knowledge.S. L. Hurley - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):433-438.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Justice, Luck, and Knowledge.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):361-365.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources.Ronald Dworkin - 1981 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (4):283 - 345.
    The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected]
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   292 citations  
  • The Pareto Argument for Inequality*: G. A. COHEN.G. A. Cohen - 1995 - Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1):160-185.
    Some ways of defending inequality against the charge that it is unjust require premises that egalitarians find easy to dismiss—statements, for example, about the contrasting deserts and/or entitlements of unequally placed people. But a defense of inequality suggested by John Rawls and elaborated by Brian Barry has often proved irresistible even to people of egalitarian outlook. The persuasive power of this defense of inequality has helped to drive authentic egalitarianism, of an old-fashioned, uncompromising kind, out of contemporary political philosophy. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Equality.R. W. Wollheim - 1956 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56:281.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations