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Brute luck equality and desert

In Sabrina Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press. pp. 169--185 (2003)

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  1. Desert and the Control Asymmetry.David Alm - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):361 - 375.
    According to what we could call the "liberal" theory of distributive justice, people do not deserve the money they are able to make in the market for contributing to the economy. Yet the standard arguments for that view, which center on the fact that persons have very limited control over the size of their contributions, would also seem to imply that persons cannot deserve admiration, appreciation, esteem, praise and so on for these and other contributions. The control asymmetry is this: (...)
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  • Tough Luck and Tough Choices: Applying Luck Egalitarianism to Oral Health.Andreas Albertsen - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (3):342-362.
    Luck egalitarianism is often taken to task for its alleged harsh implications. For example, it may seem to imply a policy of nonassistance toward uninsured reckless drivers who suffer injuries. Luck egalitarians respond to such objections partly by pointing to a number of factors pertaining to the cases being debated, which suggests that their stance is less inattentive to the plight of the victims than it might seem at first. However, the strategy leaves some cases in which the attribution of (...)
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  • Unjust Equalities.Andreas Albertsen & Sören Flinch Midtgaard - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):335-346.
    In the luck egalitarian literature, one influential formulation of luck egalitarianism does not specify whether equalities that do not reflect people’s equivalent exercises of responsibility are bad with regard to inequality. This equivocation gives rise to two competing versions of luck egalitarianism: asymmetrical and symmetrical luck egalitarianism. According to the former, while inequalities due to luck are unjust, equalities due to luck are not necessarily so. The latter view, by contrast, affirms the undesirability of equalities as well as inequalities insofar (...)
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  • Choices, Consequences and Desert.Teun J. Dekker - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):109 – 126.
    It is a commonly held position in the literature on distributive justice that choices individuals make from an equalized background may lead to inequalities of outcome. This raises the question of how to assign consequences to particular types of behaviour. Theories of justice based on the concept of moral responsibility offer considerable guidance as to how society should be structured, but they rarely address the question of what the consequences of making a particular choice should be. To fill this lacuna, (...)
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  • Chance, Merit, and Economic Inequality: Rethinking Distributive Justice and the Principle of Desert.Joseph de la Torre Dwyer - 2019 - Springer Verlag.
    This book develops a novel approach to distributive justice by building a theory based on a concept of desert. As a work of applied political theory, it presents a simple but powerful theoretical argument and a detailed proposal to eliminate unmerited inequality, poverty, and economic immobility, speaking to the underlying moral principles of both progressives who already support egalitarian measures and also conservatives who have previously rejected egalitarianism on the grounds of individual freedom, personal responsibility, hard work, or economic efficiency. (...)
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  • Why Egalitarians Should Not Care About Equality.Shlomi Segall - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):507 - 519.
    Can outcome equality (say, in welfare) ever be unjust? Despite the extensive inquiry into the nature of luck egalitarianism in recent years, this question is curiously under-explored. Leading luck egalitarians pay little attention to the issue of unjust equalities, and when they do, they appear not to speak in one voice. To facilitate the inquiry into the potential injustice of equalities, the paper introduces two rival interpretations of egalitarianism: the responsibility view, which may condemn equalities as unjust (when they reflect (...)
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  • Rethinking the Unfair Advantage Argument.Tena Thau - 2021 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 48 (1):63-81.
    Athletes who flout doping bans are generally thought to have gained an unfair advantage. In this paper, I critically examine this view. I begin by defending an effort-based account of desert in spo...
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  • Justice, Markets, and the Family: An Interview with Serena Olsaretti.Serena Olsaretti - 2016 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 9 (2):181.
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  • The Presumption of Equality.Cynthia Stark - 2018 - Law. Ethics and Philosophy 6:7-27.
    Many distributive egalitarians do not endorse strict equality of goods. Rather, they treat an equal division as having a special status such that departures from equality must be justified. They claim, then, that an equal division is “presumptively” just. Though the idea that equality is presumptively just and that departures from it may be just has intuitive appeal, making a case for this idea proves difficult. I argue, first, that extant “presumption arguments” are unsound. Second, I distill two general philosophical (...)
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  • Should Desert Replace Equality? Replies to Kagan.by Michael Weber - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (3).
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  • Institutions and the Normativity of Desert.Sorin Baiasu - 2007 - Contemporary Political Theory 6 (2):175-195.
    The question of whether desert depends on institutions or institutions on desert continues to divide politicians and political theorists, particularly in disputes over the justification of the welfare state. Even though it is a significant question with direct relevance for issues of economic justice, little has been done so far to evaluate the various positions in dispute and to make explicit the concepts involved. In this paper, I first present the main senses in which the concepts of desert, dependence and (...)
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  • Can Comparative Desert Do Without Equality?Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (2):189-205.
    In the article ‘Equality and Desert,’ Shelly Kagan rejects the principle of equality as an arbiter of distributive justice. He claims instead that all of our intuitions about distributive justice that are thought to support some principle of equality can be captured under the principle of desert. I argue that Kagan's claim fails because, in cashing out his notion of desert, Kagan makes tacit appeal to the principle of equality.
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  • Prioritarianism: Room for Desert?Matthew D. Adler - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):172-197.
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  • Desert.Owen McLeod - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Equality of Opportunity.Richard Arneson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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