A major controversy in the study of the "Analects" has been over the relation between two central concepts, ren (humanity, human excellence) and li (rites, rituals of propriety). Confucius seems to have said inconsistent things about this relation. Some passages appear to suggest that ren is more fundamental than li, while others seem to imply the contrary. It is therefore not surprising that there have been different interpretations and characterizations of this relation. Using the analogy of language grammar and mastery (...) of a language, it is proposed here that we should understand li as a cultural grammar and ren as the mastery of a culture. In this account, society cultivates its members through li toward the goal of ren, and persons of ren manifest their human excellence through their practice of li. (shrink)

This essay compares Aristotle's conception of virtue with Confucius' key notion of ren (which has also been interpreted as "virtue") against the background of the revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics in the West and of Confucianism in the East. It argues that while Aristotle's virtue hinges on practical wisdom, Confucius' ren focuses on filial love, and on this basis interprets the respective theoretical merits and weaknesses of these two philosophers. The study is intended to show how Confucius can contribute to (...) contemporary virtue ethics. (shrink)

This essay critically examines a suggestion proposed by some Confucianists that Confucianism and Care Ethics share striking similarities and that feminism in Confucian societies might take “a new form of Confucianism.” Aspects of Confucianism and Care Ethics that allegedly converge are examined, including the emphasis on human relationships, and it is argued that while these two perspectives share certain surface similarities, moral injunctions entailed by their respective ideals of ren and caring are not merely distinctive but in fact incompatible.

The traditional Christian version of the Golden Rule, some modern philosophical reformulations, and the Confucian version are compared. It is argued that the Confucian version, in contrast with its Western parallels, is based on shu as bodily or somatic interpersonal care and love, and thus should be understood first of all as a human "way" rather than as a divine rule, a way grounded in the human heart and a way for the human community.

The ideology about the relation between goodness and beauty for Confucius and the early Confucians is the continuation of the aesthetic tradition long before Confucius’s time, which sees more value in Yuejiao, namely, music/beauty education, than in Lijiao, Moral education. No doubt Confucius’s aesthetic idea is featured as the juxtaposition of Li and Yue, goodness and beauty. But we must not forget that Confucius, taking himself as a preserver of the sages’ tradition, personally values Yue (music/beauty) over Li (ritual/moral). It (...) is in this context that we argue that taking the unity of beauty and goodness as a Confucian aesthetic feature is a misinterpretation of his teaching and is poles apart from the ancient Chinese aesthetic tradition and from Confucius’ aesthetics. (shrink)

In memory of Anthony C. Yu who read and commented on an early version of this article.In the comparative philosophy of art, there is a widely accepted view that, while classical Western aesthetic theory emphasizes the unity of beauty and truth, classical Chinese aesthetic theory focuses on the unity of beauty and goodness. Indeed, one striking feature of Chinese aesthetics is its emphasis on moral education and didacticism. Although Western tradition also emphasizes the importance of moral education in art as (...) early as Plato, there had appeared, after Horace and Philip Sidney, a dualist paradigm, which, while giving emphasis to both didacticism and entertainment, tends to put priority on the latter. By.. (shrink)

: For the purposes of interpretation and constructive engagement, the structure and content of Confucius' version of the Golden Rule (CGR) is examined by elaborating its three dimensions as suggested in the Analects. It is argued that the CGR, which consists of two intertwined central ideas in Confucius' ethics, shu and zhong, involves three interdependent and complementary dimensions: (1) the methodological (i.e., the methodological aspect of shu), which consists of the principles of reversibility and extensibility; (2) the internal starting point (...) (i.e., the substantial aspect of shu), which somehow points to the fundamental virtue ren and constitutes the internal starting point for applying the methodological principles of the CGR; and (3) the external starting point (i.e., zhong as one's sincere and devoted commitment to those established social constituents specified by the li, regardless of the involved moral recipient's social status), which constitutes the external starting point for applying the methodological principles of the CGR. (shrink)

Leong Chan takes on Loubna El Amine regarding the relation between social stability and cultivation of virtue in classical Confucianism. Against El Amine’s argument that social and political order is the ideal and sole end of classical Confucian political teachings, Chan defends a reading of classical Confucian political teachings as aiming also at virtue. Two central claims of El Amine’s position, he argues, falter: that political order is the ruler’s ultimate end, and that a ruler only values virtues in the (...) people insofar as they contribute to upholding order. Chan’s line of argument then turns on El Amine’s claim that order is an end in itself begging the question. What makes order so valuable? Chan suggests that Confucians value social and political order not intrinsically but rather on the external grounds that stability promotes welfare. Chan proposes that a more accurate reading of classical Confucianism recognizes the tripartite interdependence of political order with welfare and virtue. These three values are mutually supportive and even mutually constitutive in that each promotes and serves the other two—and we can thus abandon means-end dichotomies altogether. (shrink)