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  1. Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism.Seana Shiffrin - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):481-524.
    The power to promise is morally fundamental and does not, at its foundation, derive from moral principles that govern our use of conventions. Of course, many features of promising have conventional components—including which words, gestures, or conditions of silence create commitments. What is really at issue between conventionalists and nonconventionalists is whether the basic moral relation of promissory commitment derives from the moral principles that govern our use of social conventions. Other nonconventionalist accounts make problematic concessions to the conventionalist's core (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility and "Moral Luck".Brian Rosebury - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):499-524.
    This paper argues that "moral luck", understood as a susceptibility of moral desert to lucky or unlucky outcomes, does not exist. The argument turns on the claim that epistemic inquiry is an indissoluble part of moral responsibility, and that judgment on the moral decision making of others should and can adjust for this fact; test cases which aim to isolate moral dilemmas from epistemic consideration misrepresent our moral experience. If the phenomena believed by some philosophers to exemplify the need to (...)
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  • In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Routledge.
    There is a contradiction in our ideas about moral responsibility. In one strand of our thinking, we believe that a person can become more blameworthy by luck. Consider some examples in order to make that idea concrete. Two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in the same way, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would each freely take a bribe if one were offered. By luck of the courthouse draw, only one judge is offered a (...)
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  • Resultant Luck.Carolina Sartorio - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):63-86.
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  • Sharing Responsibility.Larry May - 1996 - University of Chicago Press.
    Are individuals responsible for the consequences of actions taken by their community? What about their community's inaction or its attitudes? In this innovative book, Larry May departs from the traditional Western view that moral responsibility is limited to the consequences of overt individual action. Drawing on the insights of Arendt, Jaspers, and Sartre, he argues that even when individuals are not direct participants, they share responsibility for various harms perpetrated by their communities.
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  • Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
    Death.--The absurd.--Moral luck.--Sexual perversion.--War and massacre.--Ruthlessness in public life.--The policy of preference.--Equality.--The fragmentation of value.--Ethics without biology.--Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness.--What is it like to be a bat?--Panpsychism.--Subjective and objective.
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  • The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View.Raimo Tuomela - 2007 - Oup Usa.
    The Philosophy of Sociality offers new ideas and conceptual tools for philosophers and social scientists in their analysis of the social world.
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  • A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society.Margaret Gilbert - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Margaret Gilbert offers an incisive new approach to a classic problem of political philosophy: when and why should I do what the law tells me to do? Do I have special obligations to conform to the laws of my own country and if so, why? In what sense, if any, must I fight in wars in which my country is engaged, if ordered to do so, or suffer the penalty for law-breaking the law imposes - including the death penalty? Gilbert's (...)
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  • Shaping the Normative Landscape.David Owens - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Shaping the Normative Landscape is an investigation of the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. David Owens shows that these are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative environment.
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  • Moral Luck Defended.Nathan Hanna - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):683-698.
    I argue that there is moral luck, i.e., that facts beyond our control can affect how laudable or culpable we are.
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  • Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency.Margaret Urban Walker - 1991 - Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2):14-27.
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  • Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individuals that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should explain the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable on the model of individual agents. Group Agency offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, to a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences. (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts.Tracy Isaacs - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Intentional collective action -- Collective moral responsibility -- Collective guilt -- Individual responsibility for (and in) collective wrongs -- Collective obligation, individual obligation, and individual moral responsibility -- Individual moral responsibility in wrongful social practice.
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  • The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
    Human beings have the unique ability to view the world in a detached way: We can think about the world in terms that transcend our own experience or interest, and consider the world from a vantage point that is, in Nagel's words, "nowhere in particular". At the same time, each of us is a particular person in a particular place, each with his own "personal" view of the world, a view that we can recognize as just one aspect of the (...)
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  • Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age.Christopher Kutz - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    We live in a morally flawed world. Our lives are complicated by what other people do, and by the harms that flow from our social, economic and political institutions. Our relations as individuals to these collective harms constitute the domain of complicity. This book examines the relationship between collective responsibility and individual guilt. It presents a rigorous philosophical account of the nature of our relations to the social groups in which we participate, and uses that account in a discussion of (...)
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  • Taking Luck Seriously.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (11):553-576.
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  • We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency.Deborah Tollefsen & Shaun Gallagher - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2):95-110.
    The basic approach to understanding shared agency has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have some reason for (...)
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  • Luck and Desert.Norvin Richards - 1986 - Mind 95 (378):198-209.
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  • Moral Luck and Collectives.Gregory Mellema - 1997 - Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (3):144-152.
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  • Individual and Collective Responsibility.Andrew C. Khoury - 2017 - In Zachary J. Goldberg (ed.), Reflections on Ethics and Responsibility: Essays in Honor of Peter A. French. Springer. pp. 1-20.
    Building on Peter French’s important work, this chapter draws three distinctions that arise in the context of attributions of moral responsibility, understood as the extent to which an agent is blameworthy or praiseworthy. First, the subject of an attribution of responsibility may be an individual agent or a collective agent. Second, the object of the responsibility attribution may be an individual action (or consequence) or a collective action (or consequence). The third distinction concerns the temporal dimension of the responsibility attribution. (...)
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  • The Corporation as a Moral Person.Peter A. French - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (3):207 - 215.
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  • Dynamics of Sociality.Michael E. Bratman - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):1–15.
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  • Accountability and Intervening Agency: An Asymmetry Between Upstream and Downstream Actors.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (1):110-114.
    Suppose someone (P1) does something that is wrongful only in virtue of the risk that it will enable another person (P2) to commit a wrongdoing. Suppose further that P1’s conduct does indeed turn out to enable P2’s wrongdoing. The resulting wrong is agentially mediated: P1 is an enabling agent and P2 is an intervening agent. Whereas the literature on intervening agency focuses on whether P2’s status as an intervening agent makes P1’s conduct less bad, I turn this issue on its (...)
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