- Group Agents and Their Responsibility.Raimo Tuomela & Pekka Mäkelä - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):299-316.details
|
|
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Introduction: Empathy and Collective Intentionality—The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein.Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):445-461.details
|
|
(1 other version)What is it Like to be a Group Agent?Christian List - 2015 - Noûs:295-319.details
|
|
Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.details
|
|
How Institutions Work in Shared Intentionality and ‘We-Mode’ Social Cognition.Jeppe Sinding Jensen - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):301-312.details
|
|
Group knowledge: a real-world approach.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):813-839.details
|
|
If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.details
|
|
Social Objects Without Intentions.Brian Epstein - 2013 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 53-68.details
|
|
Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.Christian List - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1601-1622.details
|
|
(3 other versions)The Methodology of Political Theory.Christian List & Laura Valentini - 2016 - In Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation.Christian List & Kai Spiekermann - 2013 - American Political Science Review 107 (4):629-643.details
|
|
Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present.Dermot Moran - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Collective Fallacy: The Possibility of Irreducibly Collective Action Without Corresponding Collective Moral Responsibility.Marcus Hedahl - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (3):283-300.details
|
|
How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis.Thomas Szanto - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):99-120.details
|
|
Hegel’s “Objective Spirit”, extended mind, and the institutional nature of economic action.Ivan A. Boldyrev & Carsten Herrmann-Pillath - 2013 - Mind and Society 12 (2):177-202.details
|
|
Philosophical intervention and cross-disciplinary science: the story of the Toolbox Project.Michael O'Rourke & Stephen J. Crowley - 2013 - Synthese 190 (11):1937-1954.details
|
|
Collective Acceptance and the Is-Ought Argument.Frank Hindriks - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):465-480.details
|
|
Reasoning About Collectively Accepted Group Beliefs.Raul Hakli & Sara Negri - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (4):531-555.details
|
|
Framing Joint Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.details
|
|
On the Production and Ramification of Cooperation: The Cooperation Afforder with Framing Hypothesis.Steven O. Kimbrough - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):111-136.details
|
|
The aggregation of propositional attitudes: Towards a general theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.details
|
|
Joint intention, we-mode and I-mode.Raimo Tuomela - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.details
|
|
On the possibility of group knowledge without belief.Raul Hakli - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266.details
|
|
Reflective Naturalism.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Synthese 203 (13):1-21.details
|
|
On the social nature of artefacts.Tim Juvshik - 2024 - Theoria 89 (6):910-932.details
|
|
From we-mode to role-mode.Michael Schmitz - 2023 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez & Rachael Mellin (eds.), Tuomela on Sociality. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 177-200.details
|
|
Why the extended mind is nothing special but is central.Giulio Ongaro, Doug Hardman & Ivan Deschenaux - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (4):841-863.details
|
|
Group Lies and the Narrative Constraint.Säde Hormio - forthcoming - Episteme 19 (First View):1-20.details
|
|
Instituting thought: Three paradigms of political ontology.Onni Hirvonen - 2023 - Contemporary Political Theory 22 (1):26-29.details
|
|
What Roles Do Emotions Play in Morality?Antti Kauppinen - 2024 - In Andrea Scarantino (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. Routledge.details
|
|
Social epistemological conception of delusion.Alessandro Salice & Kengo Miyazono - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1831-1851.details
|
|
Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence.Christian List - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology (4):1-30.details
|
|
Normas sociales.Hugo Viciana - forthcoming - Enciclopedia Online de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica.details
|
|
Social kinds are essentially mind-dependent.Rebecca Mason - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):3975-3994.details
|
|
What it Might Be like to Be a Group Agent.Max F. Kramer - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):437-447.details
|
|
Modest Sociality, Minimal Cooperation and Natural Intersubjectivity.Michael Wilby - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Springer. pp. 127-148.details
|
|
Group minds as extended minds.Keith Raymond Harris - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (3):1-17.details
|
|
Proprietary Reasons and Joint Action.Abraham Roth - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Springer. pp. 169-180.details
|
|
The Freedom(s) within Collective Agency: Tuomela and Sartre.Basil Vassilicos - 2020 - Bulletin D’Analyse Phénoménologique 2 (XVI):112-137.details
|
|
Social Ontology and Social Normativity.Brian Donohue - 2020 - Dissertation, University at Buffalodetails
|
|
Emotions, Reasons, and Norms.Evan Simpson - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):72-97.details
|
|
Intentional cooperation and acting as part of a single body.Olle Blomberg - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):264-284.details
|
|
Intercorporeity and the first-person plural in Merleau-Ponty.Philip J. Walsh - 2019 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):21-47.details
|
|
(1 other version)The meaning of ‘populism’.Axel Mueller - 2019 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 45 (9-10):1025-1057.details
|
|
Interpersonal Moral Luck and Normative Entanglement.Daniel Story - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:601-616.details
|
|
Culpable ignorance in a collective setting.Säde Hormio - 2018 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 94:7-34.details
|
|
Joint know-how.Jonathan Birch - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3329–3352.details
|
|
Marginal participation, complicity, and agnotology: What climate change can teach us about individual and collective responsibility.Säde Hormio - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Helsinkidetails
|
|
Collective Intentionality in Non-Human Animals.Robert A. Wilson - 2017 - In Marija Jankovic and Kirk Ludwig (ed.), Routledge Handbook on Collective Intentionality. pp. 420-432.details
|
|